As of today, no team thinks Barry Bonds can help them win. But to believe that, a team has to put aside a lot of evidence to the contrary. Last season, Bonds batted .276/.480/.565. Had he qualified — he was 25 plate appearances short — he would have led the National League in OBP by a wide margin and finished in the top ten in slugging. In fact, using the rule that one can add an 0-for-25 to his stats, he actually dominated the NL in OBP.
Of course, a chunk of Bonds’s OBP came from the intentional walks he received, 43 last season. You can argue that this disproportionately inflates his OBP, a function less of Bonds’s abilities and more of Brian Sabean’s inability to find hitters better than Ray Durham and Bengie Molina to hit behind him. So lop 35 intentional walks off of Bonds’s total, and give him the average performance in his other at-bats in those 35 times up. That makes him a .276/.439/.565 hitter, assuming he drew no walks in that time and saw the same distribution of lefty and righty pitchers, both ungenerous assumptions. He’d pick up a couple of homers, and almost certainly more than a couple RBI, both of which would inflate his value to those who think RBI an indication of value.
Then again, those intentional walks tell you more about Bonds’s skills than anything else in his stat line. Managers all think he’s good enough to not bother trying to get out nearly ten percent of the time. How can a hitter that good not warrant a spot in someone’s lineup? With a VORP of 55.2, he was 19th in all of MLB. There is no argument that Bonds is not a championship-caliber hitter. He remains one of the very best in the game on a per-at-bat basis.
What are the objections to signing Bonds? His baserunning and defense have been attacked viciously. It is clear that his troublesome knees have slowed him down as he ages; he’s not the speedster he was in his prime. He doesn’t steal many bases any longer, yet he’s nearly perfect when he does: 8-for-8 since 2006, 59-for-70 since 1999. Contrary to what one might read in the papers, I’ve seen no baserunning study showing he’s one of the worst baserunners in the game. Harping on his baserunning deficiencies reflects bias, not study.
Bonds’s defense, like his baserunning, looks worse than it actually is. One legitimate criticism is of Bonds’s arm, which is terrible. Then again, that has little to do with age; Bonds couldn’t throw when he was a Pirate able to play center field. Bonds’s defense, arm included, is a negative, but does it cost his team more than a win in a season? He is not the worst left fielder in the majors, with regulars such as Adam Dunn, Raul Ibanez, Luis Gonzalez, and Pat Burrell out there. So Bonds puts up a lot of runs at the plate, and gives back some with his baserunning and defense. His performance in those areas is not optimal, but not unusually so, and no more so than the way baserunning and defense have been weak spots for older hitters since Ty Cobb was an Athletic.
Despite the persistent notion that Bonds is a designated hitter, he ranked in the top twenty in innings played in left field each of the past two seasons, and for the two years combined, he was 13th. Among the players ahead of him by innings are the aforementioned defensive liabilities and other so-so defenders such as Jason Bay and Manny Ramirez. Left field, quite clearly, is not the place where teams worry so much about defense. So raising the issue with Bonds, who is on the field a reasonable amount, played the position no more poorly than many of his peers, and outhit them all, is ridiculous. Bonds’s defense is not a reason not to sign him.
Bonds’s actual playing time, substantial in each of the last two seasons, is actually underestimating how much he could play for an American League team. With the ability to DH at least half the time, Bonds would be able to play at least as often as he has the past two seasons. Bonds’s 2006-07 performance underestimates what he could do for an AL team. Less time on the field could save his legs, enabling him to run and field better when he is in left.
Another objection is money. We have no idea what amount Bonds is looking for. But how much ground should Bonds give in negotiation? He was a more valuable player last season than Andrew Jones, who will make $18 million this season. He was better than Eric Gagne, who will make $10 million. Look at what a mediocrity, such as Juan Pierre, is paid. In a market that values inferior players like Pierre at eight figures a year and more, how can it be that a league leader in OBP has outlandish demands? At his 2007 price ($15.5 million), Bonds is a reasonable buy. At $10 million he’s a bargain.
A better reason for a prospective employer’s wariness is the uncertainty over Bonds’s perjury-and-obstruction-of-justice trial. From a contractual standpoint, this is handled easily: the contract becomes null in the event of a conviction. Beyond that, given the pace of the prosecution thus far, the government’s need for more “typos” that bias the jury pool, and Bonds’s lawyers’ need to make motions to counter the typos, Bonds will be available for the 2008 season.
Bonds is perceived as unpopular among baseball fans, and carries the stigma of his assumed steroid use with him. The first is a problem, although one that is a complicated issue going back 20 years, and clearly prevents some teams that protect their image as family-friendly from getting involved. However, the steroid thing, like Bonds’s baserunning and defense, should be a non-factor. Players have been suspended for performance-enhancing drug (PED) use and then signed to multi-year, multi-million-dollar contracts. With all the names mentioned in the Mitchell Report, and all the subsequent mea culpas, no players have found themselves released, sued, or blacklisted. Steroid use, proven or otherwise, is simply not grounds for not employing a baseball player. Holding out on Bonds for that reason is hamstringing your team for no reason.
The steroid issue leads to one other justification for not signing Bonds: that his presence creates a circus atmosphere around the team. The lack of this atmosphere is a core element in the “happy Giants” stories that floated around in the press in February. But the media circus that accompanies Bonds is just that: a media circus. If there’s anything we know about Barry Bonds, it’s that he doesn’t enjoy talking to the media. He doesn’t invite them to cover him, he certainly doesn’t provide good quotes, and he doesn’t make the media’s job easy. Nevertheless, we’ve been treated to a decade of stories about how Bonds doesn’t like the media and is a big meanie to its members. This is akin to the issues discussed above, raising the idea that Bonds creates a media circus far above its importance. Worse, the rationale blames Bonds for this, when he’s the last person who wants a “circus” atmosphere.
Barry Bonds is a championship-caliber baseball player, better at getting on base and hitting for power than all but a few hitters in the game. The things he doesn’t do well — running, throwing, and covering ground in left field — lessen his value, but do not come close to negating it. He would be one of the 40 most productive players in the NL, and with an AL team his playing time and productivity would increase. Teams have behaved as if winning is what matters in their dealings with bad guys — count the spousal abuse charges as well as the PED cases. Drawing a line at Bonds is absurd when you consider what he brings to a team.