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“Content From Directly Explanatory Correlational Information”
11:45 Coffee Break
“The Explanatory Significance of Representation: Burge, Rescorla and Schulte on Teleosemantics”
13:30 Lunch
“TBA”
20:00 Dinner
December 2nd
9:15 Cailin O’Connor (University of California)
“Games and Kinds”
“Natural information and naturalistic intentionality”
11:45 Coffee Break
“Animal signals, acquisition conditions and the explanation of behaviour”
13:30 Lunch
“On the very idea of a (natural) intentional relation”
“From Brain Circuits to Bridging”
There is no registration fee but, if you are planning to attend, please let us know.
Best,
from Friday, 5 July 2013 to Saturday, 6 July 2013 University of Fribourg (Switzerland)
Workshop with Karen Neander (Duke University)
“The Natural and the Normative”
Friday, 5th of July, 09:30 – 18:30 and Saturday, 6th of July, 09:00 – 18:00
University of Fribourg, Miséricorde, Salle Jäggi (MIS04 4112)
Organizer: Prof. Markus Wild, Rebekka Hufendiek, Pietro Snider
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Please register by sending a message to markus.wild@unifr.ch
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Friday, 5.6.2013, Salle Jaeggi (room 4112)
09:30-10:00 Karen Neander
Introduction
10:00-11:00 Stephan Schmid (Berlin)
Brentano’s Problem
11:15-12:15 Lena Kästner (Bochum)
Locating Content in Science
14:00-15:00 Raphael Scholl (Bern)
The (SE) Functional Analysis
15:00-16:00 Norman Hammel (Gießen)
The Origins of Content
15:30-17:30 Rebekka Hufendiek (Fribourg)
Norms of Nature
17:30-18:30 Christian Steiner (Zürich) & André Wunder (Zürich)
Functions Update
Saturday, 6.7.2013, Salle Jaeggi (room 4112)
09:00-10:00 Pietro Snider (Fribourg)
Simple Minds
10:15-11:15 Tobias Huber (Basel)
Response Functions
11:15-12:15 Fabian Hundertmark (Bielefeld)
Content Determinacy Challenges
13:30-14:30 Peter Schulte (Bielefeld)
Content Determinacy Challenges
14:30-15:30 Marc Artiga (Barcelona)
Inner Analogs
16:00-17:00 Markus Wild (Fribourg)
Becoming Abstracted
17:00-18:00 Ulrike Pompe-Alama (Stuttgart)
Concepts and Conceptions
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Contents of Karen Neander’s Book
1. Brentano’s Problem (introduces the traditional philosophical problem of intentionality and gives an overview of what is to come)
2. Locating Content in Science (introduces the related problem concerning representation in philosophy of science, using as an example some research into a visual deficit)
3. The (SE) Functional Analysis (aims to explain the role of the ‘normative’ and teleonomic functions in operational explanations in physiology)
4. The Origins of Content (argues that mental content arises as a theoretical entity in science in talk about information processing/carrying functions)
5. Norms of Nature (argues that psychosemantic norms are not genuinely prescriptive and so it is not a problem if functional norms are not genuinely prescriptive)
6. Functions Update (summarizes and updates my view on functions)
7. Simple Minds (closely based on my “Content for Cognitive Science”, concerns toads and argues for stimulus-based rather than benefit-based visual contents)
8. Response Functions (argues that there can be functions to respond to something and that there can be information carrying functions on a causal construal of information)
9. The Content Determinacy Challenges (explains how a causal version of teleosemantics meets the various content determinacy challenges)
10. Inner Analogs (makes room for a role for 2nd-order similarity in the content determining conditions for perceptual representations)
11. Becoming Abstracted (discusses strategies for meeting Berkeley’s problem of abstraction)
12. Concepts and Conceptions (discusses the relation between referential/intentional content and intensional content).
Organiser(s):Prof. Markus Wild, Rebekka Hufendiek, Pietro Snider
I would very much appreciate any comments!
]]>One of the main tenets of current Teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushmi-pullyu states, i.e they carry descriptive and imperative content at the same time. In this paper, I argue that Teleosemantics can not warrant imperative content to simple representations and hence, that there are no such things as Pushmi-pullyu representations. In the last part of the paper, I address some concerns that such a position may raise.
Any comment, suggestion, question, etc. will be very welcome!!
]]>Monday, April 20, 2010
Universitat de Barcelona
Montalegre, 6-8, 4ª planta.
08001 Barcelona
https://itunes.apple.com/us/itunes-u/new-england-institute-lectures/id418566747
I have not had time to take a look at it yet, but looks interesting!
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This paper is in a very early stage, so comments constructive and destructive are most welcome.
]]>There has been much discussion of so-called teleosemantic approaches to the naturalisation of
content. Such discussion, though, has been largely confined to simple, innate mental states with
contents such as There is a fly here. Even assuming we can solve the issues that crop up at this
stage, an account of the content of human mental states will not get too far without an account of
productivity: the ability to entertain indefinitely many thoughts.
The best-known teleosemantic theory, Millikan’s biosemantics, offers an account of productivity in
thought. This paper raises a basic worry about this account: that the use of mapping functions in the
theory is unacceptable from a naturalistic point of view.
It’d be cool to know what you guys think about it!
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