Why did Michelle Malkin retire from politics?


The Steve Sailer blog-commenter Jim Don Bob recently wrote:

“I was at a CIS [the immigration-restrictionist Center for Immigration Studies] function years ago and met Richwine [Jason Richwine, the man terminated from U.S. academia in 2013 for IQ research,] and Michelle Malkin, who has since retired from the fray.”

Someone responded:

“Yes, whatever happened to Michelle Malkin? I liked her.”

My response:

Michelle Malkin says she got tired of writing, tired of participating in the political-talk circuit. In October 2022, she announced she was, henceforth, “retired from the fray” (to use Jim Don Bob’s phrase). We’ve heard nothing from her since.

There is, however, more to the story.

Michelle Malkin had a public-facing career that spanned twenty years. An appraisal of her place in the politics of the (now-in-the-books) first quarter of the 21st century is in order. A more-definitive account would require more effort than I can give now. I offer this commentary in hopes to offer something. I hope it may spur more ideas from others.

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(Michelle Malkin on CSPAN TV, Sept. 2019.)

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Mainstream Conservatism started moving towards shunning Michelle Malkin, hitherto a provocateur-darling of (at least some of) these same people, by some point in the early 2020s. And probably the shift begins in the late 2010s already.

Even the rightward-most gatekeepers of the Right, even the main controlling elements of the pro-Trump Right, turned against her. She was ushered outside the gate. Although shouting all the way, she was left outside the gate and began to seek solace from other outside-the-gate people. Malkin was deeply angry and hurt by this shunning. Given so many years of being treated so well by the same people, she felt the magic was over. Her retirement in late 2022 comes relatively soon after this shunning.

A real signal of this shift was Michelle Malkin’s entry-ban at CPAC 2020. That was late-February of 2020, to be precise. The entry-ban against her was a big, shining, bright-flashing signpost, towards the answer to our inquiry here, towards the question of how, when, and why she disappeared from the scene. A Rubicon had been crossed, with Malkin’s place within the “ecosystem” of the respectable Right altered.

(“CPAC,” or the Conservative Political Action Conference, is, I suppose, the biggest of the Big Conservative gatherings of any given year in Washington. The late-February 2020 CPAC gathering was one of the very-last large-scale, notable, in-person public events before the mania of Covid Lockdowns cruelly swept across our civilization. The emboldened Pro-Panic coalition of the time, in those closing days of February and first days of March 2020, attacked CPAC: Reckless! Inhuman! These conservative gatherers in their thousands, many from distant places, Spreading the Virus! Isn’t that just like right-wingers, no respect for the common good! This was early fuel for the later-overt politicization of the Covid Panic of the early 2020s. The supposed CPAC “superspreader-event” was soon forgotten, thoughl too much was happening for the politics to dig in too much yet; the Panic was a hungry, hungry beast.)

Michelle Malkin was outraged, and hurt, by the 2020 CPAC ban. And by similar experiences around these years (ca. 2020). There was something of a sense of entitlement, given year many unbroken years of being celebrated. She;d even been a celebrated speaker at the February 2019 CPAC, although perhaps already on somewhat-thin ice by that time.

I’m not sure when the shunning of Michelle Malkin began; and I cannot now recall exactly why it emerged and sustained. But it was definitely in place by early 2020. The shunning had begun. It’s likewise true that Michelle Malkin had been a darling of (at least large elements of) the Right or populistic-Right back ca.2005, and basically still so by ca.2015.

I think that gives us a handle on the outlines of the “when.” Now to touch on the “how” and “why” before revisiting the “when”:

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Michelle Malkin was born Michelle Maglalang in October 1970, to parents who had arrived in the U.S. from the Philippines the same year, 1970.

In the 2000s, when Michelle Malkin was making a name for herself, she repeatedly, regularly and easily scooped up lots of easy points for being an Asian woman. A well-spoken, more-or-less attractive, foreign woman making sorta-kinda pro-American, pro-White talking-points. This image was, I’d argue, her stock-in-trade. She used it effectively. She was a good writer, and courageous in a way. There are also plenty of signs of her leveraging her Asian-girl status to extract things from milieus in which she moved. (This is a central problem, challenge, or tendency with “women in politics”; I’ll return to this point below.)

Steve Sailer, among others, was shunned for saying things in a generally-tamer way, than did Malkin. Reliable word has it that Sailer is, and always has been, a White Male. He was also older than Malkin by a dozen years, and looked much older than that. Sailer was auto-shunned; Malkin succeeded.

Malkin was not only a favored-class — relatively-recent-immigrant-origin, female, Nonwhite, and even with an Israeli-citizenship-eligible husband (she has bragged of her husband’s Jewishness, and sought to continue to use it as a shield and for bonus connections, but in the process she perhaps became too-willing to criticize Jewish actions, political postures, and influence, as if she were an insider in their game; more on this below).

She was also willing to fight on “culture war” points and draw attention to herself with provocative or incendiary rhetoric. Her various layers of identity and connections were effective shields in her long foray into politics. The juxtaposition with white-male Jason Richwine, eliminated from society in 2013 at age thirty-one, is stark.

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(Michelle Malkin, CSPAN, May 2015.)

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Something changed, seemingly in the latter few years of the 2010s, with Michelle Malkin’s place in the U.S. right-wing “ecosystem.” If I try to come up with a conventional explanation, it’d be: her provocateur tendencies went into overdrive in the Trump era, she “went too far,” and became shunned. But remember this centrally important part of her whole political persona: her cute-Asian-female status. The ca.2020 “turn” may relate, at least in part, to Malkin (b.1970) growing older.

Malkin’s provocateur-cute-Asian-girl days were effective when she was in her 30s and not much altered well into her 40s. And even into her 50s, it remained. This part of her persona was a big part of her success, and she knew it. By 2020, the year she turned 50, she may have felt things starting to have “run their course.”

By the late 2010s, much-younger ‘girls’ had entered the fray in large numbers. By the late 2010s, the new crop of b.1980s and b.1990s politics-girls were achieving lucrative results, doing similar acts.

I do not mean necessarily that Malkin, or any other specific individual, is not or was not genuine, in any given professed belief at any given time. I do mean there was more to these girls’ appeal — their following(s), their attention, their star-power — than their arguments.

I am here using the term “girl,” by the way, quite deliberately: To refer to the nominally-politics-oriented, social-media-based “e-girl” phenomenon, as it’s been called, and by extension also to Michelle Malkin, despite Malkin’s considerably predating the e-girls on the scene by the late 2010s. They all traded on their role as “girls,” in no small part.

The new “girls” on the scene were far-less-good writers than Michelle Malkin. The typical exemplar of the new wave, by the close of the 2010s, was not a writer at all, not primarily. Most of them traded in video format and so forth, and attention-seeking or outrage politics, and (of course) social-media far preferable to the older model of writing (as in this essay-like form; or the shorter column form, which Malkin wrote for so many years).

Social media is a decidedly lower form of written communication; video-based and Instagram-style communication is another level entirely. Michelle Malkin was already in this world as the 2010s opened. She successfully navigated it, to a degree. The new competition was considerable; and in many ways the discourse continued to be degraded.

(Incidentally, few or none of the 2010-era, politics-talking, large-following “e-girls” have ever amounted to much, and most have disappeared or renounced their quasi-ethnonationalist, so-called Alt-Lite views of the 2010s, revealing themselves as a species of fraud. Even though I wouldn’t say this is true of Michelle Malkin, it was true of her “direct competition” for views and likes, ca.2020. It’s hard to know what to make of some one of these people, the Lauren Southern-like people out there; too many to name, most social-media platforms inundated with them. It’s one of the many disappointments of Trump that many of us have that he apparently takes advice from one of them named Laura Loomer, a typical case of the 2010s-era e-girls.)

A clue that I’m right about “aging out” being a factor is that Michelle Malkin (born Oct. 1970) wrote her “signing off” column the very week of her 52nd birthday. (“‘-30-‘: An Ending, But Not the End.”) Yes, that is her final-ever published column, as of this writing in mid-2025. Late-October 2022, within days of her birthday. The sign-off column being the same week as the birthday is a 1-in-52 coincidence. The good bet (a 51/52 chance) is it was intentional.

Twenty years earlier, in 2002, Michelle Malkin has entered the fray in a big way. She was clearly energized by the attention given towards her polemic Invasion: How America Still Welcomes Terrorists, Criminals, and Other Foreign Menaces to Our Shores (published Aug 2002). That pro-War on Terror, White-ethnonationalistic-, immigration-restrictionist-, dog-whistle-style polemic reached its height around Malkin’s 32nd birthday (late 2002).

The first Trump campaign (June 2015 to Nov 2016) occurred spanning Malkin’s 45th and 46th birthdays. She he was still “passing” as being a cute-attractive girl of a maybe-around-age-30 foreign girl with the Courage to Stand Up to Political Correctness. In other words, the same persona she had used to such effect throughout the 2000s. (East-Asians can successively deceive Western audiences in all manner of ways. This is one. It is one reason they like operating within Western societies.)

By the end of her 40s, though, Michelle Malkin had started to be shunned. Perhaps especially in calendar-year 2019 (her 49th birthday was in Oct 2019). The storm surely gathering in the preceding few years. What I assess happened is that Malkin assumed the protective ring around her, that she’d known in the 2000s and most of the 2010s, would last forever.

Many East-Asian-origin people assume this kind of amulet-like protection simply exists for them in the West by default (which they like, as they benefit from it; even if concurrently seeing it as naive and over-trusting, at least viewed by standards anything near their own cultures’ standards). By around 2018-19, she was increasingly positioning herself in actually-correct positions but positions over which the ADL, AIPAC, and others were willing to toss her overboard.

The turn against the long-self-confident Michelle Malkin wounded her. Especially so when she knew well her positions were right, and on the majority side, and that she still had all the checkbox-layers of protection. She had traded in controversy, successfully shielding herself with her various places in the U.S.-administered quasi-imperial system’s racial-spoils system.

By the 2010s, however, Malkin’s fame, her public profile, meant she couldn’t quite be fully Cancelled (meaning fired from a prestige-perch; life-banned from respectful employment; shunned). Much in the same way, Ann Coulter was never destroyed, despite emerging as a defacto White-ethnonationalist by the mid-2010s (and, at times, as an outright Israel critic).

For Malkin, year after year of negative pressure, I think, got to her. Being “turned against” would hurt for anyone. But especially for one who’d done so well for so long in a self-made (or self-made-seeming) writing and speaking career, a kind of miniature political-nexus in her own right. Impressive, in its way.

She retreated to Newsmax, the right-wing TV channel, where she hosted a right-wing talk-show called “Sovereign Nation” (aired: August 2020 to May 2021).

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(Michelle Malkin, Newsmax TV, hosting her “Sovereign Nation” program, March 2021.)

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By November 2021, the SPLC and ADL and others were condemning Michelle Malkin as an Enemy of the People, over her appearance at a conference held by American Renaissance, the white-ethnonationalist organization. By this time she had turned against Israel, to some extent (the “extent” being that troublesome country’s complete stranglehold-control over U.S. foreign policy).

By 2019, Malkin was questioning central precepts of Jewish power in the West. She likely knew well she was walking on increasingly thin ice with this, more-so than her previous provocative posturings about other groups.

Remember, though, this is an East-Asian woman with a Jewish husband and half-Jewish children! Those facts, as I already say above, probably helped her career early on (and could not have hurt it, not in the ca.2000 USA); and shielded her throughout. But, by some time about the turn of the decade, ca.2020, she’d gone too far. The shield broke.

Going in the direction of American Renaissance by late 2021. I’d say that was in line with her long-successful instincts of siding with the right side of things. (I mean both “right” as in correct on arguments; and also concurrently “the Right.”) Probably the more-important inducement towards that direction, though, was her now-ongoing shunning by Big Conservatism. That had started in earnest by/around 2019, as I say. She was hurt and angry, and reacted accordingly.

If these people, the gatekeepers, had sometimes or often viewed Malkin with a wary eye in earlier eras, off-and-on in the 2000s and most of the 2010s, she’d always been seen as an okay exception, and maybe often useful. But then, in or by around late 2019, the “gate” was shut on her. By mid-2021, she was being outright villified. She made appearances on the SPLC/ADL’s “Public Enemies” lists! That, I assume, is also the reason that her highly rated Newsmax show was pulled off the air in May 2021.

The winter of 2021-22 — the third and final winter of the enforced and policed Corona-Panic’s full might in the West — may have been the hardest for Michelle Malkin in her public-facing career, which was by then nearing its twenty-year mark. Along came the 20th-anniversary milestone of her first book (mid-2002). Then her 52nd birthday (October 2022). The birthday was seemingly good-enough place to take her exit, as a kind of new life-year’s resolution to avoid the ongoing heartache of being shunned by your own community, as it were. We haven’t heard from her since.

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To return briefly yo the 2013 crucifixion of Jason Richwine (b.1982, NW-European Christian origin).

The connection with Michelle Malkin was that longtime Sailer-blog commenter Jim Don Bob reported an encounter with the then-internally-exiled Jason Richwine at a ca. 2017 immigration-restrictionist event in or near Washington. At this same event Michelle Malkin was circulating among the attendees and he met him two; maybe not at the same exact time.

Jason Richwine’s life-ban from working in academia is a classic 2010s political moment. A strange decade it was, the 2010s, in many ways. It reached its climax, inconveniently for our historical-period numbering system, in the early 2020s…

The ostracization of Michelle Malkin in or by the early 2020s, provides a point of comparison with Jason Richwine, the latter life-banned from academia, for Racism, in early 2013, a few years after his Harvard PhD. The Richwine case was a major warning-signal to similar White-male figures on the scene. There would good, solid, talented, sharp people who’d done everything right, and so forth, who could be destroyed with the push of one button by these people.

Malkin’s ostracization was many years later, longer-feeling, maybe, than the seven or so calendar-years that elapsed between the turn against Richwine and the turn against Malkin. Only towards the end of the 2010s-to-early-2020s political cycle did Malkin come into problems; Richwine was an “early” victim (although not really; the Wokeness system, I argue, long predates the 2010s).

To me, the Malkin case is instructive in how much later it came, and so forth. How generously she had been treated for so many years, by the system; how much leeway she had gotten, to say things that people were s often “Richwine’d” over, or (more commonly) “Richwine’d” themselves over. This taboos grew into place already decades ago, and have been in place throughout the lifetimes of people like Richwine.

If someone reading this can identify specific cross-over points for the shunning of Michelle Malkin, let us know.

One lesson of Michelle Malkin’s early-2000s to early-2020s career is that she was expendable. Any individual. When they found her no longer of use, they got rid of her despite her popularity and years and years of apparent high status within the right-wing pop-discourse sphere.

People have liked to talk of the rise of a multicultural, multiracial, “anti-Woke” neo-coalition for Trump, which they identify especially as having emerged in the early 2020s.

I argued in November 2024 (“Revisiting the Sailer Strategy“) that the Multiracial Trump Coalition idea was, as usual, both exaggerated and shallow. It rested in part on the Based Brown Guy political-archetype that was fundamentally both hollow, phantom-like, and so ripe for obviously-demagogic exploitation (see also: Vivek Ramaswamy).

To the extent the multiracial-rainbow-MAGA was true by the mid-2020s, it had been people fitting Michelle Malkin’s profile (if not her herself) who had laid groundwork for it, who were key “vectors” for it. For, I mean, the conversion of Trump-MAGA into what its leadings lights had always sought to portray it as: a multiracialized, populist(-in-a-negative-sense), hooting-and-hollering dumbed down, demagogic, pro-LEGAL-immigration, anti-“racist”-if-he’s-anti-Woke, pro-Israel movement; one which Trump embraced, and which embraced Trump, as a king. Or at least a petty, rule-by-decree, rule-by-emotion caudillo.

Inserting Malkin into a role of facilitator of that turn highly decontextualizes her from her own work; and removes nuance from her work. It is simply one lingering image of her place in politics that I think will stand the test of time. That holds even if she herself were too rambunctious for these people to allow to stay on board the train (or strayed too close to violating some taboos especially relating to her husband’s ethnopolitical group).

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Jim Don Bob responded at the SteveSailer.net discussion:

“[When] I met [Michelle Malkin] and [Jason] Richwine at a CIS event in 2017 or so[, Malkin] looked like she was in her late 20s.”

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ADDENDUM:

Some Sailer-blog commenter I’d never heard of suggested that Michelle Malkin “still writes for TakiMag.” That is verifiably false.

She was published at Taki Magazine, way back between September 2010 and May 2011, before moving on to bigger things. In verifying this, I discovered something of great interest, given my own anti-Trump position today (see: Evaluating Trump-II at its six-month mark and The Trump-as-Caudillo theory revisited).

Michelle Malkin’s second-to-last monthly Taki column, published in late-April 2011, was:

Donald Trump’s Eminent-Domain Empire.”

At the time, Trump had entered politics in a quasi-formal way by questioning the Obama birth-certificate, a controversy bouncing around some corners at the time. He claimed to have secret proof the birth certificate was fake. In those few days, the course towards Trump’s 2015-16 run was laid. The ultimate course was set towards (what I now see as) this man’s shambolic and embarrassing 2.125 terms-so-far as president (4 years, 6 months and counting). In 2011, with no polarization whatsoever yet over Trump, Michelle Malkin laid out a frankly accurate portrait of Trump-as-Con-Man that holds up really well fourteen years later.

Malkin wrote at the time (April 2011):

“Don’t be fooled by The Donald. Take it from one who knows: I’m a South Jersey gal who was raised on the outskirts of Atlantic City in the looming shadow of Trump’s towers. […] America, it’s time you wised up to Donald Trump[…]

Trump has been wooing conservative activists for months and flirting with a GOP presidential run—first at the Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington and most recently at a tea party event in South Florida. He touts his business experience, “high aptitude” and “bragadocious” deal-making abilities. But he’s no more a standard-bearer of conservative values, limited government and constitutional principles than the cast of ‘Jersey Shore’. […]

While casting himself as America’s new constitutional savior, Trump has shown reckless disregard for fundamental private property rights. […]

Donald Trump’s career-long willingness to trample [private property rights] tells you everything you need to know about his bogus tea party sideshow. [End quote, Michelle Malkin, April 2011]

Interesting.

I never followed Michelle Malkin closely enough to know when exactly she became pro-Trump and when (if ever) she turned against Trump. But this April 2011 warning (“America, it’s time you wised up to Donald Trump”) was really prescient.

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[End.]

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Evaluating Trump-II at its six-month mark: Do they really believe in, or want, immigration-restrictionism?


What can we say about the Trump movement, coalition — and now government — of the mid-2020s?

It is not ideas-based nor is it principles-based. It is oriented around tough-guy showmanship and theatrics. It resembles pro-wrestling. We hear tough-guy talk; we see attention-grabbing storylines; we get shocking twists and taunts. The public-facing output seemingly crafted for dissemination in exciting short-video clips and the like. An endless blitz of marketing campaigns in lieu of firm-hand policy.

Another thing we see with these people is the picking of fights, and sometimes playing the bad-guy, as the drama goes on. (Here’s the thing, the secret: In pro-wrestling, the bad-guy and good-guy performers are all friends, off-stage.) It’s a bit like a Red-team (or MAGA-hatted team) version of the words this man recently graced us all with:

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(More on this later.)

These Trump-II people are not well suited to accomplish the monumental task at hand. The urgent task is the reversal of the de-Westernization process. The process has been ongoing for decades; the Trump-MAGA mandate, back to 2015-16 and really ever since (albeit in watered-down form by 2024) was to fight and reverse de-Westernization. (That’s what the voters understood Make America Great Again to mean, of course.) This laughably unsuitable, erratic, unprincipled, inveterate-self-promoter of a man was elected for a purpose. A man with a long career in reality-tv, though, he always had other ideas in mind, or maybe no particular ideas (or principles).

Trumpism has, unfortunately, always been about a demagogic personality-driven politics. It has lots of precedent in the Third World but traditionally has been at a minimum in the West, because traditionally we care about results over image.

His core-base knew the risks all along. They justified it by saying: “It’ll send a message.” The problem is, this was a devil’s bargain. So what if it sent a message? More importantly, what is the message? And most importantly, why are we satisfied with “sending a message?” This is not a rational position. It’s a more like the “fandom” of pro-wrestling. People who want to be entertained.

Ask yourself this: If Trump were faced with the prospect of either: (a.) no/bad results but with praise and credit; vs. (b.) great results but without any attributed credit or praise, Which would he choose? You and I know the answer. The answer is (a.); and he’d take the credit with aplomb, with pomp and ceremony, and attack the other guys.

The foregoing has been a partial restatement of what I argued my essay “The Trump-as-Caudillo theory revisited” (Feb. 2025). The second Trump administration (Trump-II), in its early weeks, showed few signs of ideological consistency.

Hypocrisy and incoherence stemming from lack of real principles is the Achilles Heel of all demagogues. The internal contradictions of the Trump coalition as it had evolved by the mid-2020s has finally exploded on the scene in July 2025 with the Epstein Files crisis. Trump now looks like a buffoon to a wide range of his own core-base who had previously always looked the other way or rejected such talk. (I won’t much comment on the Epstein Files crisis here. If I can make time I’d love to do so soon. My goals are to ask about immigration-restriction and a pro-White/Western policy.)

Trump’s instincts are certainly narcissistic and his political-governance persona tends towards that of a Latin-American-style caudillo. The subtitle of my “Trump as Caudillo” essay was: “Fighting Third Worldization through another form of Third Worldization?” He says he wants to deport illegals. A degree of sluggishness has characterized the process and there is a lot of talk in various directions. In the meantime, he’s been doing a water-hose or clown-car of hollowing out of institutions, theatrics, and tough-guy talk.

We want results; no, we want radical-but-principled ideological commitment. If we have that, plus enough good men on hand who believe in the cause, plus sovereign control of our own affairs, then results follow. We don’t need tough-guy talk and silly feuds without results.

A demagogic or caudillo-like figure presents real dangers. The dangers I have in mind are not quite those that the Left whipped itself into believing around 2016-17 about Trump, but they are similar in certain ways. (I think we should be humble enough to admit the Left had a point about Trump.)

I do have serious questions as to whether the Trump-II people are committed to the kind of reform and major “re-think” needed to turn things around for the USA.

With Trump-II having crossed its six-month mark this past week, now’s a good time to ask some hard questions about these people’s commitment to immigration-restrictionism and to a pro-West line — rather than a “pro-themselves” line.

Are they really pursuing a pro-Western policy-course? If so, in what specific ways? Is it of the kind Trump’s own original base wanted? If not, how watered-down is it? The reason Trump was elected was to put a giant roadblock in front of de-Westernization and then take active measures to reverse it. Is this something they really want?

To refine the question: Do the Trump people really oppose the Elite Immigration Consensus?

What would fit their modus-operandi as participants in a demagogic political movement would be: instrumentally using immigration-restrictionist energies to rally people to their side (“pro-themselves”). Do they opposite the Elite Immigration Consensus for principled reasons?

As that great three-syllable proverb has it: “Talk is cheap.”

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Recently, Hunter Biden, gave some pro-immigration views, inelegantly and crudely but true to the Elite Immigration Consensus. It got to thinking: Might Trump, and the Trump people, fundamentally agree with Hunter Biden? In other words, do these Trump-II people still basically believe in the elite pro-immigration consensus?

Quote, from Hunter Biden:

“People are really upset about illegal immigration? F*** you. How do you think your hotel room gets cleaned? How do you think you have food on your f***ing table? Who do you think washes your dishes? Who do you think does your f***ing garden?”

The principled immigration-restrictionist commentator who writes at Peak Stupidity responded:

“The former son of the President of the US has no idea what kind of country we used to have.”

Yes.

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Hunter Biden is steeped in Big-Blue-metro-area, pro-immigrationist ideology. These opinions quoted from him are not those of a clueless individual. To the contrary, they are opinions of a highly plugged-in individual. They are words Hunter may have said, but they are not Hunter’s opinions he just happened to come up with on his own. They reflect a wider class attitude. The attitude of the broad elite.

Hunter Biden is a product almost his whole life of Washington, D.C.. Hunter’s words are the reflexive pro-immigration opinions saturating places like Washington. People tend to want to parrot the perceived consensus of their social peers. And some people are by nature a bit crude, combative, and arrogant. Combine the two and you get Hunter Biden’s pro-immigration diatribe. A pretty large majority of his peers steeped in Washington culture basically agree.

By the way: I do not here mean Washington D.C. specifically as the federal capital or as a/the “center of power.” I really mean it as a political-cultural zones which we are accustomed to calling “deep Blue.” Even more specifically, I mean it as a place where a certain ethnopolitical element is important in shaping and managing local opinion.

Steve Sailer (p.b.u.h.) used to quip, with some frequency, that the consensus-views in recent decades on major policies, in such places as the Washington D.C. — and on nothing moreso than immigration-and-nationality policy! — is heavily Judaized. He made fun of how the issue is reflexively seen through the “lens” of Ellis Island Jews. Their descendants believe in open immigration in like a religion. And it’s both a rather evangelical political-faith and an intolerant one. There is a moral tinge to the Elite pro-Immigration Consensus.

Those with similar family-histories, tracing to similar eras and experiences in certain ways as the Ellis Island Jews from Eastern Europe (and later top-up waves of Jews even down through the end of the 20th century), can easily embrace the same spirit, if not exactly the agenda. The tendency is lessened the more generally-Western, generally-Northern, and generally-Protestant the family- or personal-origins of the individual are. A broad coalition of the Ellis Islanders is not really coherent. At its core, the Elite Immigration Consensus is a Jewish project. It is rooted in a sense of Jewish exceptionalism.

These people’s views of themselves and their place in the world, and their distinct intellectual-moral tradition, have had hugely distorting effects on society, culture, politics, and foreign policy. These have been discussed plenty in recent years. Except strangely little from the main-line of the Trump camp.

Trump himself and many of his lieutenants make loud noises about how they are the most pro-Jewish and pro-Israel administration in history; they expended much political capital, in the early months, trying to deport a few thousand pro-Palestinian student protestors. This never made much sense if the goal was a generalized counter-attack against de-Westernization, expending political capital in such ways was wasteful at best (and immoral at worst; slashing free-speech traditions in favor of a defense of a foreign state). It made sense if the goal was support of Israel and a not-really-caring attitude about the general immigration problem. It was all symbolic, all for shock value.

Over the past few decades, Washington D.C.’s resident white population has been, astonishingly, as high as one-fifth Jewish. In the inner-lying areas outside of the Washington D.C. proper (the 1790-delineated borders did not anticipate the automobile or even the streetcar or train), the share of Whites who are Jewish is considerably lower in most places, but still substantial. They are highly networked, ambitious, and possessing of a pervading ideology that tells them they have the Right to Rule. (This after their rise between the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries, and associated mythologies they’ve forced everyone to acquiesce to).

Always punching above their weight, the East-European Jews are talented bunch in many ways: high IQ, if troublingly low on ethics. Definitely low on ethics when compared to the exacting standards of the NW-European ethnopolitical stock that built the USA and ran it, fully, in the first few centuries.

The ethnocultural-population core across the land remains NW-European, of course, and especially comfortably so if bypassing the largest accumulations of non-Westerners in certain regions. The underlying norms of the U.S. system remain NW-European. My concern about Trump-“caudillo”-ism is that many of the things he’s up to damage valuable social capital and laughing about it; he doesn’t understand what he’s doing, and a group of hardcore, social-media-addled demagogue lieutenants keep the thing afloat.

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A question. How the heck did it become such a deep consensus, or something obvious (as Hunter Biden’s angry rant makes clear he understands it to be) that moral-and-respectable people are all pro-immigration?! How? Why? When?

It doesn’t make sense objectively. It doesn’t make sense this would necessarily be such a strong consensus, as it was until very recently. Some important element is needed, some keystone uniting principle. The same nation that essentially banned immigration from the 1910s to 1960s, by the 1990s was pro-immigration in a religious-messianic kind of way?

The pro-immigrationist cheerleading, drumbeating, moralizing, browbeating, and hectoring, is also of a type that within itself bears certain hallmarks of its most-committed evangelists. I don’t know that I’ve ever met a single member of the Jewish ethnopolitical element in the USA who doesn’t, sooner or later, make an appeal to Jewish persecution. A moral appeal; a kind of religious appeal. And from that moralizing there follow certain policy prescriptions that are non-negotiable among respectable people: open immigration is one of them. People get the memo.

“I am all for legal immigration! I just don’t like illegal immigration,” says the Trump supporter of White-Christian origin. Hey, you’re not in favor of legal immigration! You are not exactly lying, with that phrase. You’re going as far as you can in the moral-political dispensation you perceive around you. You are apologizing for your own position; even for your own existence. Others, however, embrace the moral position with gusto, and use it to browbeat others or signal virtue. That’s Hunter Biden. And I suspect it’s a lot of the Trump people, too. Trump himself, a bs-artist for the ages, very frequently says things like he loves immigrants; more than a few times he’s said he wants “the largest numbers ever coming in, LEE-GA-LEE.” (Does he really want that? Why? Is it just the narcissism?)

If any Western city, be it in Europe or any of Europe’s extensions across the world, has a White population that is as high as one-fifth Jewish (as with Washington D.C. proper), I’ll tell you what’s bound to happen, given any sort of open system: They and their ideas or narratives will tend to end up with agenda-setting control. Everyone else in the city will be aware of their views at least indirectly,, as will those in the hinterland; after a time, people will simply accept their self-serving narratives as self-evident truth, with no other option. A tacit taboo having emerged; and the power of the taboo will occasionally fire up some barstool-loudmouth like Hunter Biden to bash whatever dissidents are around.

Often, high-info people (like Steve Sailer) will directly and consciously know, or see, or at least sense, what Jews are “up to.” Such people almost unanimously respect a taboo against mentioning the subject. (I believe that was a main reason Sailer was sidelined for so many years.) This one group tends to get veto power over competing narratives. It’s based in ethnic self-adulation or even an ethno-solipsism but they are sharp enough to conceal, from outsiders, the extent of it most of the time.

Other ethnopolitical elements, in these places, long did offer coherent opposition. Over time, however, White-Christians who wanted their own narratives to predominate and accordant policies to be followed, became ghettoized. Their voices receded from view, becoming minor-dissident voices and ending up with the unwelcome company of wackos, unstable personalities, the unfocused angry, and petty demagogues all over. What happened to U.S. politics circa the second half of the 20th century will be looked back on as a shocking development. For a country founded by us, and built by us, and so forth. It happened over a few-decade-long period. The career of Pat Buchanan is a good example of how the process worked, to different degrees over different eras of the 20th century, with the biggest strides made in the middle decades of the 20th century. The Hunter Bidens out there are products of this tectonic shift.

Yes, Hunter Biden doesn’t need to have anything defective about himself, per se, to have absorbed these views. (He need not, for example, have one of the hundreds of so-called “AIPAC handlers” giving him lines or training him like political commissars of old. There is a separate AIPAC handler assigned to every single member of Congress, I presume except for Thomas Massie, whom they believe to be an irretrievable anti-Semite. Possibly also now they’ve bailed out on Marjorie Taylor Greene given her many anti-Israel comments.)

Supposed Jewish persecution (which is often questionable in the details anyway, that’s another matter) from generations or even centuries past, somehow magically justifies the need for open immigration for Wherever Migrants in the present day. This argument always seems to be there, a guiding directive of political life in the USA which is never absent for long in the discourse.

The question I have is: Does Trump and the Trump people believe the same? I think signs point to “Yes.”

We can bring up certain specific counter-examples, such as Steven Miller’s supposed position as an immigration-restrictionist. I do notice however that he is also eager and excited to participate in the pro-wrestling-like spectacle of Trump-politics and argue with the media.

I have never met someone like Steve Miller, if he is a genuine immigration-restrictionist for nationalist reasons. I mean for reasons along lines that a NW-European with deeper ties to the USA, and the tradition on which it was built, would be a restrictionist (such as the men who engineered the strict early-1920s immigration shutdown). To the extent I’ve seen and observed members of this ethnopolitical group who do “talk in that direction,” quite often they end up being frauds. The one guy now known as Mike Benz comes to mind. In the late-2010s he was (it came out a few years ago,) conducting an intel-operation against the Alt-Right on behalf of Israel and reducing anti-Semitism.

They are talented arguers and rhetoriticians in many cases, including Mike Benz (in his Alt-Right infiltration days, he was known as “Frame Games”). They will make maudlin arguments such as you hear parroted by Hunter Biden, in his crass kind of way (we are all our father’s sons…), in the quoted excerpt.

I’ve struggled for years with what to make of this Elite Pro-Immigration Consensus. I’ve written a few times, in my usual style of several-thousand-word essays, of the kind most info-consumers in the 2020s will assiduously avoid. (See: “The USA’s Guiding Maxim on Immigration“; and “On ‘Immigrationism’ ideology, its future, and elite-dissent.”) The topic however is not to be avoided. It glares at us every day.

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With Trump-II at the six-month mark (a full “one eighth” done with the four-year term), it’s hard still to get a grip on what the full impact of things. The border-closure, some unclear number of forcible deportations, some uncertain number of voluntary deportations. What impact on the scale of the demographic problem?

The pro-Trump people have always, always, since the start of this strange thing now just over ten years ago, said: “Give him more time.” Or, as the Q-Anon slogan had it: “Trust the plan.”

What if we want to trust demonstrable actions and reliable data, above some intelligence operation (as reliable info has it that Q-Anon was)?

Here is some data for us:

The U.S. ethnocultural-core population stands at about 185 million. I here refer to most Whites of fully European-Christian heritage. This group has been shrinking, in absolute terms, for at least the past ten years (more deaths than births; the trajectory of aging, the advancing of the average age, has run its course and for at least ten years now deaths have exceeded births).

All other population-elements other than the core now number above 155 million.

The broad non-core is a huge category. It includes all sorts; races, languages, religions, identities, citizenships, legal-statuses, lengths of residence in the country. It’s not like all of them are one single category. (It would be a different game if the 155m were all Blacks, rather than just 40m Blacks.)

The total-resident population, core plus non-core, crossed the 340m mark sometime around late 2024. That according to the Census Bureau. The 340-million mark was passed at about the time of the Trump-II presidential-election victory (Nov 2024). Or perhaps earlier during the contra-Kamala kampaign. Statistical-modelling-based Census Bureau estimates.

Recapitulation:

— 185m: the US ethnocultural-core population (54.5%)

— 155m: the US non-core population (45.5%)

— 340m: Total US resident population, ca. late 2024.

Today, in July 2025, the total population is estimated at 342 million (Census Bureau). Some 2 million extras have been tacked-on since the 2024 election. Under Trump-II, so far, the ethnocultural-core share has actually gone down from 54.5% to 54.0%. That would strike many as a surprise. You’d think it’d at least have stabilized.

Of the 155m non-core, perhaps 25m are illegals. That is to say: in-principle easily-removable (deportable) people. It’s unclear what estimate the Census Bureau is using for illegals. (I am certain the Census data-people have an estimate of illegals, but they refuse to release it. They hide behind the fact that the Census questionnaire itself doesn’t ask about citizenship; the Yale study of a few years ago, using similar methods to the Census, estimated the illegal population was likely over 20m active illegals before the Biden waves.

So the big numbers are:

– – 185m core (54.5%);
– – 130m non-core, legal (38%);
– – 25m non-core, illegal (7.5%?);
– – (negligible numbers in a hypothetical category of “core, illegal”).

A considerable portion of the 130m non-core legal residents are actually of “illegal-immigrant stock”: People normalized in some way after an initial illegal arrival, or after overstaying visas; or children of such people. Such people, too, should be encouraged to depart, along a policy of demographic stabilization favoring the core. Most any other country in the world would see this as an obvious step.

Now, we learn that the Trump-II people’s now-stated goal is to deport one million illegals per year, for a total of 4 million deported by January 19, 2029. They are said to be running well behind even on that modest pace, and they seem to have stopped publishing deportation statistics.

Deporting 4m illegals by January 19, 2029, might sound like a lot. But it would raise the core-stock back only up to 55.0%! (That’s “all else held equal”; i.e., 185/336.) It’s practically a purely symbolic effort.

Importantly, there is NO discussion going on about the bigger picture. About something I’ve elsewhere called “demographic emergency measures.” (See: “A study on America’s demographic-national crisis: Developments in the White birth-share in the USA, 1920s to 2020s.”). A policy of stabilization of the core, expressly in the interest of keeping the U.S. a Western society. There needs to be a moral seriousness here: The core needs to have a healthier majority than the paltry 54% at which it now stands.

Demographic-emergency measures are needed, given the past decades of almost-continuous slide and the rise of para-national thinking both at home and abroad. “Empire abroad, Empire at home” is a tacit ideology of important elements of the broad upper class. (The empire-abroad side goes beyond Israel, although that gangster-state is a keystone, as any glance at the news shows. It goes back to the 1940s-60s period and developments of that time, and by the 1970s a new consensus favoring diversity at home came in.)

The internal de-Westernization process was itself the impetus towards Trump in the 2010s. He never himself took it seriously enough and he is distracting himself with any number of other toys and shiny objects.

Lest I be accused of excessive negativity, there is good news. New flow of illegals is way down. The bad news is that that needs to followed by the words “for now.” How do we ensure it stays down?

Flows of migrants, be they deemed illegal or not, might turn back upward sooner than we expect. Trump has turned against his own base over the Epstein affair. He has been fuming. It seems he is thinking about how to exact revenge on these disloyal people. That includes half or so of his own voters, according to polls, who have lost confidence in him over the Epstein Files scandal and cover-up, betrayal of a campaign promise, and hypocrisy. Could Trump introduce an amnesty and guest-worker program (“comprehensive immigration reform”), in alliance with the Left, in 2026 or 2027? It’d fits his style and the flexibility of his principles.

I am not sure how much I trust Vance. If Trump dies, or is removed (as by impeachment), how do we know Vance will not to do something similar, a patriotic amnesty? Vance’s own principles have slid all over the game-board in the 2010s and 2020s. He was a critic of Trump in 2015-16, saying that Trump was cruelly “making Brown people afraid,” Vance has boasted many times of having “mixed-race” sons by his elite-Hindu wife. His political evolution is puzzling and, to some of us, suspicious.

These people came to power on a demagogic movement, which they exploited. They exploited the desperate position of “White America,” the receding ethnocultural-core. They took advantage of the fighting-energy left in a civilization and people that are being led into planned obsolescence. Everyone kind of knows this is the game, the managed system. Even well-networked barstool-idiots like Hunter Biden might know it, but are okay with it because they think they can coast along signaling virtue and getting cheap-and-pliant services. Outside a portion of younger-male hotheads, few are willing to vocally oppose the civilizational planned obsolescence, and even those wise to things are often content with pro-wrestling-like political-entertainment.

These people, the Trump-II people, must be held accountable and pushed towards the right direction.

The time for a rift with Trump was many years ago now. Ann Coulter led the way, already in the closing weeks of 2018 I believe it was, when she turned on him publicly. (I note that she is quite pro-Trump in the six months of Trump-II, and is also completely avoiding all foreign-policy commentary. She probably has many of the same worries and complaints the rest of us have had, but sees it useful to not vocally opposite the Trump-II team for now.)

I believe there is evidence, from occasional quips but also from actions, that Trump and these other people don’t actually disagree with the quote from Hunter Biden about how vital and precious Holy Migrants are, how we couldn’t live without them.

From the Trump-II people, I see no real vision of a transformed society. No pro-White, pro-Western policy that is morally serious, coherent, professional, and substance-over-image.

The apparent break with Trump over the Epstein cover-up, if it continues, may finally allow room for a principled opposition to Trump from the Right.

The danger: Such a challenge would cause this man a narcissistic injury. He might lash out, as by engineering a Trump amnesty. “The biggest numbers ever” has already been promised at various times. Oh, maybe he’d add that only non-Woke migrants would be allowed; transgenders and anti-Israel protestors would be banned. But otherwise, a surge of new legal residents (“LEE-GUH-LEE”). How surprised would you be?

Some tentative conclusions at the Trump-II six-month mark: It might be a lot less fun for many politics-as-sport enjoyers, but: Morally serious, consistent, principled, get-it-done leaders really are a better idea. (See: Ron DeSantis, possibly.)

I don’t think the old standby to the effect that “Trump fights but principles leaders don’t” holds water. Fights for what?

Nothing is consistent about these Trump people, about the Trump-II government. It’s a collection driven by demagogic tendencies. I am uncertain they are even committed to one of the centerpieces of the Trump campaigns: Immigration-restriction — and, tacitly, a greatly firmed up nationality policy to the effect of steering the USA away from des-Westernization; a championing of the ethnocultural core.

If not Trump, then who? When? How? It’s unclear; the bloated shadow of the unprincipled chief still looms large over the rest of us.

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[End.]

Alfred Eckes on the Smoot–Hawley Tariff of 1930 and its long-lasting civic mythology


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“When McKinley, most famously, put tariffs on in 1890, they lost fifty percent of their seats in the next election. When Hawt–Smooley [sic] put on their tariff in the early 1930s, we lost the House and Senate for sixty years. So [tariffs] are not only bad economically. They’re bad politically.” — Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky), evening, April 2, 2025

“Many of us studied in school about the [Great Depression], and how we put on the Smoot–Hawley Tariff. Some say it caused the recession; it didn’t, but it exacerbated the recession. But these [Trump tariffs of 2025] are higher. Higher than when we had, what every historian would say, were the worst tariffs we ever put in place. Until now.”— Steve Rattner, economist, early morning, April 4, 2025, MSNBC

“I think this is the biggest policy mistake in 95 years. I don’t know why Trump didn’t learn the lesson of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act.” — Jeremy Siegel, University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of Business, morning, April 4, 2025

“Did we not learn from Smoot–Hawley of 1930? These tariffs [of 2025] are going to reduce imports…But they’ll also lead to a contraction of the economy. During the Great Depression, we ran trade surpluses. But did anyone care, when we had 20% unemployment? No, they didn’t! It was a mistake. And everybody acknowledges it. So why are we doing it again? It’s not only dumb, it’s destructive.” — Charlie Dent, former U.S. Congressman (R-Penn. [2005-2018]), midday, April 4, 2025

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That the Smoot–Hawley Tariff of 1930 is being much-mentioned in news and commentary, in 2025, might sound like it shouldn’t be possible. Ninety-five years under the bridge. The reason: President Donald Trump imposed — unilaterally, by fiat — a wide range of tariffs.

The most-impactful or shocking of the tariffs were announced in a ceremony in the 4pm hour EST of Wednesday, April 2, 2025. An uproar followed. The international-news became saturated with tariff talk and remained there through the weekend.

A Financial Times editorial, “America’s Astonishing Act of Self-Harm” (April 3, 2025) is typical of the highly-negative reaction. In this context, the references to “Smoot–Hawley” poured forth.

My purpose here is to examine Smoot–Hawley. To identify it as part of U.S. civic mythology. To point towards good scholarship that refutes the core claims about Smoot–Hawley (by Alfred Eckes, 1995).

“Smoot–Hawley,” the expression, is functionally an incantation. A warning-spell against evil spirits. Everyone knows the consensus. Everyone knows trade-protectionism is a disaster, a lose-lose proposition.

But Smoot–Hawley is often half-remembered and vaguely understood. That is typical for civic-mythologies. Rand Paul, interestingly, misremembered the exact names. He said “Hawt-Smooley” during a Fox News interview during which he condemned the tariffs. An innocuous mistake? yes, but poetically fitting for my point.

Middle-to-highbrow audiences will generally recognize the reference to Smoot–Hawley, understand what it means, and know that it is a consensus. The premises, however, are seldom questioned or examined or, as some like to say, “interrogated.”

Alfred Eckes, an economic historian, is one of the few who has interrogated Smoot–Hawley, alongside the civic-mythology weavers and believers. He does so in the context not of the 1930s alone, or the second quarter of the 20th century alone, but really of centuries of trade-policy (to be specific, the 225 years of U.S. trade-policy history between the 1770s and 1990s).

Is the conventional-wisdom on Smoot–Hawley accurate? If so, how accurate? Eckes gives us a 15,000-word treatment of the “the infamous Smoot–Hawley tariff of 1930.” It has never been more valuable than it is now.

I reproduce, below, the full text of Eckes’ Smoot–Hawley chapter in his 1995 U.S. trade-history book, for easy reference.

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In the 1986 comedy movie Ferris Bueller’s Day Off, the Smoot–Hawley tariff was a joke-line. It was delivered by the droning-on voice of a teacher, as students stare on, blankly:

In the Ferris Bueller movie context, this discussion of Smoot–Hawley was a stand-in for “a generic, dry academic topic,” one utterly boring and irrelevant in 1986 to born-circa-late-1960s students then in teenage. But it was also in the “everyone knows that” territory. (In the movie, it helped set the mood for conditions that induced Ferris Bueller to skip out on school for the day.)

In the movie you see the teacher repeat the familiar myth:

TEACHER: “[The Smoot–Hawley Tariff] did not work, and the United States sank deeper into the Great Depression.”

Tariffs can trigger major recessions, crater global commerce, sow seeds of world wars and concentration camps, and who knows what else. Troglodytes like tariffs, but right-thinking people treat them ad toxic. The foremost evidence for these claims, the “go to” reference, is Smoot–Hawley. Middle-brow and high-brow Americans who got good grades in school all know this. It is part of U.S. civic-mythology, as I’ve said. But is it true?

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The Trump-as-Caudillo theory revisited: Fighting Third Worldization through another form of Third Worldization?


[3000 words]

Shortly after the 2024 election, I proposed the term “Trump Caudillo Strategy.” (“Revisiting the ‘Sailer Strategy’ after the Trump-2024 victory; see the section at the end of that essay titled The Sailer Strategy vs. the Trump Caudillo Strategy).

Now, past the one-month mark of the Donald Trump second-term, I ask:

Is Trump ruling as a caudillo?

If so, what does that mean? He ran as a caudillo, and marketed himself as one (which appealed to Hispanics and others). At this point ,he is governing as one–albeit with certain personal twists. It is a path littered with danger along the waysides.

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Some are excited by Trump’s “U.S. president as caudillo” strategy. They see, or think they see, good things being done. I see a certain sluggishness on important things. I see a less-than-promising outcome compared to the what-could-have-been dreams of 2016.

In certain isolated respects, we can say 2025 is better than 2017. We also see demagogic frenzies over less-important things. We see much willy-nilly antagonism of allies without apparent purpose and other troubling things.

This man’s entire political movement was a great cry-in-the-wilderness political moment (long moment, now) to reverse Third Worldization. That’s the only reason he exists, politically. In ruling, he has adopted what really looks like a Third-World-like regime. (Remember much-mocked line somebody is reported to have said in 1968: “We had the destroy the village to save it.”)

The Trump-II administration moves are nominally to reverse Third Worldization. At least so his supporters believe and hope. It’s not at all clear what degree of commitment there is to this goal. That is a real problem. Without fierce moral commitment to a coherent agenda, it is a bad, bad thing indeed to have a government run by a narcissistic caudillo.

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The term caudillo is from Latin-American history. A caudillo is a paternal-autocratic leader. He is common throughout Latin-American history. Most Latin Americans recognize him readily. Many of them like him. He is tough, after all. He is a Big Man.

The caudillo‘s power, or let’s say his “regime,” is based heavily on personal networks and on charisma rather than disinterested principle. He is less on the common-good than we’d like from any government.

This term caudillo is readily adaptable to Trump and the way he has positioned himself politically, organizationally, culturally, and more, between the mid-2010s and mid-2020s. The term is apt given the turn towards rising popularity among Latin Americans in the USA, especially in the early 2020s. Hispanics, as well call them, turned towards Trump in some number despite the core-base support-layer rooted in White-ethnonationalism.

People have occasionally used this term, caudillo, to apply to Trump since the 2016 campaign. It is not a term that had ever previously gained much stock in U.S. (English). The fact that it caught on, is remarkable, suggesting its aptness to the situation.

Early in the Trump-I period, we saw this: “Trump is the U.S.’s first Latin American president,” by Ishaan Tharoor, Washington Post, Jan. 26, 2017. (I took the graphic accompanying this essay from that article.)

More recently, a star Chilean journalist named Daniel Matamala has been writing and speaking about the Trump-as-caudillo topic. He recently titled an analysis of Trump-as-president thusly: “El Caudillo Del Norte.”

Geopolitical commentator Peter Akuleyev wrote this one week after the November 2024 election:

“[Trump] is extremely Latino. Many of the things about Trump that read as strongly effeminate to old line Anglo-Saxon men, such as his make-up, Liberace like taste in furniture, weird little hand gestures, speaking in superlatives instead of a calm recitation of facts – read to Latino men as caudillo behavior.” (end quote from Peter Akuleyev)

All the way back in October 2015, the longtime Steve Sailer commenter Twinkie, of East-Asian-origin, had his finger on the pulse when he wrote:

“If elected, [Trump] would be the closest thing to a populist-corporatist caudillo we will have seen north of Mexico.” (end quote from Twinkie)

Dave Pinsen had similar thoughts in January 2016, writing:

“Trump would do better with blacks and Hispanics than Romney did. Trump has been the subject of rap songs. His lifestyle and unapologetic wealth will play better with average blacks than any of Rand Paul’s warmed over Kempism. Average Latinos are also likely to respect him as a caudillo.” (end quote from Dave Pinsen)

At the height of the Republican-primary campaigning, in March 2016, a commenter named Astorian wrote:

“Surely, of all the people running [for the Republican nomination in 2016], Donald Trump is the only one who has the look and feel of a Latin American caudillo” (end quote from Astorian)

Longtime Steve Sailer commenter Reg Caesar wrote, in response to Astorian in March 2016:

“He may be a caudillo, but he’s nuestro caudillo.” (end quote from Reg Caesar)

A few weeks later, in April 2016, still in the Republican-primary season, New York Times columnist Ross Douthat, a conservative, wrote:

“Donald Trump is clearly running to be an American caudillo, not the president of a constitutional republic, and his entire campaign is a cult of personality” (end quote from “Give Us a King!” by Ross Douthat, New York Times, April 30, 2016)

The comparisons kept coming, independently from other commentators, somewhat steadily, as the 2010s drew to a close. Sailer commenters Inquiring Mind and nebulafox wrote in January 2018:

“Mr. Trump is a very Latin American-style president. Not every Latin American leader is left wing. You got your left wing leaders and your very, very right wing leaders and all of them are “flamboyant” by U.S. standards? So could people consider that having Mr. Trump is a consequence of making the U.S. so much more Latin American, both in the intended as well as unintended ways? For the Open Our Borders to Latin America advocates, be careful what you wish for?” (end quote from Inquiring Mind)

“I personally think of Trump as the American Berlusconi. But I could see him as a right-wing Latin American leader-albeit of the corrupt, bombastic plutocrat type, not military caudillo kind.” (end quote from nebulafox)

Steve Sailer himself, who never endorsed Trump or turned himself into a pro-Trump propagandist een at th have, propitious possible moments when he could have, characterized Trump and his appeal thusly in December 2021:

“Trump [is] the kind of blond caudillo who appeals to the Latin spirit[.]” (end quote from Steve Sailer)

What each of these observers meant, exactly, by “caudillo” (or similar terms) may differ from case to case. Overall, though, it’s remarkable how prescient this commentary was. A great deal of the 2015-16 commentary remains applicable about a decade later.

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The point with the “caudillo” comparisons is not that Trump is supposedly a “populist.” Nor even that he is an “authoritarian,” “anti-democratic,” or other such buzzwords often heard. The specific strength of this term is that he is a Latin-American-flavored “strongman”-type leader, one whose approach, appeal, and philosophy are captured delightfully by the term.

The United States has never quite had a figure like that in the presidency. To find comparable figures one can only look to the annals of the history of the various Latin American republics.

When I proposed the term “Caudillo Strategy” in November 2024, I used it in a narrow sense, to refer to what Trump was doing in the 2024 campaign (and to some extent back to the 2010s). I used it to refer to the kind of appeal he was making, which was especially appealing to Latin Americans. This explains how he got more Nonwhite votes in 2024.

The “Caudillo Strategy” I contrasted, at the time, with the “Sailer Strategy.” The Sailer Strategy was the long-made argument that a White-Midwest-centric electoral coalition was the best path to win victories. In other words, appeal to marginal White-Christians and scoop up victories in the critical swing states in a Midwestern belt between Pennsylvania and Iowa.

The Sailer Strategy was demonstrably true, correct, the key, to the 2016 and 2024 victories. I argued so at the time. Despite being used imperfectly by Trump-2024, he still won with the Sailer Strategy. His victory was despite his actual neglect of the White-appealing Sailer Strategy, as he actually used a White-unappealing “Caudillo Strategy.” The momentum of Trump and the shock and outrage that someone like Kamala was being pushed forward as a plausible “President of the United States of America” was so outrageous that Trump was elected.

In November and December 2024, a lot of commentators made the wrong call, took the wrong lesson, in their various declarations that the Sailer Strategy was dead and that a Multiracial, Multicultural, Tough-Talking Caudillo Strategy was clearly-and-demonstrably superior. (Few if any commentators used these exact phrases; these are my own, but get to the heart of the thing.) I addressed this question of the Sailer Strategy’s correctness in 2024 in the essay “Revisiting the ‘Sailer Strategy’ after the Trump-2024 victory” and won’t do so further here.

In any case, the Trump Caudillo Strategy succeeded only because the Sailer Strategy was already in place. Call it piggybacking; or more negatively, if you wish, call it a degeneration of an original model.

The next step, however, was running the same sort of strategy when actually in government. That came in the early weeks of the Trump-II administration.

Whether it’s a good thing or not is a question we should be asking right now. We, as Western people, are committed (in principle) to a Western tradition of good government. We are committed to not tolerate Third World-style banana-republic politics and overt-nepotism and government-by-celebrity. The dilemma is, how to dislodge the problems of the USA in its postmodern, Third-Worldizing era. Problems, there are many. Is a caudillo the solution? Is this particular caudillo the solution? I know many are willing to give an unqualified “Yes,” to both. I cannot join them.

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Caudilloism, or Trumpist Caudilloism, as a defacto theory-and-practice of statecraft is simple and direct. As a theory of governing — that is to say, of running a polity — of reshaping the institutions of state, of the purpose of the state itself, of the role of a state’s leaders at home and abroad, it leaves much to be desired. Still the supporters are with him, because of implied promises of reversing Third Worldism, which there is little guarantee that he will pursue with any sort of sense of moral-mission.

The first month of Trump-II is full of signs of Caudilloism nestled into place. It’s not necessarily been effective, although we shouldn’t make judgements at this early date. We do know that Caudilloism, is by nature, not very effective. (See the “Sailer Strategy vs. the Trump Caudillo Strategy” for more discussion on that.)

A caudillo-like regime has been forced upon the U.S. executive branch, and as so often with classic Latin American caudillos also heavily influencing the legislative branch (most Latin American caudillos nominally led republics with nominal legislatures). It has all been done in an exciting or dramatic way: the Trump Show, per usual. It includes lots of anti-Wokeness sloganeering along the way. This sloganeering is exciting to many (and a quiet-relief to many more). A lot of the successes of the early weeks are reflective of Caudillo Trump’s marketing-savvy and decades as a hype-man for his own brand. Not all caudillos, historically, have done that. Many have. This one does.

Trump and his people have him as a tough-guy, big-man caudillo with centralized power, which flows through a patronage network around himself. There is a spirit of running roughshod over other nexuses of power, whatever they may be. He naturally wants flunkies. Characteristically for Trump, he sees in other demagogues and big-talkers — as long as they bend the knee to him and flatter him — a kind of spiritual-kin. One direct result is the large number of television personalities now nominally heading government agencies.

The big problem is this: He is running this Caudillo Strategy of Government without a core moral-ideological center. “He just makes things up as he goes along” is a common comment. That comment generally seems the best answer, a lot of the time. His consistent principles involve empowering his family and a taking-credit-and-moving-on maneuver he uses often. He doesn’t care about whether the thing he’s taken credit for was actually accomplished nor whether the accomplishment is a positive good for the ethnocultural core of the nation, nor of something as abstract as Western Civilization generally.

A caudillo regime (or Caudillo Strategy), if totally divided from a firm moral-ideological commitment — an ideology that is coherent and honorable, and which makes sense beyond slogans, personal whims, and close-in patronage networks — can become a little ridiculous, can sometimes turn dangerous, and eventually always undermines the state and civic culture. It’s generally a bad thing. Government on a basis of demagogic drifting along feelings-of-the-moment is a bad thing per se. White-Western people have known this for centuries. The tendency against this sort of rule might be said to trace back to prehistoric ancient times and the emergence of Western Man millennia ago (which is the argument of the political philosopher Curt Doolittle).

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Caudilloism is not a solution to Third Worldization. Caudilloism is Third Worldization.

The unlikely Trump victories of 2016 and 2024 (and the disputed-but-nominally-near-to-being-a-victory election of 2020) were votes by the White-Christian political-center against Third Worldization. U.S. developments for decades have included a kind of bottom-up, soft Third Worldization (actually a high-low coalition; that’s another story). Caudilloism is a case of overt-and-shocking, top-down Third Worldization.

Under Trump-II so far, we have seen the Caudillo Strategy in practice. We’ve seen people cheering or jeering. Predictable people cheer; predictable people jeer. A few dissenters have popped up, so far not enough to matter much.

Who does the cheering or jeering at the Trump-Caudillo moves of early 2025, and how loudly or committedly, depends on their chosen side. Their chosen side, that is, the politics-as-spectacle, politics-as-consumer-item cheerleading contest in this era of systematized “infotainment.”

(The term, infotainment, incidentally, was a jocular one when it was introduced in the mid-1980s. It referred to a light mixture of news or commentary with entertainment. “Infotainment” as a term or concept was still so-understood its heyday around the 1990s and early 2000s light items, fluff, not to be taken too seriously. By the close of the 2010s, the term “infotainment” had become almost obsolete as a concept: most everything that was nominally “information” or political discourse now resembled something more like the proposed “infotainment.” This is certainly true of a huge share of the consumption of political material on the Internet. It’s even true of many leading political figures: their m.o. resembles something like that of the characters from professional wrestling.)

It is largely White-Christians (along with a fair number of dual-citizens with Israel) who are the new heads of government departments and thus the face of the Trump-Caudilloist administration-regime. These faces do not change the spirit of Trump-Caudilloism. In classic Latin-American caudillo-type regimes, it was also often the White element that ran the state with “based brown guy” allies.

Today, we see the same: the White-caudillo rich-guy element and the base-brown-guy helpers like Vivek Ramaswamy. But here in the 21st century it is de rigueur to include also a lot of attention-seeking MAGA-women. Tulsi Gabbard, it’s just been reported, in her first week as “director of national intelligence” has studied the matter and decided there is too much sexism in the intelligence community. She has identified 115 males to terminate, on grounds of sexism. These men were not fired under Biden; they have been swiftly dumped under Trump/Tulsi! (Interesting! “MAGA are the real feminists”?)

Those cheering on the pro-Trump side, who remember the campaign-slogans and think they are real policy being determined with a fiery determination, they may still be right. I am not making any final judgements at the one-month mark of a 48-month presidency. I just don’t yet see it. A lot of people, U assume, vaguely think illegal-migrants are being deported because of a video clip they saw or a headline or two (media management). They’re so far not being deported at any abnormally high rate.

To those who think an unprecedented mass-deportation program is underway, the criticism of Trump-as-caudillo and why that’s bad is probably simply not comprehensible. Most people are low-info; but others are deeply morally committed to “confirming their priors.” This is definitely true, also, of the other side. (I’m reminded a bit here of the catastrophe of 2020 when the Pro-Panic coalition triumphed and held the whip hand for two long, dreary years. They never admitted their mistake.)

What are some of the immediate fruits of Trump-Caudilloism? A lot of really hardened demagogues with questionable motivations and clear non-suitability to power of a nominally-Western and White-Christian state are in, with consequences that cannot be foreseen. This includes the demagogue “Kash Patel,” and too many others to name. It also includes, frankly, Elon Musk.

These staffing decisions bear much in common with Trump’s reality-television background. A 21st-century media-guy’s variant on traditional caudilloism. Most of these people wouldn’t be there if their presence were based on strict judgement on experience and qualifications. They are where they should be based on personal-loyalty to the caudillo.

Normal functioning of the system, along with competence, are clearly secondary considerations. This often happens with caudillo-like regimes. The popular goal was the revitalizing White Middle America, of demographic stabilization and reversing inroads by non-Western immigrants, giving dignity back to Western Man, and giving the cultural-civilizational initiative back to Western Man, at the last in our own countries.

The typical classical caudillo, however, dealt with a substantially different reality: A White element was present in a typical Latin American society in which an old-style caudillo would rise to power. That White element was often not large, and intermarriages over generations undermined its integrity and the size of the full-White pool. The Whites in this kind of society and regime were often surrounded by Nonwhite elements of various shades and conditions. The landowning and other elite classes were often full-White with the occasional “Castizo”; as the generations went by, in many places a true full-European element was almost impossible to find and the quasi-White “Castizo” became replacement Whites for practical purposes.

By the way: see also the previous essay on the rise in the ideology of so-called Castizo Futurism on the dissident-Right. It grew directly from MAGA in the late 2010s, and found a place for itself happily within early-2020s MAGA. This movement, Castizo Futurism, reinforces the thrust of my Trump-as-Caudillo argument. (See: “On Caudillos, ‘Castizo Futurists,’ and a ‘steady de-Westernization of the USA under a right-wing banner’ scenario,” in “Sailer Strategy Revisited,” Nov. 2024.) (There are variants of this all over MAGA, such as J.D. Vance’s pride in his “Nonwhite sons,” who are in fact instant members of a high-caste Hindu global network.)

The typical caudillo of yore was interested in maximizing upper-class wealth and managing the rest. The typical caudillo regime was really “a tyranny of low expectations” in many ways. Is that Trump? Stripped of the bluster, the big-talk, the stage-managed theatrics, and the hype. Is it a tyranny of high-drama plus low expectations? He just wants to be let alone to declare victory and move on, and then be widely praised. Besides the consolidation of power around himself and an inner circle, what is his goal?

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Many-a caudillo would snap back and some of these criticisms made in this essay. They’d say: Hey, it’s the other guys who were/are the problem. Often, this means predecessors. They are the real ones who were unqualified! They ruined the country! Trump rarely neglects to blame Biden or others even when so doing is irrelevant. It’s a demagogue’s tactic. It’s also “weasel-wordy” and even dishonorable. Trump constantly engages in weasel-wordery and other forms of blame-shifting and buck-passing. It may even be a form of laziness, although few would use that word to describe Trump. A better word may be uncreative.

Not all demagogues are aspirant caudillos. Definitely not. Many demagogues are, in a sense, harmless. Many of them are comparable to con-men, out for money or attention. This type of demagogue has developed a skill in how to get those things through big-talk. Conversely, not all caudillos are demagogues. Many caudillos shun demagogic big-talk and prefer to be silent and handle things with a veil of dignified silence. Trump, however, has the instincts of both the demagogue and the caudillo.

Trump has gotten very lucky: His opponents were often quite ineffective (and were demagogues themselves in many cases), and his own demagogic skills tapped into a huge reservoir of decades-in-the-making White resentment against their orchestrated dispossession. This in addition to his pre-existing celebrity and the political-cult that developed around him, was enough for his unlikely-and-undeserved string of victories.

The problem with elevating such a figure as this became clear soon enough: His demagogic instincts are turned against friends and allies. White-Western institutions are undermined and made into a bit of a farce. His fans will still cheer, but I cannot join them if I see so much less commitment to such things as reversing Third Worldization, encouraging large-scale removals of illegals, and a firm demographic-stabilization policy. Does he really seek to fight Third Worldization by turning to another kind of Third Worldization (Caudilloism)? Alongside “based brown-guy” allies and girl-power-MAGA allies?

A reality-TV-inflected variant of the Caudillo Strategy is a troubling thing. It’s troubling for all the classic reasons that we in the Western tradition have tended to hold the caudillo (as type) in disdain, as a sometimes-necessary-evil at best. I see it as a tragedy that it was Trump who ended up in the role he did.

Yes, it’s the fault of the Woke Left, for they gave fuel to the fires kept burning for years by the various smaller-time demagogues in this new Trump-Caudillo world. Yes, Wokeness did need to be confronted and reversed. In system terms, we can say the fault of the inability of a non-Woke Left to suppress their wackos (as some on the Left have been saying lately). To stop there, though, is to fail to meet the issue of the day.

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The persistence of “high trust” in Europe west of the Hajnal Line and the future of Western uniqueness in the 21st century


What is the West? What is the source of Western success? How are Western people different from others (“the Rest”)? What is unique about the West?

Many volumes can be written on these questions. A large amount, however, is captured in the sociological concept(s) of High Trust versus Low Trust. The West is relatively high trust. This one metric, “trust,” symbolizes a lot of things, good things at social scale, if you can get and keep them. High trust both reflects and creates functional institutions; it is associated with positive feedback-loops. As the political philosopher Curt Doolittle has written:

“What is Europe? It is a civilization defined by heroism, excellence, beauty; by sovereignty, reciprocity; by capital-t Truth and duty. It is “truth before face, regardless of cost,” which is something that only heroes can bear.”

Within Europe, however, we see a definite gradient towards a Western “core” and a “periphery.” The core is northwest of the “Hajnal Line”:

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Quantifying the West’s super-power: social trust

My goal here is to present some findings and observations from a recent look-through I did through the latest World Values Survey. One question in particular (Q61) shows the Hajnal Line division so starkly that it begs close consideration. I give the matter its due with this medium-long essay (7500 words). We stand at the cusp of the “mid-21st century” — the year 2025 being year-one of the second quarter of this century of ours — and the direction of the West is an evergreen topic.

The most-recent round of the World Values Survey (WSV) had seven questions asking how much respondents trust various sorts of people. Respondents are statistically-randomly selected respondents in dozens of countries. The WSV employs the best in statistical sampling methods and is long considered a gold-standard for international apples-to-apples comparisons of this kind.

Much sociological work has been done from the WSV results, including this famous cultural map:

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Here are the World Values Survey questions related to trust: Q57.) agree/disagree “Most people can be trusted”; Q58.) Trust in your family; Q59.) Trust in your neighborhood; Q60.) Trust in people you know personally; Q61.) Trust in people you meet for the first time; Q62.) Trust in people of another religion; Q63.) Trust in people of another nationality.

Looking at the results of Q61, “Trust in people you meet for the first time,” we see a really remarkable variance across regions of Europe. The highest-trust by a good margin is Northwest Europe; parts of western- and central-Europe is mid-to-high trust; while far-eastern Europe, southeastern Europe, the Balkans, and parts of the Mediterranean-fringe are low trust.

Here is the raw data for Q61:

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Sorting these responses from highest-trust to lowest-trust divides sharply and clearly along “Hajnal Line lines” (see List 1, List 2, List 3 below); just how much this is so, and what it means for past, present, and future of Europe and the West, will be the goal of the rest of this essay.

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Revisiting the “Sailer Strategy” after the Trump-2024 victory: Whites cast 80%+ of Trump’s votes, but some call the Sailer Strategy obsolete–Why?


The Sailer Strategy, proposed in the early 2000s by Steve Sailer, argued that the Republican Party’s focus should to maximize its share of White votes, and specifically on Whites in Midwest states. Appeals should be made to the White voters there, not goose-chases to chase Nonwhite votes across the map in a blunderbuss approach.

The Sailer Strategy implicitly said that the R side should shift towards policies White-Midwest voters like, amounting to a message of: We are for you, the other side is for Third Worldization. This was a rather radical proposition back in the 2000s. But by the 2020s, it’s seen as a kind of self-evident truth. The Big-Blue coalition dislikes this strategy because they have seen, now, twice that it works:

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A large majority of the attention in the 2024 election focused on exactly the states Sailer pointed to twenty years earlier. Some have called Steve Sailer a prophet of the Trump-MAGA movement, or at least the Trump electoral strategy, for that reason. Trump implemented the Sailer Strategy implicitly, to greater or lesser degree. And twice won with it.

The idea with the original Sailer Strategy was: if even a limited number of Whites in those states could be persuaded to defect to the Republicans, the states would tip like dominos and assure Republican victories: a stable and winning electoral-coalition strategy, all hinging on improving the White vote-share by the Republicans. This sounds like an obvious strategy, but was not really being used in the 1990s or 2000s at any scale. Certainly not in any of the presidential campaigns.

The political-prophet Steve Sailer (b.1958), a California native, had witnessed California tip into a strange mutant of a once-classic-American region: a “D-supermajority, high-low coalition, political oblivion.” Sailer knew the importance of rallying Whites before, as it were, “it’s too late.” It may have been “too late” for California already in the 1980s. Enough people didn’t quite realize it until the 1990s, well past a point-of-no-return. The big fight of our time involves a national-scale version of California. (The D side and the Regime know it well.)

In any case, now that Trump has won the U.S. presidency for the term January 2025 to January 2029, we have time to re-assess. People are scrambling to figure out what it all means.

The question of the day, in the mid-2020s, is whether the higher number of Nonwhite votes that Trump secured running in 2024 against Kamala, the worst candidate in U.S. history, whether that indicates that the Sailer Strategy is obsolete. I say it is not obsolete, but this is a problem that needs to be walked through, a bit. And so in this essay I “revisit” the Sailer Strategy. I am hopeful that the man himself will soon get around to writing a full-form appraisal of the career of his own eponymous strategy. I have a feeling he will.

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[4000 words]

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On the metapolitics of Israel and Jewish ideological-power relations with the West: Dennis Dale on “blood libel” mythology and Israel’s wars


The State of Israel’s neverending supply of wars, confrontations, terror-bombings, mafia-like assassinations, blackmail, occupations, and ‘ethnic cleansing’ operations is a useful jumping-off point for a deeper ideological-political discussion that needs having: The psycho-political and ethno-political aspects to relations between the Jews and the West.

After all, we Westerners are the historical host-population[s], and current-day patrons (as some would call it), of Israel today. We cannot dismiss the nuclear-armed mafia-state of Israel and its neverending aggression and destabilization as something distant, something of which we can wash our hands.

And the Jewish intellectual-tradition, so influential and successful in the 20th century, casts a long shadow. We still tread here in that shadow at the cusp of the mid-21st century. Discussions that need ‘having’ stare on from just beyond the veil, waiting to be had.

Dennis Dale delivers, in excellent form:

Dennis Dale writes without fear or favor, in the best tradition of the essayist. In other words, he is no toady and no coward. He thinks, and allows himself to write, from an uncompromised, uncompromising pro-Western position. That also with discipline and thoughtfulness.

Mr. Dale’s essay “Israel slaughtering children, Jews hardest hit” (October 2024, Dennis Dale Untethered blog; see also Substack-mirrored version) is not actually primarily about Israel. It is about Jewish-Western relations and the course of civilizational history. In other words, it is a big step above merely scrapping over the headlines.

Ideas are power: The concepts of Jewish moral-superiority and White-Christian moral-inferiority, and how these translate into power terms, matter. There is no way to understand Israel and its wars, and the West’s strangely-passive-patron positioning, without these ideas. The exact same applies to the West’s wider civilizational course. But the middle-of-the-road Westerner — certainly the middle-of-the-road North American — never ‘sees’ these things discussed directly. He lacks the power, therefore, to even think about them. A useful purpose is served thereby, by the side that orchestrates this conspiracy-of-silence.

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Kamala Harris and “female solipsistic-narcissism” in the realm of the political, in early-21st-century USA


[2500 words]

Peak Stupidity suggested recently that Kamala “may have never expected to get this far up in public life” (emphasis mine).

The short response to this is: This would be a valid observation if Kamala were a male. But with Kamala, we enter a world of female solipsism.

An understanding of “solipsism” as applied to the political is key to understanding Kamala. It is key to understanding applied feminism, Wokeness, and really our politics and culture generally in the 21st-century.

In women and people of non-Western origin, there is a tendency towards believing in magic as regards their personal situations, in their personal worlds. You see it even in relatively-high-IQ, high-functioning people. It is solipsistic narcissism at work. That’s Kamala.

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(This ‘meme’ is at once satirical and non-satirical.)

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“Too many preachy females dominating the culture of the Democratic Party,” said longtime Democratic strategist (and White-male) James Carville in early 2024. Many more such commentaries came out in late-July and early-August 2024, comparing the Democratic Party’s latest attack on White Republicans as “weird,” for being a sign of a fully feminized party, a “Mean Girls” tactic. This from a syndicated column by Daniel McCarthy, “Kamala Harris and the ‘Mean Girls’ election,” July 30, 2024:

“Immigration, foreign crises, inflation — Harris is faced with all the failures of the administration she shares with Biden, without having his decades of experience to draw upon. So instead of making issues her signature — other than abortion — she’s conducting her campaign like it’s a deleted scene from ‘Mean Girls.’ 

Like cliquish teenagers bullying their classmates, the Harris team has taken to labeling their rivals ‘weird.’ Campaign statements and social media posts brand Trump ‘old and quite weird’ and his running mate, J.D. Vance, ‘weird’ and ‘creepy’.”

The feminization of the Democratic Party will also tend to empower solipsism, and its malignant psychological-political offspring, “solipsistic narcissism.”

Some psychological theorists state that “solipsism” is the default thinking-mode for women. They say this is, evolutionarily, necessarily so. It is vital that she who takes care of children care intensely about immediate surroundings, to keep the child(ren) alive and healthy. At social-scale, that same kind of solipsism, applies to the realm of ideas and policies, leads in bad directions.

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The Democratic Party as ‘apparatus’ and as Regime-party; a reflection on how power works in the USA, one day after the anti-Biden palace-coup succeeds


Biden was removed in palace coup. The principal events of the coup played out over twenty-four days starting abruptly in late-evening June 27, 2024. The lessons for how “power” works in the U.S. system are there for the taking.

The coup-plotters were identified by many of us in late June already. Ann Coulter did so, publicly, on July 8; by many others, including me, in late June already. Biden likely also saw it, despite his administration’s top-heaviness with same ethnopolitical element that took him down.

This was what Biden said on July 8 when faced with the coup-plotting by Pharisees, and in an above-board sense there is no denying he has a point:

“Do we now just say [the Democratic-primary] process didn’t matter? That the voters don’t have a say? I decline to do that. I feel a deep obligation to the faith and the trust the voters of the Democratic Party have placed in me to run this year. It was [the Democratic Party voters’] decision to make. Not the press, not the pundits, not the big donors, not any selected group of individuals… How can we stand for democracy in our nation if we ignore it in our own party?” — Joe Biden, July 8, 2024

The pressure by the “press, pundits, celebrities, and big donors” was ceaseless, a nonstop deluge of propaganda resembling wartime disinfo-operations, fabrication of narratives, or something out of the early Corona-Panic itself. They had normally only run ‘ops’ like this against Trump. A lot of people noticed this and were uncomfortable with it; but the deluge never stopped, except for a few-day reprieve after the July 13 shooting of Trump.

Ann Coulter, on the same day as Biden made his strongest case for staying (July 8), said:

“The New York Times and the ‘donors’ are one-hundred-percent opposed to Biden… The Democrats will do anything to replace their candidate, if they think that candidate is going to lose… The only people standing by Biden are Black people. This entire fight [over whether Biden should be removed] is between the Blacks and the Jews. Those are the two most-important constituencies of the Democratic Party. We’ll see who wins. My bet’s on the Jews.”

That was Ann Coulter voicing a view that she (along with the betting-markets) had come to, probably already in late June . The early voices shrilly raising the bloody-shirt and demanding Biden be killed-off and dumped in the ocean were almost all members of the ethnopolitical group that Ann Coulter mentioned there. One can check the early names.

Of those releasing “Biden Must Go!” invectives within the first 36 to 48 hours, almost all the names match up; many are dual-citizens or have family-ties to the IDF, and the like. It was obvious to me, already by midday or so June 28 (<18 hours after the debate), what was happening, by whom, for whom. Here was a comment from June 28th at Peak Stupidity:

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The British political-jailbreak attempt of 2024: Reflections on the attempt to destroy the Conservative Party


[4,000 words]

The British people are nearing a revolutionary mood, or so it seems. Such a mood they expressed, this year, on the day associated with the American Revolution: the Fourth of July.

In the British general election of July 4, 2024, the UK’s Conservative Party got its worst-ever result. A specter now haunts the land, a specter of a White ethnonationalist political-force willing to act in concert and punish those who betray it.

The new oft-ethnonationalist political-bloc is no single party, no niche movement. It is psychological. It has declared itself the enemy of the Conservative Party (and vice versa). The cordon sanitaire is broken. Just as we have seen elsewhere Western Europe. Britain, a late-comer to this game, has finally arrived. Welcome.

The results I give in popular-vote terms:

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The table, my own, shows the magnitude of the anti-Conservative political revolt. The scale of vote-shift may not seem like a lot, but there are many reasons to take these results as a major milestone, as will become clear in this essay.

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Again to fall back to the “Fourth of July” connection: The UK’s Conservative Party has long carried the nickname “Tories,” the name as used by the pro-royalist faction of British politics in centuries past. In the 1770s-80s, the “Tories” were opposed to the independence movement by the North American colonies, and every American will have heard the term “Tories” in history class to refer, at least, to anti-independence residents of the North American colonies.

The July 4, 2024 election date was set by the Hindu-Indian-origin prime minister, Rishi Sunak. What an interesting alignment across time. The 1776 incident associated with that date was an anti-Tory revolt; the 2024 election back home, associated with the date, was likewise an anti-Tory revolt.

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A study of White ethnic-dispossession and ‘replacement’: Maryland’s Prince George’s County, 1970s to 1990s


Last week, a Steve Sailer commenter named Colin Wright recalled a scene from his life, some years ago, in which he had helped a friend in Washington, D.C., move house: “[Every] night, dog-tired after putting in our twelve-fourteen hours, we’d get lost [on the way to our accommodations] and wind up cruising DC’s ghetto for an hour in the dark. I did not need that. Not with everything else.”

To this came a reply from Ennui, apparently former area resident of the area, with more tips. Ennui said that among the areas to “avoid” in the Washington, D.C. region was the entirety of Prince George’s County. That’s quite a statement statement given how big the county is.

That’s Prince George’s County, in the state of Maryland: 482.5 square miles in size (1250 sq km). eight times the land-area size of the “District of Columbia,” which it borders to the east. Here is a map:

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Prince George’s County is a racial-political tragedy. Prince George’s County is the story of the perils of migration and ideology. It is a story of U.S. “race politics” in a sense, but it bears lessons for Western Man wherever he may be found. South African Whites will recognize the story, at a far-larger scale.

Prince George’s County was, within living memory, 90%-White. That was as of the 1960s. Today, the active population is something below 10% White, and many of those are elderly who’ve never bothered moving or otherwise embedded in all-Black environments in one way or another. Of core-population and the family-raising population, it’s far below even 10%.

Prince George’s County late-20th century story was a true, “Great Replacement. Whites, out; Blacks, in. How? Why? When?

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