vlang
diff --git a/Collapse file
‎vlib/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha.v‎
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+16-16Lines changed: 16 additions & 16 deletions b/Collapse file
‎vlib/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha.v‎
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+16-16Lines changed: 16 additions & 16 deletions
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‎vlib/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_64bitctr_test.v‎
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+2-2Lines changed: 2 additions & 2 deletions b/Collapse file
‎vlib/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_64bitctr_test.v‎
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+2-2Lines changed: 2 additions & 2 deletions
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‎vlib/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_test.v‎
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‎vlib/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_test.v‎
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+2-2Lines changed: 2 additions & 2 deletions
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ enum CipherMode {
 pub fn encrypt(key []u8, nonce []u8, plaintext []u8) ![]u8 {
 	mut stream := new_stream(key, nonce)!
 	mut dst := []u8{len: plaintext.len}
-	stream.keystream_full(mut dst, plaintext)
+	stream.keystream_full(mut dst, plaintext)!
 	unsafe { stream.reset() }
 	return dst
 }
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ pub fn encrypt(key []u8, nonce []u8, plaintext []u8) ![]u8 {
 pub fn decrypt(key []u8, nonce []u8, ciphertext []u8) ![]u8 {
 	mut stream := new_stream(key, nonce)!
 	mut dst := []u8{len: ciphertext.len}
-	stream.keystream_full(mut dst, ciphertext)
+	stream.keystream_full(mut dst, ciphertext)!
 	unsafe { stream.reset() }
 	return dst
 }
@@ -94,14 +94,8 @@ pub fn (mut c Cipher) xor_key_stream(mut dst []u8, src []u8) {
 
 	mut idx := 0
 	mut src_len := src.len
-	// check for counter overflow
-	num_blocks := (u64(src_len) + block_size - 1) / block_size
-	if c.Stream.check_ctr(num_blocks) {
-		panic('chacha20: internal counter overflow')
-	}
 
 	dst = unsafe { dst[..src_len] }
-
 	if subtle.inexact_overlap(dst, src) {
 		panic('chacha20: invalid buffer overlap')
 	}
@@ -129,21 +123,27 @@ pub fn (mut c Cipher) xor_key_stream(mut dst []u8, src []u8) {
 	full := src_len - src_len % block_size
 	if full > 0 {
 		src_block := unsafe { src[idx..idx + full] }
-		c.Stream.keystream_with_blocksize(mut dst[idx..idx + full], src_block)
+		c.Stream.keystream_with_blocksize(mut dst[idx..idx + full], src_block) or {
+			c.Stream.overflow = true
+			panic('chacha20: xor_key_stream leads to counter overflow')
+		}
 	}
 	idx += full
 	src_len -= full
 
-	// If we have a partial block, pad it for chacha20_block_generic, and
+	// If we have a partial block, pad it for keystream_with_blocksize, and
 	// keep the leftover keystream for the next invocation.
 	if src_len > 0 {
 		// Make sure, internal buffer cleared or the old garbaged data from previous call still there
 		// See the issue at https://github.com/vlang/v/issues/24043
 		unsafe { c.block.reset() } //  = []u8{len: block_size}
 		// copy the last src block to internal buffer, and performs
-		// chacha20_block_generic on this buffer, and stores into remaining dst
+		// keystream_with_blocksize on this buffer, and stores into remaining dst
 		_ := copy(mut c.block, src[idx..])
-		c.Stream.keystream_with_blocksize(mut c.block, c.block)
+		c.Stream.keystream_with_blocksize(mut c.block, c.block) or {
+			c.Stream.overflow = true
+			panic('chacha20: xor_key_stream leads to counter overflow')
+		}
 		n := copy(mut dst[idx..], c.block)
 		// the length of remaining bytes of unprocessed keystream
 		c.length = block_size - n
@@ -156,18 +156,18 @@ pub fn (mut c Cipher) xor_key_stream(mut dst []u8, src []u8) {
 // Its added to allow `chacha20poly1305` modules to work without key stream fashion.
 // TODO: integrates it with the rest
 @[direct_array_access]
-pub fn (mut c Cipher) encrypt(mut dst []u8, src []u8) {
+pub fn (mut c Cipher) encrypt(mut dst []u8, src []u8) ! {
 	if src.len == 0 {
 		return
 	}
 	if dst.len < src.len {
-		panic('chacha20: dst buffer is to small')
+		return error('chacha20: dst buffer is to small')
 	}
 	if subtle.inexact_overlap(dst, src) {
-		panic('chacha20: invalid buffer overlap')
+		return error('chacha20: invalid buffer overlap')
 	}
 
-	c.Stream.keystream_full(mut dst, src)
+	c.Stream.keystream_full(mut dst, src)!
 }
 
 // free the resources taken by the Cipher `c`. Dont use cipher after .free call
 
@@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ fn test_chacha20_encrypt_with_64bit_counter() ! {
 
 		mut c := new_cipher(key, nonce)!
 		mut dst := []u8{len: plaintext.len}
-		c.encrypt(mut dst, plaintext)
+		c.encrypt(mut dst, plaintext)!
 		assert dst == ciphertext
 
 		// decrypts the ciphertext back
 		// we need rekey the ciphers, because internal states has changed from previous invocations.
 		c.rekey(key, nonce)!
-		c.encrypt(mut dst, ciphertext)
+		c.encrypt(mut dst, ciphertext)!
 		assert dst == plaintext
 	}
 }
 
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ fn test_chacha20_cipher_encrypt_with_xor_keystream() ! {
 		cs.set_counter(c.counter)
 
 		mut output := []u8{len: plaintext_bytes.len}
-		cs.encrypt(mut output, plaintext_bytes)
+		cs.encrypt(mut output, plaintext_bytes)!
 
 		expected := hex.decode(c.output)!
 		assert output == expected
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ fn test_chacha20_cipher_decrypt_with_xor_keystream() ! {
 		cs.set_counter(c.counter)
 
 		mut output := []u8{len: ciphertext.len}
-		cs.encrypt(mut output, ciphertext)
+		cs.encrypt(mut output, ciphertext)!
 
 		expected_decrypted_message := hex.decode(c.plaintext)!
 		assert output == expected_decrypted_message
Original file line number	Diff line number	Diff line change
`@@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ fn test_chacha20_encrypt_with_64bit_counter() ! {`
`97`	`97`
`98`	`98`	`mut c := new_cipher(key, nonce)!`
`99`	`99`	`mut dst := []u8{len: plaintext.len}`
`100`		`- c.encrypt(mut dst, plaintext)`
	`100`	`+ c.encrypt(mut dst, plaintext)!`
`101`	`101`	`assert dst == ciphertext`
`102`	`102`
`103`	`103`	`// decrypts the ciphertext back`
`104`	`104`	`// we need rekey the ciphers, because internal states has changed from previous invocations.`
`105`	`105`	`c.rekey(key, nonce)!`
`106`		`- c.encrypt(mut dst, ciphertext)`
	`106`	`+ c.encrypt(mut dst, ciphertext)!`
`107`	`107`	`assert dst == plaintext`
`108`	`108`	`}`
`109`	`109`	`}`