| CARVIEW |
afghanhindsight
global peace and conflict analysis
Afghanistan in 2026
Summary: Little to be optimistic about – humanitarian, security and economic prospects remain very poor. The Taliban regime remains unrecognised around the world and has been condemned for widespread abuse of human rights, most notably for its suppression of women, which will remain damaging to society and the economy. The Taliban leadership is opaque but the regime still appears stable, with little evidence of effective resistance both within and without the Taliban. Violence levels will stay low. But events and geo-politics (US intervention, clashes with Pakistan, humanitarian crises, internal resistance and popular protest) are realistic possibilities and have the potential to trigger change.
“Roza Otunbayeva, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, told ambassadors that while the country has seen a relative decline in armed conflict since the Taliban takeover in 2021, the humanitarian, economic and human rights situation has deteriorated significantly.
‘It is an open question whether there is sufficient pragmatism among the de facto authorities [the Taliban] to manage this perfect storm of crises, or whether decisions driven by ideology will prevent sustainable solutions,’ she said.”[1]
Current situation:
Afghanistan remains in a state of economic and societal turmoil.[2] The humanitarian situation is extremely bleak, with little evidence that the Taliban know how to address the problems.[3] There is a drought, food insecurity, a freeze on government finances and widespread unemployment affecting Afghanistan.[4] The healthcare system is under extreme pressure.[5] A “brain drain” of those seeking to flee the Taliban is likely to make it hard for the Taliban to get the country on an even keel.[6] Violence, instability, and humanitarian challenges will continue to impact Afghanistan for the foreseeable future with the only security provided by poorly trained Taliban fighters, ill-versed in the application of human rights.[7]
There are many thousands of Afghan refugees inside neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Both countries are now in the process of forcibly deporting these refugees back into Afghanistan.[8] This includes many who have fled Afghanistan to escape the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 and are seeking to get to other countries via asylum and other legal processes.[9] In July 2025, news broke of a large UK MOD data leak potentially revealing the identity of thousands of Afghan for government and military personnel, together with their families.[10] Although it remains unclear the extent to which the Taliban may have this list, multiple credible reports show that the Taliban continue to target and kill former members of the previous government’s army, police and intelligence forces.[11]
Assessing the developing situation in Afghanistan is difficult. The Taliban regime aggressively attempt to control the media and information environment across Afghanistan, making for hostile and non-permissive conditions for data collection, dissemination and analysis. Many international NGOs, aid agencies and journalists have withdrawn from Afghanistan or are now operating under an extremely repressive regime which seeks to prevent general access to any information that might present the Taliban in a negative light or allow opportunities to criticise their system of government. The Taliban are monitoring and restricting access to social media in Afghanistan.[12] The most powerful manifestation of this repression is the Taliban’s persecution of journalists.[13]
Attacks on the media are not new Taliban tactics and are highly likely to continue in 2026. Since taking power in August 2021, the Taliban have placed many restrictions on media activities across the country.[14] Many media organisations, including social media, TV and radio stations, have been targeted and intimidated in order to prevent or regulate media reporting that challenges or questions the Taliban, their policies and their interpretation of Islam. Journalists are regularly, detained, harassed and beaten.[15] A Human Rights Watch’s report from October 2025 concludes:
“The Taliban have gutted Afghan media since taking control of the country in August 2021 through the use of surveillance and censorship and by punishing media workers for perceived criticism. As the Taliban’s oppression of the media has increased, the need for independent news outlets in Afghanistan has become even greater. Journalists described both the harsh conditions in Afghanistan and growing challenges facing those living in exile…Media freedom has declined throughout Afghanistan over the past four years under Taliban rule. News outlets report that the Taliban’s intelligence agency monitors all content…Local officials enforce official rules arbitrarily, leading to varying degrees of censorship across provinces.”[16]
Key issues for 2026:
The Taliban’s rule
The Taliban seized power violently in August 2021. Because of the nature of their coming to power and the aggressive enforcement of their own specific interpretation of Sharia law, the regime remains unrecognised by the world, with the exception of Russia, who formally recognised the Taliban as the rulers of Afghanistan in July 2025.[17] The strict enforcement of Sharia law remains at the core of the Taliban’s beliefs, including beatings, amputations and beheading as punishments.[18] In August 2024, the Taliban released a “The Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” (PVPV) law imposing a range of restrictions on behaviour, dress and other social conduct. It has been described by the United Nations as “a deeply discriminatory and regressive law”.[19] The Taliban leadership and its intelligence services are notoriously opaque. It is always difficult to get a clear sense of what the Taliban are actually thinking, planning and doing. The Taliban leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, remains largely hidden from public view, surrounded by a closed group of Pushtun religious elders. He rarely ventures outside of Kandahar province.[20] Over the years, much analytical time and effort has been spent assessing whether there are significant divisions, disagreements and rival factions (“moderate Taliban”) likely to cause the Taliban to weaken or splinter.[21] The Taliban leadership place a strict emphasis on loyalty and unity.[22] There certainly appear to be disagreements over Taliban policies – most notably the ban on education of women and the almost complete exclusion of them from society (travel, education, employment and social interaction). As to whether these internal views are likely to make themselves known more forcefully in 2026, it is unclear but it seems unlikely.
Security situation
There are several anti-Taliban groups established across the country – the National Resistance Front (NRF) headed by Ahmed Masoud and Amrullah Saleh) is the largest resistance force. But violence levels appear low level, sporadic and confined to small-scale incidents and ambushes. Islamic State retains a small presence but also appears to have had limited impact on Taliban rule. There still appears little appetite amongst the population for a return to significant fighting. Anti-Taliban groups are only likely to make headway against the Taliban if they receive significant external political, military and financial backing, of which there is currently little sign. A recent UN Security Council report notes:
“These groups, however, are fragmented and uncoordinated, and they do not currently significantly threaten the stability of the regime.”[23]
Economic conditions
Although by some measures there has been an uptick in the Afghan economy, economic prospects are poor and likely to be hard to sustain.[24] International community engagement and funding has decreased.[25] There is no unemployment benefit, other than stealing, begging and hand-outs from aid agencies.[26] There are many thousands of Afghan refugees inside neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. Both countries are now in the process of forcibly deporting these refugees back into Afghanistan.[27] This includes many who have fled Afghanistan to escape the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 and are seeking to get to other countries via asylum and other legal processes.[28]
In June 2025, the United Nations assessed that there were 3.2 million conflict-induced internally displaced persons (IDP) in Afghanistan, 1.65 million IDP returnees and about 21,000 refugees, out of an approximate population of 44 million.[29] The issue has been complicated by the massed deportation of millions of Afghans from neighbouring countries, particularly Iran and Pakistan. Many IDPs gravitate to Kabul and other major urban cities, like Herat and Mazar-e Sharif. Many are reluctant to return to their home areas, because they are unable to assure financial assistance, social support, employment, access to housing and land and a stable security situation.[30] Others are currently located in areas where there have been recent natural disasters, such as earthquakes are in border areas having been forcibly returned from Iran and Pakistan or because of the recent border clashes.[31]
Humanitarian
The United Nations has reported that over half of the population are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance.[32] Millions of the population are in highly vulnerable situations, as a result of climate, drought, earthquakes, ongoing conflict or the results of earlier conflicts.[33] Afghan infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed after decades of conflict. Aid takes the form of various types – money/cash, food, resources and healthcare – and comes from many different sources: the United Nations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, The European Union, the World Food Programme, individual countries (particularly the United States) and many aid agencies.[34] Some of the assistance is emergency relief – to support earthquake victims of the hundreds of thousands forcibly deported from Iran and Pakistan. Other assistance is longer term – for example help to clear mines and unexploded ammunition, cash handouts to local communities and the provision of seeds and agricultural support.[35]
There are still major challenges getting humanitarian aid into Afghanistan – many nations and international organisations do not recognise the Taliban regime, others find it difficult for their staff to operate in the country due to Taliban regulations and restrictions, particularly in relation to the employment of women in aid activities.[36] Not all the aid judged necessary is reaching Afghanistan.[37] The current US government abruptly closed down USAID. The cessation of USAID resources to Afghanistan will likely have a further negative impact in 2026.[38]
International
The geo-political situation facing the Taliban is complicated. They have fallen out with Pakistan over Pakistani accusations – with some justification – that the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) are using Afghanistan as a base from which to attack Pakistani government and military targets. There is some irony here: Pakistan had a policy of allowing the Afghan Taliban to base themselves in Pakistan to attack the Afghan government and international forces between 2001 and 2021. Increased border clashes and even Pakistani use of drones and airstrikes into Afghanistan are likely to continue into 2026. Friction with Pakistan might need a more pragmatic India/Taliban relationship – India remaining only too happy to cause Pakistan discomfort in what it considers its “backyard”. In 2026, Taliban tensions with Iran and Pakistan will likely be exacerbated by further aggressive forced returns of Afghans back into Afghanistan, where the Taliban will continue to struggle to absorb thousands of unwilling returnees, many of whom lack accommodation and other basic humanitarian needs.
And the Taliban will remain highly suspicious of the potential for Western involvement in Afghanistan.[39] These are volatile times – Donald Trump’s government is making inflammatory statements about Afghanistan.[40] Heightened by the media furore around the revelations of the UK MOD data leak it is clear to the Taliban that many former intelligence, military and former government officials are now safe in Western countries. From the Taliban’s perspective, faced with armed resistance internally and hostility from all directions abroad, they almost certainly see a collection of prominent Afghan government and military commanders (including Special Forces and intelligence personnel) gathered in the US, UK and the West as a hostile force that could be used for “regime change” against them.
Outlook:
So there is no particular “good news” on the horizon for Afghanistan. There are no clear indicators that dramatic political, military, economic or social change is likely in Afghanistan in 2026. The Taliban regime itself is likely to remain broadly stable – obsessed with unity and developing an increasingly aggressive intelligence and surveillance apparatus. The Taliban will continue struggle with governance, favouring fellow Taliban, Pushtuns and religious qualifications over secular education and state-building skills. The abandonment of the female half of the population (termed “gender apartheid” by the United Nations) will continue to have multiple and deeply negative impacts on Afghanistan’s society and economy. It is highly likely that the Taliban are unpopular, but the absence of large-scale conflict in the country remains a powerful incentive for many to continue to accept the regime. The international community’s political, financial and humanitarian capital has dwindled and what remains has been largely distracted by other pressing global developments (climate change, AI, Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, Venezuela…). Internal anti-Taliban resistance, with the NRF at the fore, will remain a nuisance to the Taliban but unlikely to score a significant blow against the Taliban.
Afghan minority groups – ethnic, religious, social and gender (if the entire female population can be described as “minority) – will continue to suffer surveillance, control and persecution. The economic and humanitarian conditions will remain extremely poor. Large parts of the population will be dependent on NGOs, charities and aid agencies for the crucial humanitarian work (housing, food, healthcare…) that the Taliban struggle with.
If “no significant change likely” is the broad and pessimistic conclusion for Afghanistan in 2026, there are always a range of a range of plausible and less plausible developments to watch out for:
- US military intervention – Donald Trump’s government is highly unpredictable but he is known to consider Bagram airbase (a huge former Soviet airbase north of Kabul) to be a US strategic asset and has also demanded the return of the millions of dollars of US military hardware abandoned during the August 2021 US evacuation. Prognosis – unlikely: US currently distracted in South America and elsewhere. US force projection into Afghanistan would be very difficult militarily.
- Clashes with Pakistan – violence at the borders, crossing point closures and even escalated forms of conflict (artillery, soldiers and airstrikes). Prognosis – probable: Pakistan remains very touchy about the presence of the TTP in Afghanistan.
- Clash with Iran – border clashes as a result of the poor treatment of Afghan deportees (including deaths). Prognosis – likely: but low level in scale.
- Internal terrorism – Islamic State terror attack, other terrorist groups, e.g. attack into Kabul or against Chinese workers and other international targets. Prognosis – realistic possibility.
- Increased scale of attacks by anti-Taliban resistance – greater frequency, over a wider area, increased Taliban casualties. Prognosis – realistic possibility: and might indicate increased international backing beyond Afghanistan.
- Taliban increased crack down on a minority group. Prognosis – realistic possibility: perhaps in relation to internal resistance (e.g. Tajiks and the NRF).
- Humanitarian crisis – Prognosis – likely: – earthquake, flood, crop failure, food insecurity, migration. The Taliban’s ability to deal with such crises look extremely limited and their restrictions on women will hamper relief efforts.
- Wider popular protest – large scale anti-Taliban demonstrations exacerbated by Taliban inept and violent response). Prognosis – realistic possibility: Could be triggered by any random event – a shooting, mass arrest, humanitarian incident, corruption, targeting of a minority group, assassination of a minority group leader, economic crises (such as unemployment), religious or gender violence).
- Further recognition of the Taliban regime – a Gulf State(s) or a neighbouring country. Prognosis – realistic possibility: Boosts Taliban’s standing at the further expense of human rights. May come with trade and economic benefits for the Taliban.
[1] Mishra, V., ‘Afghanistan faces ‘perfect storm’ of crises, UN warns’, United Nations, 17 Sep. 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165870
[2] Mishra, V., ‘Afghanistan faces ‘perfect storm’ of crises, UN warns’, United Nations, 17 Sep. 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165870
[3] Guldogan, D., ‘UN warns of “severe humanitarian situation in Afghanistan’, Anadolu Agency, 6 Mar. 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/un-warns-of-severe-humanitarian-situation-in-afghanistan/3502301
[4] ‘ Afghanistan has its ‘sharpest surge’ ever of child malnutrition, UN agency says’, CNN, 5 Aug. 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/04/asia/afghanistan-child-malnutrition-surge-intl-hk
[5] Mirzaie, M., ‘Afghanistan’s Fragile Health System Buckles Under Surge of Deportees from Iran and Pakistan’, Health Policy Watch, 18 Aug. 2025, https://healthpolicy-watch.news/afghanistans-fragile-health-system-buckles-under-surge-of-deportees-from-iran-and-pakistan/, Kumar, R., and Ahad, Z., ‘Millions of Afghans lose access to healthcare services as USAID cuts shut clinics’, The Guardian, 3 Apr. 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/apr/03/millions-afghans-left-without-healthcare-usaid-cuts-shut-clinics-malnutrition-measles-malaria-polio-world-health-organization and ‘“A Disaster for the Foreseeable Future”: Afghanistan’s Healthcare Crisis’, Human Rights Watch, 12 Feb. 2024, https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/02/12/disaster-foreseeable-future/afghanistans-healthcare-crisis
[6] Sadat, S., ‘The Impact of Displacement and Brain Drain in Afghanistan: Challenges and Solutions’, Displaced International, 25 Jan. 2025, https://displacedinternational.org/afghanistans-skilled-exodus-tackling-brain-drain-displacement/ and Rahimi, L., ‘The Silent Erosion of Afghanistan’s Urban Middle Class: A Neglected Crisis’, The Diplomat, 24 Feb. 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/the-silent-erosion-of-afghanistans-urban-middle-class-a-neglected-crisis/
[7] ‘Afghanistan: Relentless Repression 4 Years into Taliban Rule:Forced Returns of Millions Intensify Crisis’, Human Rights Watch, 5 Aug. 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/05/afghanistan-relentless-repression-4-years-into-taliban-rule
[8] ‘Afghanistan/Iran/Pakistan: Mass refoulement of Afghan refugees a systematic violation of human rights amid inaction by international agencies’, International Federation for Human Rights’, 23 July 2025, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-iran-pakistan-mass-refoulement-of-afghan-refugees-a and ‘The Azadi Briefing: Thousands Of Afghans Deported From Pakistan And Iran Each Week‘, RFE/RL, 14 June 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-pakistan-iran-afghan-refugees/32993099.html
[9] ‘Pakistan Expels Some Afghans Waiting For U.S. Resettlement’, RFE/RL, 27 Dec. 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-afghan-refugees-resettlement-united-states/32749464.html
[10] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg8zy78787o
[12] Maroof, H., and Faulkner, D., ‘Social media content restricted in Afghanistan, Taliban sources confirm’, BBC News, 8 Oct. 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgrq8d0jpdwo
[13]https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/afghanistan-taliban-arrests-at-least-seven-journalists-in-july and ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Trample Media Freedom’, Human Rights Watch, 23 Oct. 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/23/afghanistan-taliban-trample-media-freedom
[14] Sirat, S., and Saifullah, M., ‘Afghanistan: Taliban impose new restrictions on media’, Deutsche Welle, 27 Sep. 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/afghanistan-taliban-impose-new-restrictions-on-media/a-70347059
[15] ‘Afghanistan: Journalists face increasing persecution in fourth year under Taliban’, International Federation of Journalists, 15 Aug. 2025, https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/afghanistan-journalists-face-increasing-persecution-in-fourth-year-under-taliban
[16] ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Trample Media Freedom’, Human Rights Watch, 23 Oct. 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/23/afghanistan-taliban-trample-media-freedom
[17] As a reminder, during the Taliban’s previous rule of Afghanistan – 1996 to 2001 – they were recognised by only three countries: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
[18] https://www.livemint.com/news/world/taliban-leader-declares-no-need-for-western-laws-in-afghanistan-says-democracy-is-dead-11743384910448.html ‘Afghanistan: Taliban leader orders Sharia law punishments’, BBC News, 14 Nov. 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-63624400
[19] ‘Study on the so-called “Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice”’, United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/58/74, dated 25 Feb. 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2024/call-submissions-study-so-called-law-promotion-virtue-and-prevention-vice
[20] https://www.digitaljournal.com/world/hibatullah-akhundzada-afghanistans-reclusive-taliban-leader/article
[21] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/afghanistan/taliban-have-not-moderated
[22] https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-leader-eid-message-ed490817f123c2cec7aaea4b81e350d5
[23] https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/796
[24] https://atlaspress.news/en/2025/12/14/afghanistan-economy-growth-world-bank-2025/
[25] Byrd, W., ‘Two Years into Taliban Rule, New Shocks Weaken Afghan Economy’, USIP, 10 Aug. 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/08/two-years-taliban-rule-new-shocks-weaken-afghan-economy
[26] Shayan, Y., ‘Afghanistan’s economy struggled throughout 2024’, Amu TV, 1 Jan. 2025, https://amu.tv/147813/
[27] ‘Afghanistan/Iran/Pakistan: Mass refoulement of Afghan refugees a systematic violation of human rights amid inaction by international agencies’, International Federation for Human Rights’, 23 July 2025, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-iran-pakistan-mass-refoulement-of-afghan-refugees-a and ‘The Azadi Briefing: Thousands Of Afghans Deported From Pakistan And Iran Each Week‘, RFE/RL, 14 June 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-pakistan-iran-afghan-refugees/32993099.html
[28] ‘Pakistan Expels Some Afghans Waiting For U.S. Resettlement’, RFE/RL, 27 Dec. 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-afghan-refugees-resettlement-united-states/32749464.html
[29] ‘Afghanistan, June 2025, Operational Update’ UNHCR, and https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/afghanistan, (website accessed 28 Nov. 2025).
[30] ‘Why Are IDPs in Kabul Reluctant to Return to their Places of Origin following the Taliban’s Takeover?’, Researching Internal Displacement, 27 June 2024, https://researchinginternaldisplacement.org/short_pieces/why-are-idps-in-kabul-reluctant-to-return-to-their-places-of-origin-following-the-talibans-takeover/#:~:text=Among%20these%2C%20housing%20and%20land%20accessibility%2C%20along,participants%2C%20including%20the%20camp%20leaders%20or%20representatives.
[31] ‘Afghanistan – Earthquakes extend cycle of conflict and disaster displacement’, IDMC, 14 May 2024, https://www.internal-displacement.org/spotlights/afghanistan-earthquakes-extend-cycle-of-conflict-and-disaster-displacement/ and ‘Border Violence Deepens Afghan Displacement Crisis: Displaced International Calls for UN Action and Civilian Protection’, Displaced International, 16 Oct. 2025, https://displacedinternational.org/border-violence-deepens-afghan-displacement-crisis-displaced-international-calls-for-un-action-and-civilian-protection/
[32] ‘Half Of Afghanistan’s Population Requires Life-Saving Assistance, Says UN’, Afghanistan International, 16 Aug. 2025, https://www.afintl.com/en/202508169913 and ‘UNAMA Chief Warns of Severe Food Crisis in Afghanistan’, Tolo News, 28 Feb. 2025, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-193250
[33] ‘UN agencies on hand as deadly new quake hits northern Afghanistan’, United Nations, 3 Nov. 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166250
[34] ‘EU donates €1 million in humanitarian funding and 130 tonnes of in-kind assistance in response to the earthquake in Afghanistan’, EU website, 2 Sep. 2025, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-donates-eu1-million-humanitarian-funding-and-130-tonnes-kind-assistance-response-earthquake-2025-09-02_en
[35] ‘Afghanistan needs $21.9 million for mine clearance, UN says’, Ariana, 3 Feb. 2025, https://www.ariananews.af/afghanistan-needs-21-9-million-for-mine-clearance-un-says/
[36] ‘UN in Afghanistan calls for lifting of restrictions on female staff accessing UN premises’, UNAMA Press report, 11 Sep. 2025, https://unama.unmissions.org/un-afghanistan-calls-lifting-restrictions-female-staff-accessing-un-premises
[37] ‘Afghanistan: Overview of Funding Shortfall and Impact on Humanitarian Operations (as of 14 August 2025)’, OCHA, 14 Aug. 2025, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-overview-funding-shortfall-and-impact-humanitarian-operations-14-august-2025
[38] Follorou, J., ‘Suspension of USAID puts Afghan population at risk’, Le Monde, 11 Feb. 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/02/11/suspension-of-us-aid-puts-afghan-population-at-risk_6738012_4.html#
[39] ‘Unidentified Drones Seen Flying Over Northern Afghanistan’, Kabul Now, 13 Nov. 2022, https://kabulnow.com/2022/11/unidentified-drones-seen-flying-over-northern-afghanistan/ and Soltani, M., ‘Trump: I Will Regain Control of Bagram Air Base’, Tolo News, 18 Sep. 2024, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-190787
[40] ‘Rubio threatens bounties on Taliban leaders over detained Americans’, VoA, 25 Jan. 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/rubio-threatens-bounties-on-taliban-leaders-over-detained-americans/7950570.html
Taliban dismantles the internet across Afghanistan
Summary: Taliban have shut down the internet and mobile access across Afghanistan – severe economic, social and humanitarian turmoil is likely if this shutdown is sustained. It is unclear as to the Taliban’s motivations other than a poorly-articulated desire to prevent “vice” and they may not fully appreciate wider social, economic and humanitarian impacts. Some members of the Taliban may privately have qualms but the senior leadership are unlikely to care.
After some days of partial severing of internet connectivity in different provinces, the Taliban appear to have brought internet access and mobile phone networks to a halt across the entire country.
“Afghanistan has been plunged into a digital blackout after the Taliban ordered the suspension of internet services nationwide and mobile networks also began to collapse, cutting off nearly all communication with the outside world.
Residents across Kabul and several provincial cities reported on Monday that fiber-optic services were no longer available, with only limited mobile data functioning briefly before signal towers stopped working altogether.
As a result, it is now no longer possible to place or receive international calls into Afghanistan, leaving families, businesses, and aid organizations unable to reach people inside the country.
Journalists based abroad confirmed that repeated attempts to contact Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Uruzgan failed, suggesting that the blackout has extended across multiple regions simultaneously.”[1]
On Monday 15 September, the Taliban closed access in northern provinces, starting with Balkh province. Other provinces followed.[2] This appears to be a decision by the Taliban’s supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhundzade, in order to “prevent immorality”, likely meaning a desire to prevent women and girls communicating and seeking education and, more generally, to prevent the wider population getting “polluted” by Western ideas and values – particularly with regard to human rights. It seems to be a self-inflicted act, rather than a cyber-attack by criminals, terrorists or a hostile nation.
The Taliban may not have fully thought this through. Shutting down the internet and the communication network is likely to have massive wider negative impacts – many likely not immediately apparent to the Taliban leadership – on a range of societal, economic, security and humanitarian issues. It is at least plausible that, in the event of international and Afghan protest, the Taliban might backtrack partially or fully, although but they are not known for their flexibility and willingness to compromise.
The Taliban may feel comfortable with their grip on Afghanistan – armed resistance (such as the NRF and the AFF) is making little significant headway. Akhundzade, reclusive and isolated in Kandahar, surrounded by like-minded Pushtun religious idealogues appears to feel he can push the extreme values of the Taliban another step further down an obsessive route of complete dominance over the thoughts, deeds and actions of the Afghan population. It remains to be seen if there will be any push back inside the country or whether even the Taliban quickly come to conclude that this way is starkly unworkable. For the next few days and weeks it is possible that the Taliban might “fiddle”, switching systems on and off to maintain their own government communications and avoid the collapse of key operations. If the process is reversed, Russia and China might be able to offer more subtle ways of controlling people’s access to information and ideas short of pulling the plug completely.
[1] ‘Taliban Order Nationwide Shutdown of Internet and Mobile Services in Afghanistan’, Kabul Now, 29 Sep. 2029, https://kabulnow.com/2025/09/taliban-order-nationwide-shutdown-of-internet-and-mobile-services-in-afghanistan/
[2] Haidary, K., ‘”It kept our spirits alive”: Taliban’s internet blackout leaves girls in despair’, The Guardian, 23 Sep. 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/sep/23/taliban-afghanistan-internet-shutdown-women-girls-education-hope
The Taliban are still targeting former members of the previous government and armed forces.
Summary: Since the Taliban took power in August 2021, they have aggressively targeted former members of the previous government and its armed forces, submitting many to illegal detention, torture, “disappearance” and execution. Family members have also been targeted. There is no sign at present that the Taliban are winding up these efforts to track and trace, likely in part because they fear former government personnel might yet form part of the resistance against them in the future.
Introduction
There are regular and credible reports of Afghans that worked in the previous government and armed forces, as well as alongside international forces, having been specifically targeted and killed by the Taliban.[1] Tens of thousands of security personnel were killed by the Taliban during the 2002-2021 insurgency.[2] Since the Taliban’s seizure of power in August 2021, the Taliban have been able to intensify their campaign to track and kill former members of the Afghan security forces and intelligence communities.[3] There have been multiple credible reports that the Taliban are pursuing former members of the government in violation of what the Taliban leadership declared was a “General Amnesty” to all former officials.[4]
“Taliban forces in Afghanistan have summarily executed or forcibly disappeared more than 100 former police and intelligence officers in just four provinces since taking over the country on August 15, 2021, despite a proclaimed amnesty, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.”[5]
A New York Times study in 2022 developed this research and judged that the figure was closer to 500. It is highly likely that many other deaths and disappearances have taken place since and remain unaccounted for:
“The revenge killings were widespread, touching every region of the country, shattering families and communities, and giving a lie to the Taliban’s promises of tolerance and moderation. After initially denying that such killings were occurring, the Taliban leadership has come to acknowledge some of them, though has insisted that those acts were the work of rogue commanders and not an authorized campaign. But the number of killings, and their ubiquity, might suggest otherwise. So would their ruthlessness, including summary executions that were captured on video…”[6]
The United Nations noted the ongoing risks to those connected to the armed forces and officials of the previous government in June 2023:
“The Taliban continued to maintain and consolidate power in Afghanistan. This has created a period of relative absence of armed conflict but also a continued curtailment of Afghans’ fundamental rights and freedoms, especially for women and girls…Security incidents linked to the armed opposition and attacks by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) continued. UNAMA continued to receive credible allegations of human rights abuses and violations, including against former government officials and security personnel, in violation of the general amnesty announced in August 2021, as well as against individuals accused of affiliation with armed resistance groups and ISIL-K.”[7]
An Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) report from August 2023 assessed the four most targeted groups in Afghanistan are former government and security officials, prisoners, women, and journalists. The report noted:
“Since the takeover, the Taliban has targeted former government and security officials, carried out collective punishments in areas where anti-Taliban groups have emerged, and imposed ultraconservative societal restrictions – especially on women and journalists – aimed at maintaining control. ACLED records over 1,000 incidents of violence targeting civilians by the Taliban between the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021 and 30 June 2023, accounting for 62% of all attacks on civilians in the country. This places the Taliban regime in Afghanistan among the world’s top government or de facto state perpetrators of violence targeting civilians domestically since August 2021, behind only the military junta in Myanmar.”[8]
In January 2024, Human Rights Watch made the following assessment (my highlights in bold):
“The human rights situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate in 2023 as the Taliban committed widespread human rights violations, particularly against women and girls. Women also faced significant barriers to freedom of movement and speech. Human Rights Watch has concluded that the pattern of abuses against women and girls in Afghanistan amounts to the crime against humanity of gender persecution. Taliban authorities cracked down further on local media and freedom of speech and increased arbitrary detentions of journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society activists, including women protesters. Their forces detained and executed members of the former government’s security forces.”[9]
When the Taliban regime took over, they used many of the seized bases, properties, databases, and other assets of the previous government to establish their own intelligence system, the Government Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). The Taliban also “inherited” many of the personnel databases of the previous government and are prioritising the development of the GDI, including use of biometric data, personal data, and other associated technology.[10] It is therefore extremely likely that the Taliban know personal details about the individuals and families of people they seek (possibly including details of the wider family), such as names, addresses, employment and bank details.
Members of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the previous government’s intelligence organisation were responsible the detention and deaths of thousands of Taliban fighters in a “dirty war” of arrests, interrogations, assassinations and house raids. The NDS cooperated closely with international forces. They have received particularly aggressive attention from the Taliban since August 2021.
“A former member of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) has died after being detained and severely tortured by the Taliban in a prison. According to sources, the victim’s name was Khan Mohammad and he was a resident of Surobi district of Kabul. About a week ago, he was arrested near his home in Kabul and taken to the prison of the Taliban Intelligence Directorate. Mohammad’s body was handed over to his family members at 9:00 pm on Wednesday night this week. The victim’s friends confirm that he died of deep wounds just two hours after being released. So far, the motive behind his detention is not yet reported and the Taliban have not commented on the case either.”[11]
Former NDS officers continue to remain at severe risk of illegal detention, torture, and summary execution:
“Local sources in western Herat province have accused Taliban agents of brutally murdering a former intelligence officer in the Farsi district of the province last week. A close relative of the victim told KabulNow that the man, identified as Jamshid, was a former officer in the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the intelligence agency under the previous government. The source added that Jamshid was initially detained in Farsi after returning from Iran a month earlier and later killed by the Taliban intelligence agency. Taliban subjected Jamshid to extreme torture, including breaking his arms and legs, the source lamented. The body of the man was handed over to his family on Monday.”[12]
The Taliban do not appear to show deference to age or gender. In June 2024, a female former NDS officer gave an account of extreme and protracted torture at the hands of the Taliban:
“Raiessa Yazdanparast, a former senior officer at the National Directorate of Security (NDS), has disclosed that she was detained by the Taliban from her home in Kabul and subjected to one and a half months of torture in prison.
Yazdanparast told Afghanistan International that the Taliban have access to information about NDS officers, leading to their arrest and torture.
As the head of the women’s section at the former NDS’s 050 department, Yazdanparast recounted that on 15 January 2022, Taliban fighters entered her home in Kabul under the pretext of conducting a search operation. Upon entry, they struck her face with a rifle butt… Images provided by Yazdanparast to Afghanistan International show her face and body bruised from the torture… She revealed that she was held in solitary confinement and that all the prison guards were men. After her release from Taliban custody, she underwent about a year of medical treatment.
Yazdanparast also recounted that the Taliban killed her husband in 2008 due to his work with foreigners. He was a translator at Bagram Air Base during Hamid Karzai’s presidency.”[13]
Targeting of family members
Family members of government officials and military personnel have been targeted by the Taliban for many years, both before and after the Taliban’s seizure of power in August 2021.[14]
The British Home Office, when considering asylum cases of Afghans fleeing to the UK acknowledges a range of attacks against former Afghan security officials “and their family members”.[15] Evidence of reports outlining attacks on former police and army (and family members) include references to family members (including children) having been tortured, raped, “disappeared” and killed.[16]
Since the Taliban re-took power, in August 2021, multiple credible reports have highlighted Taliban revenge killings of relatives and the settling of scores:
“When the Taliban won back control of the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar last month, they set out to settle a score…Taliban members detonated explosives…and detained and whipped several of his relatives to try and establish his whereabouts. The events were recounted by two relatives who say they were targeted in the reprisals, 10 local officials and residents who witnessed or were familiar with the incidents…Images from the sources…show a badly damaged property and family members with injuries they say were from Taliban beatings…‘None of us had imagined we would be targeted like this,’ said one of Omar’s relatives, requesting anonymity. ‘The Taliban said they will not punish anyone who had worked with the previous regime but they did the exact opposite in our case.’”[17]
If any family members are detained by the Taliban, it is highly possible that revenge attacks could be undertaken. My highlights are in bold:
“The Taliban have also searched for known former security force members, often threatening and abusing family members to reveal the whereabouts of those in hiding. Some of those eventually apprehended have been executed or taken into custody without acknowledgment of their detention or their location…”[18]
The Taliban target family members as a means of getting to their desired target.[19]
“The Taliban have told my family that my brothers are on a list…They searched our house and arrested my older brother. He was released after two days, but during those days my younger brother was arrested and till now we don’t know where he is, how he is, if he is alive.”[20]
In June 2023, Amnesty International investigations concluded the Taliban were extensively targeting family members to use them as hostages to get to the individuals they were seeking:
“The detention of family members to induce surrender by fighters amounts to hostage-taking, and is a war crime. Detainees remained in Taliban custody for various lengths of time, ranging from hours to months. In one case in Darah district, a man said the Taliban arrested his father from his village in June 2022, in an attempt to find the man and his brothers, whom the Taliban suspected had joined the NRF.
The man told Amnesty International: ‘[The Taliban] had taken my father by 1pm… He was taken to the mosque, and there they unbound his blindfold… They made him sit on a mattress… There they began questioning [him], “Where are your sons? It is said that your sons are in the mountains”.’
Arresting family members of suspected NRF fighters, the mass arrest and detention of civilians, and the torture and unlawful killings of the shepherds are further examples of the Taliban’s campaign of collective punishment against civilians in Panjshir. Other Taliban tactics of intimidation documented in the report include the destruction and long-term seizure of civilian property, and placing restrictions on civilian movements.”[21]
In May 2024, there were reports of several former NDS officers – and multiple family members connected to other former NDS officers – being arrested by the Taliban.
“Local sources in Takhar report that Taliban intelligence in the province has detained two former personnel of the previous government’s national directorate of security… On December 6, 2023, local sources in Takhar reported that Taliban intelligence in the Darqad district of the province had detained three family members of a member of the former security forces named Shahzad Khan. These individuals were arrested from Musa Zai village of Darqad district in Takhar. The detained individuals include the brother, nephew, and a young daughter of the former military personnel.
Shahzad Khan was an employee of the NDS, the predecessor to the Taliban’s GDI in the previous government and left for Turkey after the republic’s collapse, where he currently resides…in less than nine months, Taliban intelligence in Takhar had detained and imprisoned over 76 individuals, including children…findings indicate that some of these individuals were being held in two Taliban-controlled prisons at the Taliban’s intelligence office located at the airport square on the outskirts of Taluqan, without access to their basic rights or legal representation.”
The families of these detainees told Etilaatroz that in most cases, their relatives have been subjected to torture by the Taliban without any criminal charges, and some have been publicly executed without trial.”[22]
In June 2025, media reporting continues to highlight the targeting of family members of former military personnel:
“Several families of former Afghan government military personnel report that, despite the Taliban’s announcement of a general amnesty, they face surveillance, interrogation, and threats from the group due to their familial ties to former security forces. They state that Taliban members have repeatedly visited their homes, demanding information about the whereabouts of their military relatives and, in cases of non-cooperation, have subjected them to detention and mistreatment. According to these families, they have been forced to relocate multiple times to protect their lives, a challenge exacerbated by the current economic hardships.”[23]
Conclusions
There are currently no indications that the Taliban are winding down their efforts to track and target those they suspect or believe to have been former members of the Afghan government.[24] If anything, they are slowly improving their ability to identify suspects, as they press ahead with even more draconian punishments, aggressive methods of social control, travel restrictions, biometric measures and intelligence surveillance.[25] In 2025, former members of the government are still being traced and attacked.[26] Organised resistance to the Taliban is still relatively limited – although it is growing incrementally each year. Some of the anti-Taliban resistance groups operating in Afghanistan contain former soldiers and politicians from the previous government (notably Amrullah Saleh a former vice President and former head of the NDS). It is likely the Taliban fear that other former government officials might yet join the resistance. A United Nations Security Council update on Afghanistan, from June 2025 noted of a three-month reporting period:
“During the reporting period, UNAMA documented at least four killings and 10 arbitrary arrests and detentions of government officials and former members of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces.”[27]
Violent targeting of former officials is likely to continue. But many attacks and disappearances will be hard to confirm, difficult to attribute and highly unlikely to receive justice.
[1] Gossman, P., ‘No End to Taliban Revenge Killings in Afghanistan’, Human Rights Watch, 22 Aug. 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/22/no-end-taliban-revenge-killings-afghanistan
[2] Afghanistan’s Ghani says 45,000 security personnel killed since 2014’, BBC News, 25 January 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47005558
[3] Marcolini, B., Sohail, S., and Stockton, A., ‘The Taliban Promised Them Amnesty. Then They Executed Them’, The New York Times, 12 Apr. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/12/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-revenge.html?te=1&nl=opinion-today&emc=edit_ty_20220412
[4] Payenda, S., ‘Ex-Military Personnel Face Rising Number of Executions’, Hasht-E-Subh Daily, 16 Mar. 2023, https://8am.media/eng/ex-military-personnel-face-rising-number-of-executions/
[5] ‘No Forgiveness for People Like You’, Human Rights Watch, 30 Nov. 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/30/no-forgiveness-people-you/executions-and-enforced-disappearances-afghanistan
[6] Marcolini, B., Sohail, S., and Stockton, A., ‘The Taliban Promised Them Amnesty. Then They Executed Them’, The New York Times, 12 Apr. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/12/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-revenge.html?te=1&nl=opinion-today&emc=edit_ty_20220412
[7] ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Security Council, A/77/914-S/2023/453, 20 June 2023, p.1.
[8] ‘Two Years Of Repression: Mapping Taliban Violence Targeting Civilians in Afghanistan’, ACLED, 11 Aug. 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/11/two-years-of-repression-mapping-taliban-violence-targeting-civilians-in-afghanistan/
[9] ‘Afghanistan, Events of 2023’, Human Rights Watch, 12 Jan. 2024, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/afghanistan
[10] ‘New Evidence that Biometric Data Systems Imperil Afghans: Taliban Now Control Systems with Sensitive Personal Information’, Human Rights Watch, 30 Mar. 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/30/new-evidence-biometric-data-systems-imperil-afghans
[11] ‘Taliban Rebels Brutally Kill a Former NDS Member’, Hasht-e Subh, 9 Sep. 2022, https://8am.media/eng/taliban-rebels-brutally-kill-a-former-nds-member/
[12] ‘Taliban accused of killing former NDS officer in Herat province’, Kabul Now, 3 June 2023, https://kabulnow.com/2023/06/taliban-accused-of-killing-former-nds-officer-in-herat-province/
[13] ‘Afghan Female Intelligence Officer Reveals Torture in Taliban Prison’, Afghanistan International, 14 July 2024, https://www.afintl.com/en/202407142930
[14] Roggio, B., ‘Afghan forces, families are prime target for Taliban, says commander’, Long War Journal, 2 Apr. 2012, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/04/a_taliban_commander.php
[15] ‘Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban’, Home Office, Version 4.0, August 2024, paragraph 3.2.2, pp.9-10.
[16] ‘Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban’, Home Office, Version 4.0, August 2024, paragraph 10.4.17, p.32.
[17] Jain, R., ‘The Taliban vowed no revenge. One Afghan family tells a different story’, Reuters, 28 Sep. 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-vowed-no-revenge-one-afghan-family-tells-different-story-2021-09-28/
[18] ‘No Forgiveness for People Like You’, Human Rights Watch, 30 Nov. 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/30/no-forgiveness-people-you/executions-and-enforced-disappearances-afghanistan
[19] Zucchino, D., and Mangal, F., ‘Seeking Revenge, Taliban Target Afghan Soldiers’ Families’, The New York Times, 10 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/world/asia/taliban-revenge-afghanistan.html
[20] ‘No Forgiveness for People Like You’, Human Rights Watch, 30 Nov. 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/30/no-forgiveness-people-you/executions-and-enforced-disappearances-afghanistan
[21] ‘Afghanistan: Taliban’s cruel attacks in Panjshir province amount to war crime of collective punishment – new report’, Amnesty International, 8 June 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/06/afghanistan-talibans-cruel-attacks-in-panjshir-province-amount-to-war-crime-of-collective-punishment-new-report/
[22] Framarz, F., ‘Hunting for Potential Foes, Taliban Arrests Former Intelligence Personnel in Takhar’, Kabul Now, 14 May 2024, https://kabulnow.com/2024/05/35686/
[23] Mohammad, ‘Endless Retribution: Taliban Interrogates Families and Children of Former Afghanistan Military Personnel’, Hasht-e Subh, 11 June 2025, https://8am.media/eng/endless-retribution-taliban-interrogates-families-and-children-of-former-afghanistan-military-personnel/
[24] ‘Taliban Detains Former ANDSF Member in Eastern Afghanistan’, Kabul Now, 2 Nov. 2024, https://kabulnow.com/2024/11/taliban-detains-former-andsf-member-in-eastern-afghanistan/
[25] Yawar, M. and Greenfield, C., ‘Taliban weighs using US mass surveillance plan, met with China’s Huawei’, Reuters, 25 Sep. 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/taliban-weighs-using-us-mass-surveillance-plan-met-with-chinas-huawei-2023-09-25/ , Bajak, F., ‘US-built databases a potential tool of Taliban repression’, AP News, 7 Sep. 2021, https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-taliban-c007f85fb1b573c43a4391b947a5dcd4 ‘New Evidence that Biometric Data Systems Imperil Afghans: Taliban Now Control Systems with Sensitive Personal Information’, Human Rights Watch, 30 Mar. 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/30/new-evidence-biometric-data-systems-imperil-afghans
[26] ‘Taliban Accused of Killing Former Security Officer in Western Afghanistan’, Kabul Now, 24 Feb. 2025, https://kabulnow.com/2025/02/taliban-accused-of-killing-former-security-officer-in-western-afghanistan/
[27] ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, A/79/947-S/2025/372, 11 June 2025
Weekly Update: 5th – 13th February, 2025
Taliban Leader Emphasizes Modern Education
On 5th February 2025, the reclusive Taliban leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, made a rare public appearance at Kandahar University. During his visit, he underscored the importance of integrating secular subjects alongside religious studies, stating that both are vital and should be protected. This marks a notable shift in the Taliban’s stance, which has traditionally prioritized Islamic education over secular learning. However, it’s important to note that the event did not include any female participants, reflecting ongoing restrictions on women’s education in Afghanistan.
German Firm Takes Over Kabul Luxury Hotel
On 7th February 2025, the German company Cinderella International Group announced its acquisition of the Kabul Grand Hotel, previously known as the Kabul Serena Hotel. The hotel, which had been under Taliban control, was handed over to the German firm following a tender process. Aaron Azim, leading the company, secured a ten-year contract for the hotel’s operation. The Kabul Grand Hotel has a tumultuous history, having been the target of multiple Taliban attacks in the past, notably in 2008 and 2014.
ICC Faces Criticism Over Gender Equality in Afghan Cricket
On 12th February 2025, Caroline Dinenage, chair of the UK’s parliamentary committee for culture, media, and sport, criticized the International Cricket Council (ICC) for not enforcing its gender equality rules concerning Afghan women’s participation in cricket. She urged the ICC to either uphold its standards or risk aligning with the Taliban’s oppressive policies. This follows the UK government’s support for the England and Wales Cricket Board’s decision not to boycott an upcoming match against Afghanistan, emphasizing that such actions would unfairly penalize athletes.
Afghanistan Participates in Asian Winter Games
From 7th to 14th February 2025, Afghanistan is participating in the Asian Winter Games held in Harbin, China. The Afghan delegation comprises three male snowboarders, with Nizaruddin Ali Zada serving as the flagbearer during the opening ceremony. This participation highlights Afghanistan’s ongoing engagement in international sporting events despite domestic challenges.
Looking Ahead
In the coming week, attention will be focused on the Taliban’s response to international criticisms regarding women’s rights and education. Observers are keen to see if Hibatullah Akhundzada’s recent endorsement of modern education will lead to tangible policy changes, particularly concerning female education. Additionally, the international community will monitor the ICC’s actions in response to the mounting pressure to enforce gender equality in Afghan cricket.
Sources:
- https://apnews.com/article/2f78150449031259d66c52e71eb75aa9
- https://www.bild.de/geld/wirtschaft/deal-mit-taliban-deutsche-firma-uebernimmt-luxushotel-in-kabul-67a4e7b5094c8360edaf4bbd
- https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/icc-obeying-taliban-by-ignoring-own-equality-rules-over-afghan-women-j3tbvcqrp
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan_at_the_2025_Asian_Winter_Games
Afghanistan in 2025
Summary: It will be a turbulent and volatile year for Afghanistan. The Taliban‘s unwillingness to compromise on human rights – and women’s rights in particular – means they will remain pariahs for most nations and struggle to gain funding, support and investment. The economic, social and humanitarian conditions in the country remain dire. Armed resistance groups included international terrorist groups (Islamic State) and local guerrilla forces (such as the National Resistance Front). A dramatic shift in the Taliban’s control is unlikely this year – the Taliban still appear largely united and the population do not relish another return to protracted fighting. But resistance will continue to pose increasing security problems for the reclusive Taliban leader and the under-qualified and unrepresentative government.
In August 2021, the major conflict in the country came to an end, with the Taliban as the clear and uncontested winners. In theory at least, despite a botched American withdrawal massive international reservations and the fears of the Afghan people themselves, there was a huge potential opportunity to set Afghanistan back on some kind of path to reconstruction. The early Taliban announcement of a “General Amnesty” to former members of the government and armed forces gave some hope that the Taliban might be prepared to take a pragmatic approach to rebuilding Afghanistan.
But, in January 2025, after three and a half years of brutal Taliban rule in Afghanistan there are precious few causes for encouragement – and many causes for outright concern. The amnesty came to nothing.[1] Multiple credible reports continue to show that the Taliban are targeting, persecuting and killing former members of the government and armed forces.
If the measure of a country is whether you are trying to get into it or out of it, then the Taliban are spectacularly failing. Illegal migration and trafficking out of Afghanistan are at high levels.[2] Although some Afghans have chosen to return and try and re-establish land, property and family, hundreds of thousands have had to be been forcibly returned – particularly from Iran and Pakistan, who are not known for their benevolent treatment of Afghans.
“The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has reported that over 1.2 million undocumented Afghan migrants returned from Iran to Afghanistan in 2024, with 67% of these returns being forced deportations.”[3]
By all indicators – economic, humanitarian, political, healthcare, social and security – Afghanistan has failed to progress.[4] Some of the blame might fall to regional neighbours and the international community, but the vast majority of Afghanistan’s failure to move forward lies with the Taliban, running a brutally repressive regime to an extreme set of religious rules that are followed by no other country or religious group on the planet. The Taliban have failed to consider any former of inclusive government and responses to any form of protest have been violent. But what has triggered revulsion from the world – and ensured that the Taliban still remains an unrecognised government, unable to join the family of nations – has been the horrific treatment of women, relegating them to the status of invisible slaves, forbidden to seek education, take employment or to travel independently and to be beaten if they step out of line.
Some regional neighbours (China) and other countries (Russia) are less concerned about human rights violations and happy to develop some form of trade agreements. China is keen to exploit Afghanistan mineral wealth and transport connectivity opportunities. The Taliban seem willing to accept whatever international engagement they can get – looking to China for assistance with surveillance measures to monitor the population.[5]
Armed resistance to the Taliban is growing – from terrorist groups including Islamic State, but also home grown forces like the National Resistance Front and the Afghan Freedom Front who prefer focused attacks on Taliban personnel rather than indiscriminate killing of civilians.[6] Such resistance is unlikely to topple the Taliban in the next couple of years, but it is likely to be an increasing cause for concern for the Taliban, who desire for compromise and meet any problems with aggression, oppression or denial.
The return of Donald Trump is a new worry for the Taliban. The Taliban are suspicious of the potential for future American and British involvement in Afghanistan.[7] These are volatile times – the US is making inflammatory statements about Afghanistan.[8] No one knows what Donald Trump will do in relation to Afghanistan in the coming year– almost certainly including Donald Trump himself. Trump has mused on taking back Bagram airbase. Most recently he has demanded that the Taliban return American weapons and equipment left behind during the August 2021 withdrawal. Compounding the uncertainty, the International Criminal Court is seeking arrest warrants for Taliban leaders while other parts of the internal community are urging engagement with the Taliban.[9]
2025 will be turbulent for Afghanistan and the youth of Afghanistan will continue to seek to leave the country.
[1] Chen, H., ‘Taliban carried out hundreds of extrajudicial killings after seizing power, UN says’, CNN, 23 Aug. 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/23/world/un-taliban-human-rights-violations-afghanistan-intl-hnk/index.html
[2] https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghan-refugees-iran
[3] ‘Over 1.2 Million Undocumented Afghans Expelled from Iran in 2024: IOM’, Kabul Now, 17 Jan. 2025, https://kabulnow.com/2025/01/over-1-2-million-undocumneted-afghans-expelled-from-iran-in-2024-iom/
[4] ‘”Approximately 85 percent of Afghans live on less than one dollar a day.”’, UNDP, 10 Jan. 2024, https://www.undp.org/stories/approximately-85-percent-afghans-live-less-one-dollar-day
[5] Arain, G., ‘Afghanistan navigates controversies on digital identity journey’, Biometric Update, 2 July 2024, https://www.biometricupdate.com/202407/afghanistan-navigates-controversies-on-digital-identity-journey, and Stanikzai, M., ‘Taliban install hundreds of security cameras in Baghlan’, Amu TV, 23 Dec. 2024, https://amu.tv/145731/
[6] ‘NRF Claims Responsibility for Deadly Attack on Taliban in Kabul’, Kabul Now, 8 Nov. 2024, https://kabulnow.com/2024/11/nrf-claims-responsibility-for-deadly-attack-on-taliban-in-kabul/
[7] ‘Unidentified Drones Seen Flying Over Northern Afghanistan’, Kabul Now, 13 Nov. 2022, https://kabulnow.com/2022/11/unidentified-drones-seen-flying-over-northern-afghanistan/ and Soltani, M., ‘Trump: I Will Regain Control of Bagram Air Base’, Tolo News, 18 Sep. 2024, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-190787
[8] ‘Rubio threatens bounties on Taliban leaders over detained Americans’, VoA, 25 Jan. 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/rubio-threatens-bounties-on-taliban-leaders-over-detained-americans/7950570.html
[9] Wright, G., and Holligan, A., ‘ICC prosecutor seeks arrest of Taliban leaders for “persecuting Afghan girls and women”, BBC News, 23 Jan. 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20kn0d7d30o
The National Resistance Front – resisting the Taliban since 2021
Summary: The National Resistance Front looks to be the best hope for Afghan opponents of the Taliban who are willing to fight. Its guerrilla capabilities and reach look to be slowly improving. Expect to see a further incremental improvement in NRF operations in 2025.
The National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan emerged in August 2021 as a coalition of former Northern Alliance members and anti-Taliban fighters loyal to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the NRF declared its opposition, advocating for an inclusive government and democratic principles. Led by Ahmad Massoud, son of the renowned commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, the NRF initially established a stronghold in the Panjshir Valley, a region historically resistant to external control. This attracted some brutal Taliban clampdowns inside the valley later that year and in 2022. The NRF generally follow the tactics of the 1980s Mujahideen and the Taliban – guerrilla ambushes and assassinations. As of late 2024, the NRF claims to have conducted 380 military operations across more than 20 provinces, reportedly resulting in over 500 Taliban casualties, although this is difficult to verify. This is likely why the Taliban are continuing to target former members of the previous government, military and police, for fear that they are potential supporters of the NRF.
The NRF appear to be emphasising focused attacks on key targets attacks, including assaults on Taliban-controlled facilities such as the military sector of Kabul Airport and various ministries. These operations demonstrate the NRF’s adaptability and resilience, even as they face challenges in terms of resources and manpower. The group’s leadership emphasises a commitment to countering not only the Taliban but also other extremist organizations like Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, which have reportedly expanded their presence in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. The NRF appear to be avoiding terrorist activities involving the indiscriminate killing of civilians.
In 2025, the NRF still look to be underpowered, but they seem to be improving. And it took the Taliban four or five years, from a crushing defeat in late 2001, to develop their own effective insurgency (and only in limited parts of the south and east). The NRF’s prospects depend on several factors. They have demonstrated an ability to conduct effective guerrilla operations, but do not yet have the capacity to pose a significant threat to Taliban control over Afghanistan. This may change, but is still likely a few years away if the Taliban’s hold on power roughly remains intact. Popular support will be critical to NRF success. But the population, after forty years of conflict, do not yet seem willing to involve themselves in another protracted conflict.
The NRF will probably need to unify – or at least achieve a viable modus operandi – with various anti-Taliban factions (but not Islamic State), secure external support, and expand its influence among Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic groups. The establishment of alliances with other resistance entities, such as the Afghan Freedom Front, might indicate a potential for increased collaborative efforts against the Taliban. Without substantial external assistance and broader domestic support, the NRF is unlikely to achieve a decisive military victory in the near term. But, like 2024, in 2025 we should expect to see another incremental uptick in NRF attacks, activities and capabilities.
Targeting of the Hazaras continue
Summary:
Terror attacks, violence and discrimination against the Shia Muslim Hazara communities in Afghanistan continue. The Taliban and Islamic State Khorosan Province (the Islamic State franchise operating in and around Afghanistan) both hate Shia Muslims and are both guilty of targeting them. At best, the Taliban remain unwilling to take credible steps to protect them, at worst, they are complicit in some of the attacks. Islamic State are most likely responsible for the more brutal and indiscriminate attacks against this highly fearful minority group
Background:
On 12 September 2024 a group of Hazara civilians were stopped by gunmen in Daikundi province and attacked. Fourteen were reported killed and six injured. The attack was subsequently claimed by ISKP.[1] A Taliban response, beyond a brief “thoughts and prayers” media statement, has been largely absent. Islamic State’s claim to have undertaken the attack looks entirely plausible. Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), a Sunni Muslim terror organisation, has been operating in Afghanistan since early 2015. They are extremely and violently hostile to Shia Muslims. They have frequently launched terrorist attacks against the Hazara civilian community.
“Two bomb blasts at a boys’ school in the Afghan capital Kabul have killed at least six people and wounded more than 20, officials say. The blasts happened at the Abdul Rahim Shahid high school in the Shia-dominated west of the city. The number of dead and wounded is likely to rise. A nearby tuition centre was also targeted in a grenade attack. There was no immediate claim of responsibility.”[2]
A May 2020 Islamic State attack against a maternity hospital in Kabul was in a Hazara area.[3] Their goal is to disrupt and destabilise. This has often focused on the targeting of religious and ethnic minorities, particularly against Shia and Hazara communities.[4]
The Taliban and ISKP are entirely opposed to each other and have fought continuously since the emergence of Islamic State in eastern Afghanistan in late 2014. But the Taliban and ISKP are united in their violent hostility to Shia Muslims. The Taliban regime, since coming to power, has attempted to convince anxious Afghan Shias and a concerned international community that the Hazaras are now safe in Afghanistan. But, in the current fragile situation since the Taliban’s return to power, ISKP still retains a presence in Afghanistan and has continued to target ethnic and religious minorities (for example, Sikhs, Hindus and Hazara) in an effort to trigger a wider sectarian conflict.
It is difficult to know what the Taliban’s rationale and policy is in relation to ISKP attacks on the Shia community since the Taliban took power. The Taliban have attacked and killed many Hazaras since the 1990s – and more recently. In October 2021, Amnesty International directly accused the Taliban of killing 13 Hazaras – including a teenage girl – in Daikundi, during the violent and turbulent Taliban takeover in August 2021.[5] It is hard to see direct evidence of Taliban collusion with ISKP in these attacks, but many ISKP members originally derived from Afghan and Pakistani Taliban groups ten years ago, so the situation in some parts of the country regarding fighter allegiance is somewhat murky.
Prospects:
Large scale, indiscriminate, ISKP attacks across Afghanistan make the Taliban’s autocratic de facto government look weak and incompetent – it also holds open the possibility that the United States – and other actors – might reach into Afghanistan to swipe at ISKP with drones and missiles. The Taliban certainly do not want this. The Taliban is still relatively new to running a government and is struggling to develop security forces that can counter terrorist groups – until recently they were the terrorist group causing the chaos. They are likely unable to prevent ISKP terror attacks and have come under strong criticism for failing to protect the Hazaras.[6] At the same time, given the Taliban’s intense hostility to Hazaras, it is likely that the Taliban security effort is not prioritising protection of Shia Muslims and Hazara communities such as Daikundi. A report by Human Rights Watch in September 2022, noted:
“The Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Islamic State’s (ISIS) affiliate in Afghanistan, has repeatedly attacked Hazaras and other religious minorities at their mosques, schools, and workplaces…The Taliban authorities have done little to protect these communities from suicide bombings and other unlawful attacks or to provide necessary medical care and other assistance to victims and their families…The Taliban’s failure to provide security to at-risk populations and medical and other assistance to survivors and affected families, as well as Taliban policies that violate human rights, particularly those of women and girls, exacerbates the harm these attacks cause.
‘Armed group leaders may one day face justice for their atrocities against Hazaras and other communities,’ [a Human Rights Watch researcher] said. ‘Taliban officials who fail to take action to protect religious minorities from attack may be complicit in these grave crimes.’”[7]
The Taliban are unlikely to be trying too hard to prevent attacks or to investigate them when they take place. For good reason, the Hazara communities do not trust the Taliban to protect them or investigate attacks against them. For Islamic State, attacking the Hazaras – and the more brutally the better – represents an ideal way to cause the instability they need. The attacks will continue.
[1] Rahmati, F., ‘ISIS claims responsibility for deadly attack on Hazara civilians in Daikundi’, Khaama Press, 13 Sep. 2024, https://www.khaama.com/isis-claims-responsibility-for-deadly-attack-on-hazara-civilians-in-daikundi/
[2] ‘Kabul blasts kill six and wound 20 at boys’ school’, BBC News, 19 Apr. 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61148248
[3] ‘Babies among 24 killed as gunmen attack maternity ward in Kabul’, Al Jazeera, 13 May 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/afghanistan-gunmen-storm-kabul-hospital-200512071439807.html
[4] Foxley, T., ‘ISKP attacking minorities in Afghanistan’, Afghanhindsight report, 25 Mar. 2020, https://afghanhindsight.wordpress.com/2020/03/25/iskp-attacking-minorities-in-afghanistan/ , https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/24/two-bomb-blasts-kill-at-least-14-in-afghanistan-officials
[5] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58807734
[6] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/03/attacks-target-afghanistans-hazaras
[7] ‘Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious Minorities: Taliban Need to Protect, Assist Hazara, Other At-Risk Communities’, Human Rights Watch, 6 Sep. 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/06/afghanistan-isis-group-targets-religious-minorities
Afghanistan: The Taliban continue to target journalists who report stories that reflect badly on the Taliban.
Summary: Journalists and journalism remains under pressure from the Taliban. Getting access to reliable open source reporting and data about Afghanistan is much more difficult since August 2021, when the Taliban took over. It likely to get harder as the Taliban’s hold on the country strengthens.
“Taliban authorities cracked down further on local media and freedom of speech and increased arbitrary detentions of journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society activists, including women protesters.”[1]
The Taliban have attacked journalists on multiple occasions for reporting news that is deemed unfavourable to the Taliban.[2] The Taliban are installing thousands of security cameras in Kabul and across the country.[3] They are looking at plans to restrict access to Facebook.[4] Many Afghan media professionals have fled the country. Outlets that remain are in fear from threats, illegal detention and violence.
“Nine journalists in Taliban custody across Afghanistan have been released following a campaign of arrests targeting foreign or exiled media outlets. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and its affiliate, the Afghan Independent Journalists Union (AIJU), condemn the Taliban’s crackdown on journalists and call for the immediate release of all media workers still in custody.”[5]
The Taliban have been particularly sensitive to journalists covering women’s protests.
An Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) report from August 2023 assessed the four most targeted groups in Afghanistan are former government and security officials, prisoners, women, and journalists. The report notes:
“Since the takeover, the Taliban has targeted former government and security officials, carried out collective punishments in areas where anti-Taliban groups have emerged, and imposed ultraconservative societal restrictions – especially on women and journalists – aimed at maintaining control. ACLED records over 1,000 incidents of violence targeting civilians by the Taliban between the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021 and 30 June 2023, accounting for 62% of all attacks on civilians in the country. This places the Taliban regime in Afghanistan among the world’s top government or de facto state perpetrators of violence targeting civilians domestically since August 2021, behind only the military junta in Myanmar.”[6]
The targeting includes radio stations playing music. Women journalists have been particularly targeted. In January 2024, Human Rights Watch made the following assessment:
“The human rights situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate in 2023 as the Taliban committed widespread human rights violations, particularly against women and girls. Women also faced significant barriers to freedom of movement and speech. Human Rights Watch has concluded that the pattern of abuses against women and girls in Afghanistan amounts to the crime against humanity of gender persecution. Taliban authorities cracked down further on local media and freedom of speech and increased arbitrary detentions of journalists, human rights defenders, and civil society activists, including women protesters.”[7]
Conclusions and outlook
This all comes straight out of a playbook that any self-respecting dictator – theocratic or otherwise – has on his bedside reading table. There is absolutely no sign that the aggressive Taliban pressure on all forms of media in Afghanistan is likely to ease, let alone stop. It makes it harder for national and international observers to understand what is happening inside the country. This is what the Taliban desire: it allows them to deny, denounce and deflect any unfavourable reporting (of which there is a lot), while allowing them a head start at controlling the narrative.
Afghanistan’s media environment will remain extremely difficult for the foreseeable future.
[1] ‘Afghanistan: Events of 2023’, Human Rights Watch, 12 Jan. 2024, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/afghanistan
[2] ‘Four journalists arrested, two TV channels closed in latest Taliban crackdown on Afghan media’, Reporters Without Borders, 24 Apr. 2024, https://www.google.com/search?q=Afghanistan+taliban+shut+down+journalists&client=firefox-b-d&sca_esv=9f7ecf1a9cd93cb6&sca_upv=1&source=lnt&tbs=cdr%3A1%2Ccd_min%3A1+jan+2024%2Ccd_max%3A25+apr+2024&tbm=
[3] Rahmati, F., ‘Installation of 80,000 security cameras in Kabul’, Khaama Press, 14 Apr. 2024, https://www.khaama.com/installation-of-80000-security-cameras-in-kabul/
[4] Noorzai, R., and Faizi, W., ‘Taliban Facebook plan is attempt to silence critics, journalists say’, VoA, 11 Apr. 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-facebook-plan-is-attempt-to-silence-critics-journalists-say/7566996.html
[5] https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/afghanistan-taliban-releases-nine-journalists-following-crackdown
[6] ‘Two Years Of Repression: Mapping Taliban Violence Targeting Civilians in Afghanistan’, ACLED, 11 Aug. 2023, https://acleddata.com/2023/08/11/two-years-of-repression-mapping-taliban-violence-targeting-civilians-in-afghanistan/
[7] ‘Afghanistan, Events of 2023’, Human Rights Watch, 12 Jan. 2024, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/afghanistan
Afghanistan: Prospects for 2024
Summary
With the violent and oppressive Taliban now fully in charge of the country, Afghanistan continues to travel down a dark and isolated road. As almost every political, humanitarian, economic and societal indicator continues to show a downward trajectory, there are minimal signs for optimism this year.
Overview
The Taliban remain isolated from, and unrecognised by, the international community. Even the handful of countries that were prepared to recognise them in the 1990s are reluctant to do so again. A serious economic downturn and man-made humanitarian crises have been compounded by natural disasters – not least the recent and devastating series of earthquakes in Herat and western Afghanistan in October last year. There is no realistic prospect that the situation will improve for Afghanistan in 2024. The security, social, economic and humanitarian conditions for the country will remain at critically low levels which can worsen over the coming twelve months.
One recent comment by Heather Barr, a director at Human Rights Watch, strikes an important tone when considering this post-August 2021 trajectory.
“What’s tragic is that now you could look back to the situation in April of 2021 and feel like it’s some kind of halcyon vision of the past, when, in fact, it was very, very grim. It’s just that we didn’t realize then how much worse things could get.”[1]
But many of the societal and individual human tragedies underway in Afghanistan now go under-reported – or not reported at all. Other global events, not least Ukraine, the Middle East and the Trumpian turbulence of US domestic politics, pull attention away from Afghanistan. Getting access to reliable information about developments in Afghanistan is tricky. The Taliban themselves are very hostile to journalists who fail to present the Taliban in a good light. Many media outlets have been clamped down on, hounded out or brought under Taliban control.[2]
“An Afghan journalist detained by the Taliban’s intelligence service has been released amid increasing concerns over mounting Taliban harassment of Afghan journalists. The Taliban detained Ruhollah Sangar, a correspondent for the independent Tolo TV, on December 17 while he was reporting from Charikar, the capital of the northern Parwan Province… On December 12, the Taliban handed down a one-year sentence to journalist Sultan Ali Jawadi in the central province of Daikundi.
He headed the local broadcaster Nasim Radio and was convicted for “propaganda against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” and “espionage for foreign countries” by rebroadcasting the programs of banned international media. The Taliban has also been holding journalist Abdul Rahim Mohammadi in the southern Kandahar Province since December 4. He works for independent Afghan broadcaster Tamadon TV.”[3]
Political
There is no evidence of serious fractures or division within the Taliban, although the internal workings of the Taliban will remain opaque. As with the original Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, who died in 2013, the decision-making process is focused around an inaccessible leadership group based in Kandahar under Haibatullah Akhundzade, who appears to have an inflexible and more or less absolute control over Taliban policies. It is likely that his prime criteria for entry into his inner group of Taliban is for them to have strong religious credentials.
Over the decades, international efforts to understand the Taliban and find viable ways of entering into a workable dialogue have regularly come unstuck in the quest to find a group of “moderate” Taliban. With the absolute power that the Taliban now wield in Afghanistan, there is no evidence that they are open to any appeals to moderation on religious matters, their attitudes to women or the specifics of the application of Sharia law, which has now replaced all aspects of the previous government’s legislation. What schools they are building are religious ones. The Taliban madrassas will offer a narrow curriculum intended to produce radically indoctrinated students in their own image.[4]
Security
By the standards of terrorism that the Taliban themselves set in the last twenty years, the levels of of political violence are low. Internal resistance groups – primarily the National Resistance Front and the Afghan Freedom Front – are certainly active and attacking isolated Taliban targets. But their actions are small in scale and limited in impact.[5] They do not currently present as powerful, nationwide movements capable of unseating the Taliban – crucially, there is little strong international backing for them. But this is not to say that they cannot capable of challenging the Taliban in the future. It took the Taliban in the region of four to five years to develop a credible guerrilla capability after their defeat in 2001. Local anti-Taliban groups will not cause the Taliban any significant concern this year.
Despite several reverses, Islamic State are still active in Afghanistan, targeting the Taliban and also the Hazara local ethnic group who do not share the views of Islam that Islamic State do.[6] The Taliban, similarly aggressively opposed to the Shia Hazara, will do little tangible to protect this group.[7] Islamic State will continue to seek to conduct terror attacks against the Taliban.[8]
The borders are volatile. Along poorly defined boundaries, ill-disciplined Taliban border guards have traded shots on many occasions with Iranian and Pakistani counter-parts. Sometimes this has led to artillery exchanges. This unpredictability – which has often caused border crossing points to be closed – will continue.[9]
International relations
The international community is distracted. When it does pay attention to Afghanistan in 2024, it will likely stay cautious and critical of the Taliban, but largely lack the leverage to affect real change. The United Nations has started using the term “gender apartheid” to describe and condemn the Taliban’s violent, restrictive and discriminatory approach to women.
The Taliban feel that they are entitled to international recognition and a seat at the United Nations. They purport to represent the will of the Afghan people. There is no evidence of this and neither is any likely to be forthcoming – the Taliban have abolished the concept of political parties. It is difficult to see any form of election ever being held under a Taliban regime.
The Taliban need international recognition – it will gain them access to credit, aid and economic and trade deals. At some levels it will endorse their policies and practices. But the leadership shows no evidence of serious willingness to jump through the hoops of humanitarian compromise necessary to secure the cautious co-operation of the international community. For now, the Taliban look prepared to press on with a repressive agenda, regardless of the social and economic cost.
Pakistan – deportations
The Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan – their former sponsors – is mired in dispute and friction. Pakistan seems to be getting little return for its efforts in bringing the Taliban into power. Pakistan has over-reacted to its own security problems with the Pakistani Taliban – the TTP – by declaring, last November, that hundreds of thousands of “illegal” Afghans would be ejected from Pakistan and deported to Taliban controlled Afghanistan. This has uprooted generations of Afghan refugees who had fled to Pakistan in the eighties and nineties from earlier waves of violence in Afghanistan. They settled there, married – many children have never visited their parent’s country – and many contributed to the economy of Pakistan. The forced return of Afghans from Pakistan has caused major disputes between the Taliban and the Pakistani government – and some economic difficulties in Pakistan at the sudden departure of a substantial workforce.
Some Pakistanis fear that the Afghan Taliban might be minded to support their comrades in the TTP as they conduct terror attacks in Pakistan. Many recent Afghan refugees include those who worked with or for the international community or for the previous Afghan government. If returned to Afghanistan they will be in real danger from a revenge-minded Taliban regime that has spent the last two and a half years detaining and killing “collaborators” from the previous government. Most Afghans being returned to Afghanistan have had to abandon jobs, property and possessions. Prospects of starting from scratch in Afghanistan without capital, a family support network and property will be very limited.
Economic
The Afghan economy is flat-lining. This is due in large part to the Taliban’s ban on women having employment. Occasional photo shoots of provincial Taliban leaders cutting ribbons on a local bridge or road repair project do not conceal the fact that serious investment is not coming to Afghanistan. Many educated Afghans – doctors, engineers, scientists and scholars – have either left or are seeking to leave. This “brain drain” will continue.
“The Afghan economy is expected to hover around no-growth territory this year, amid uncertainty after contracting by 25% since August 2021 and adjusting to significantly lower demand, while the interim Taliban administration’s restrictive policies on women’s education and work will further lower Afghanistan’s growth prospects says the World Bank”[10]
The international community is highly circumspect about investing in Afghanistan. For most countries it requires diplomatic recognition first. China, largely indifferent to the human rights abuses of other nations, was expected to jump in with both feet to snap up raw material bargains from a Taliban desperate for hard cash. But China has been cautious and the Taliban have been wary. Regional enthusiasm for China’s Belt and Road Initiative looks to be waning – Pakistan has little to show beyond a large debt. Previous Chinese investment in Afghanistan has proven less than successful – and tinged with fraudulent activities.
Humanitarian
There are any number of statistics demonstrating Afghanistan’s stark humanitarian crisis, caused by decades of conflict, the destruction of infrastructure, widespread unemployment, long-term poverty and the collapse of the healthcare system. Around 30 million Afghans – about three quarters of the entire population – are in need of humanitarian assistance.[11] The Taliban regime shows no signs of concern or capability to address these challenges, choosing to blame the international community. There are reports that the Taliban are taking aid money for their own purposes.[12] The Taliban’s bizarre approach to the female half of the population – including restricting women’s access to employment, education and the use of women healthcare workers – means that death rates of women and children from treatable health issues are starting to creep upwards.[13] More women are now dying in childbirth.[14] Other health issues, such as mental health and suicide rates – particularly amongst women and girls – will remain major and under-reported problems.[15]
Women’s rights
The Taliban’s views are based on a very strict interpretation of Sharia. Any group – ethnic, gender or religious – can expect harsh treatment if they do not conform to the Taliban’s vision of the world. Any action or policy that attempts to promote women’s equality is considered Western ideological interference and is to be resisted. Attitudes to women are harsh and violent – women are now prevented from accessing work and education. The United Nations is now describing this as “gender apartheid”.[16]
Women and girls appear to be making some progress with accessing online education after the Taliban’s ban on female attendance at school. But the Taliban are likely to try and suppress this. Women’s public protests against the Taliban have been inspiringly brave in the face of harsh repression. The Taliban have no compunction about meeting unarmed and peaceful women demonstrators with automatic weapons, whips and clubs. There are credible reports that some women have been forcibly married to Taliban officials.[17] Many women have been arrested and are held, without visiting rights or legal representation, in low grade prisons where it is highly likely they are subjected to mental, physical and sexual abuse.[18]
Conclusions
Are there any causes for optimism? It is hard to see anything with real potential in the coming year. The Taliban continue to demonstrate a lack of ability and interest in running a country effectively or coherently attempting to alleviate the many societal problems. Many of Afghanistan’s problems could be at least begin to be addressed if there was substantial international engagement. But this would require the Taliban to make concessions and the international community to generate more funding and enthusiasm than it currently has. It seems that the Taliban would rather that the population continued to suffer rather than they should walk back any aspect of their ideology.
It is always possible to look at less likely “wild card” possibilities, such as a successful Islamic State strike against the Taliban leadership. There might be a surge in support for the NRF after a Taliban excess, perhaps a more brutal than usual dispersal of human rights protestors. Or perhaps a genuine change of heart – or, more likely, a grudging concession – within parts of the Taliban, perhaps on something as basic as education for girls and women. But such developments would probably lead to more violence.
At a talk at the end of last year, the veteran expert, Thomas Barfield, made two interesting points.
Afghanistan can seem stable – until it suddenly isn’t. Events can suddenly bring Afghanistan back to the top of the international agenda, but not in a good way. If there was another return to violence, given the large urban populations, an anti-government resistance might more likely resemble an Iraq or Syria-style city-based insurgency, rather than guerrillas moving around the mountains and valleys of far-flung provinces.
But 2024 will be another grim year for the people of Afghanistan.
[1] https://msmagazine.com/2024/01/09/afghanistan-women-maternal-mortality-taliban/
[2] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-jailing-journalists/32729256.html
[3] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-journalist-sangar-released-taliban-harassment/32738979.html
[4] https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-secular-schools-converted-madrasahs-education/31914672.html
[5] https://www.afintl.com/en/202401032099
[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/8/isil-claims-credit-for-kabul-bus-attack-targeting-shias
[7] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/afghanistan-taliban-torture-and-execute-hazaras-in-targeted-attack-new-investigation/
[8] https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/can-taliban-contain-islamic-state-afghanistan
[9] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/12/afghanistan-and-pakistan-trade-blame-as-key-border-crossing-remains-closed
[10] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/10/03/afghanistan-s-contracted-economy-faces-uncertainty-afghan-families-are-struggling
[11] https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2024-december-2023
[12] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-un-aid-profits/32650430.html
[13] https://www.passblue.com/2023/12/19/in-afghanistan-women-are-dying-on-the-way-to-the-hospital-or-inside-it/
[14] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231221-dying-every-two-hours-afghan-women-risk-life-to-give-birth
[15] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-women-suicides-taliban/32586222.html
[16] ‘Afghanistan: Taliban ‘may be responsible for gender apartheid’ says rights expert’, United Nations, 19 June 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137847
[17] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-woman-accuses-taliban-rape-forced-marriage/32015852.html
[18] https://8am.media/eng/families-worried-as-taliban-arrest-girls-the-girls-are-imprisoned-in-homes/
Thomas Barfield on Afghanistan
16 November notes from Conservative Friends of Afghanistan discussion with Thomas Barfield, hosted by Shabnam Nasimi
I listened in to a fascinating discussion with a true Afghanistan expert, Thomas Barfield, hosted by the UK based Conservative Friends of Afghanistan. Here are my rough notes from the discussion – with my highlights in bold. But two key points to highlight from it:
- Afghanistan will seem stable – until it suddenly isn’t. Afghanistan always finds a way to suddenly surprise the world – ignore Afghanistan at your peril.
- If there is to be a new revolution/uprising/insurgency, it may look a lot more like the Arab Spring, focusing on protests and unrest in the cities, than guerrilla war in the mountains of Badakhshan…
Introduction – SIGAR notes the Taliban are scooping off aid money. UN nation states noting Taliban engaged in ethnic cleansing of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras. Much arbitrary imprisonment – mainly Tajiks.
Pakistan deportation policy
Af/Pak relations complicated and subject to tensions. Afghanistan never recognised the Durrand Line that cuts Pushtun tribes in half. They accept the de facto border but it is not the same as a legitimate one. After 1947, Afghanistan felt the border should be renegotiated. Pakistan never fully established control over NWFP and still trying to get Afghans to recognise the Durrand Line. Remember that the Afghan borders with Iran and Central Asia are also not formally recognised.
It has been shock for Pakistan, having spent over twenty years arming the Taliban in the hope of getting the Durrand Line recognised only to find the Taliban are a potential enemy – and one that is allowing the TTP into Afghanistan as a safe haven. The Pakistani regime has not got what it wanted.
The Taliban are not recognised by any country – not even Pakistan – and Pakistan is now using crude levers to try and influence the Taliban by deporting 1.5 million Afghans. It is hard to define the Afghans in this deportation – there are different types – three million came over in the 1980s – the most recent refugees came over post-August 2021. Their asylum status was never formalised so they stayed as refugees. Some are now grandfathers who have never known Afghanistan. Most are ethnic Pushtuns – from an Afghan perspective the border is not recognised, so who is Pakistan to decide that they should be moved?
For Pakistan, the deportation represents a policy failure. For the Taliban, perhaps they will ultimately shrug their shoulders as “not our problem” and expect the UN to solve it. Also, the Taliban may respond by helping the TTP – perhaps even as the TTP undertake a jihad against Islamabad? That would be a new, bigger problem.
Humanitarian aid
Afg governments historically have always survived non international aid, particularly since the 1950s Cold War time – a long tradition of seeking outside aid. This was exacerbated post-2001 – the World Bank estimates that 42% of Afg GDP was foreign aid, so after August 2021, Afg was plunged into an immediate crisis of food, aid and healthcare. During the Afghan civil war from 2001 – 2021, the Taliban retained government employees in the districts and provinces they had captured – they outsourced the functions of government so they could focus on the war. In 2021, they wanted the foreigners to go but leave their money behind. Even if the Taliban were not stealing aid money, they are still dependent on the international community to keep Afghanistan stable
Now the Taliban are much more hardline and they do not understand how to keep the population fed – in a sense they are “playing chicken” with the international community – expecting the UN to feed the population rather than allow mass starvation.
Dynamics of the Taliban
Barfield cautions that it is very hard to know the inner workings and thinking of the Taliban so his comments should be seen as speculation only. The Taliban have factions like every other Afghan government (eg Parcham/Khalq or Ghani/Abdullah) – divisions are nothing new.
The speed of the Taliban takeover upset a potential long-term strategy – a fast military takeover of Kabul meant the Taliban had little interest in negotiating and no question of them sharing power.
There are Taliban factions –
Taliban old school – Quetta Shura/Kandahar
Haqqani Network – Zadran Pushtuns who were not formed based on religion – their leaders were not mullahs
Northern Taliban – Kabul fell in Aug 2021 to Taliban forces from the north, not Taliban from Kandahar or Jalalabad – northern Afghan Taliban are more diverse (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pushtuns) – some slightly more liberal – ok to have girls in school
Herat – Herati Taliban
Right now the situation in Afghanistan is stable and the group mainly calling the shots is the older, Kandahar group and not the Zadran-influenced Kabul government (who might be more open to compromise over issues like girls education in exchange for aid). Instead of moderating once they came to power, the Taliban have become more radical – if the Taliban are defining themselves purely as Pushtun nationalists, then they make their group even more narrow. Kandahar is the Taliban’s spiritual heartland – we may see some internal disputes between the Kandahari Taliban and those in Kabul
Nothing is happening as yet – but it can be really stable until suddenly it isn’t (and then we academics will explain ten years later what happened and why it was quite obvious)!!
Women’s rights
The Taliban’s fixation with these policies is hard to explain – it is having a big impact on the economy (particularly after the Afghan economy has lost so many men to war) – educated women had been able to work and were significant “breadwinners”. More generally, the attitude of Afghans to women has gradually changed – but the Taliban’s view never did. It is partially explained by religion (but Iranian women have a massive role in education and work).
The Taliban leadership is mainly old – but still hard to explain the fixation – they could be “separate but equal” – this would still be a form of gender apartheid but perhaps more workable? The Taliban’s approach is destructive – but confused – even the Taliban Ministry of Education doesn’t know what the policy is. The Taliban greatly misunderstand the nature of the Afghanistan they are taking over – the population is very young – most were born post-2001 and the Taliban have now effectively “destroyed the future of the majority of the young generation”
The country is no longer predominantly rural – most of the growth and progress has been in the cities. Historically there has been modernising progress – in the 1920s under King Amanullah, Afghan women got the vote before American women.
So the situation looks stable at the moment – so at what point might we see a crisis?
Many of the Taliban have daughters – Afghanistan will need women doctors even with gender segregation. It is counter-productive internally and externally – with an absolute ban on women working it makes it easier for the international community to drop the Taliban.
Question – does the international community have the leverage to compel the Taliban in anyway?
No – for the Taliban “God feeds people”. The Taliban are “pre-modern” – “they really don’t care”
We have been hearing about the idea of “moderate Taliban” since the late 1990s! This is wishful thinking – the government has zero inclusivity – it is almost all Pushtun. But the hardline line Taliban do not necessarily cover all of Afghanistan – perhaps it is possible for the international community to work with some of the more pragmatic Taliban in the north and west? For example giving aid to Herat if some schools are opened? Avoid dealing with central Afghan government.
Question – what about the resistance groups in Afghanistan, any legitimacy to them?
US did not assist resistance groups in the 1990s – US policy blows hot and cold – the US does nothing and then is suddenly diving in feet first – and we should not expect the US to understand a complex situation. The Afghans in country have their own basic survival problems to deal with – food, aid, work, education – doesn’t make them well placed to join a revolution – if anything, history of the world shows that revolutions start once the situation has improved slightly
Resistance groups may get the opportunity in future to exploit a situation that suddenly occurs inside Afghanistan – but the diasporas are too ideological – they have agendas and programmes, eg communism, Islam, democracy, Presidency (even in the 2001-2021 period, people were not allowed to choose their own governors).
If there is some opposition in Afghanistan, they might become a focal point for opportunities of others – remember issue of rural vs urban. Kabul is now a city of 4-5 million and a very young population. If there were to be an insurgency in the future, perhaps it is more likely to resemble the Arab Spring, building on a frustrated youth (perhaps without an agenda).
In such a situation the Taliban would either have to make a deal or try and clamp down on Kabul with only 10,000 fighters. This could lead to an urban insurgency – Afghanistan has never had cities before – a revolt now looks less likely in the mountains of Badakhshan – but think about the cities of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar…and Governments tend to fall instantaneously.
Economy
Countries like China have sent ambassadors – but no recognition by the international community. People think/assume China will get involved – Belt and Road Initiative – but maybe the BRI is “past its sell-by date”? Many countries have racked up debts due to the BRI – Pakistan has spent millions trying to protect Chinese development projects in north west Pakistan.
China is very sensitive to Chinese citizens being attacked – if China was in Afghanistan, could the Taliban guarantee security? Islamic state attached Chinese workers hotel in Kabul. Afghanistan has a mass of resources under the ground – none of which has been developed – even in the twenty years of western involvement in 2001-2021 no Western country has invested in Afghanistan.
China will be calculating – will the security hold for the 5-10-20 years necessary? Would a new regime stand by the deals signed with the Taliban?
The China BRI problem also involves dealing with Islam when it is committing genocide of Uighurs – how to square the circle? “The Taliban are the stuff of Xi Jinping’s nightmares”. The cynical Chinese view might be that the US has abandoned Afghanistan and left the mess with China. China cannot even get good security from Pakistan – these are all dilemmas for China.
Afghanistan’s neighbours also showing little interest – no one is speaking out about the Taliban or on Muslim issues – hard to define Afghanistan’s location – is it eastern-most Middle East? Is it Central Asia? Or South Asia? But is a link – a “marshalling yard” for the Silk Road.
Iran barely recognises that Afghanistan is its neighbour – Iran more focused on Middle East, Iraq, Russia. Iran has enough other problems (and it is also deporting Afghans).
Central Asia has been part of the Russian Empire for so long – same ethnic groups but very different thinking.
Pakistan is now at odds with the Taliban – and worried about the encroachment of India.
India – strangely, Kabul might find it easier to deal with Delhi than Islamabad, so we may see the return of India influence – there is potential in the Chabahar port and route with India/Iran collaboration.
Two years ago it was possible to envisage a Pakistan-dominated Taliban government in Kabul – but now even the Taliban are hostile to Pakistan: “Afghanistan has been constantly surprising Pakistani governments” After 9/11, Pakistan was desperate for the Taliban to ditch Bin Laden in case the Americans arrived in force. Mullah Omar refused to do so.
Pakistan therefore sees the Taliban as very ungrateful – Pakistan invested heavily – they were a major factor in bringing the Taliban to power, but now the Taliban are able to jettison Pakistan. It is relatively easy to bankroll an insurgency but Pakistan is not able to rebuild a country…
Question: In international affairs Afghanistan is dropping off the radar – what are the consequences?
Afghanistan both benefits and suffers from international intervention – in the 19th century, Afghanistan had always been written off as an inconsequential issue – but somehow it would always come back to the centre of world attention
In 1923 Afghanistan was the only independent Muslim country in the world.
Post 1945 Cold War – 1980s – Afghan blood being spilled over non-Afghan issues.
Now in 2023 there is a danger of forgetting about Afghanistan – but it could always come back in some new and surprising way. It is an unstable area, but a lot more modern and advanced now in some ways – iPhones, WhatsApp for communications – a mix of modern and old-fashioned but with much stronger connections to the outside world.
Don’t ignore Afghanistan.
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