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Verifiable Credentials Status List v2021
Privacy-preserving status information for Verifiable Credentials
W3C First Public Working Draft
More details about this document
- This version:
- https://www.w3.org/TR/2023/WD-vc-status-list-20230427/
- Latest published version:
- https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-status-list/
- Latest editor's draft:
- https://w3c.github.io/vc-status-list-2021/
- History:
- https://www.w3.org/standards/history/vc-status-list
- Commit history
- Editors:
- Manu Sporny (Digital Bazaar)
- Dave Longley (Digital Bazaar)
- Orie Steele (Transmute)
- Mike Prorock (mesur.io)
- Mahmoud Alkhraishi (Mavennet)
- Authors:
- Dave Longley (Digital Bazaar)
- Manu Sporny (Digital Bazaar)
- Feedback:
- GitHub w3c/vc-status-list-2021 (pull requests, new issue, open issues)
- Related Documents
- Verifiable Credentials Data Model
Copyright © 2023 World Wide Web Consortium. W3C® liability, trademark and permissive document license rules apply.
Abstract
This specification describes a privacy-preserving, space-efficient, and high-performance mechanism for publishing status information such as suspension or revocation of Verifiable Credentials.
Status of This Document
This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. A list of current W3C publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the W3C technical reports index at https://www.w3.org/TR/.
This document is experimental and is undergoing heavy development. It is inadvisable to implement the specification in its current form. An experimental implementation is available.
This document was published by the Verifiable Credentials Working Group as a First Public Working Draft using the Recommendation track.
Publication as a First Public Working Draft does not imply endorsement by W3C and its Members.
This is a draft document and may be updated, replaced or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to cite this document as other than work in progress.
This document was produced by a group operating under the W3C Patent Policy. W3C maintains a public list of any patent disclosures made in connection with the deliverables of the group; that page also includes instructions for disclosing a patent. An individual who has actual knowledge of a patent which the individual believes contains Essential Claim(s) must disclose the information in accordance with section 6 of the W3C Patent Policy.
This document is governed by the 2 November 2021 W3C Process Document.
This section is non-normative.
It is often useful for an issuer of verifiable credentials [VC-DATA-MODEL] to link to a location where a verifier can check to see if a credential has been suspended or revoked. There are a variety of privacy and performance considerations that are made when designing, publishing, and processing status lists.
One such privacy consideration happens when there is a one-to-one mapping between a verifiable credential and a URL where the status is published. This type of mapping enables the website that publishes the URL to correlate the holder, time, and verifier when the status is checked. This could enable the issuer to discover the type of interaction the holder is having with the verifier, such as providing an age verification credential when entering a bar. Being tracked by the issuer of a driver's license when entering an establishment violates a privacy expectation that many people have today.
Similarly, there are performance considerations that are explored when designing status lists. One such consideration is where the list is published and the burden it places from a bandwidth and processing perspective, both on the server and the client fetching the information. In order to meet privacy expectations, it is useful to bundle the status of large sets of credentials into a single list to help with herd privacy. However, doing so can place an impossible burden on both the server and client if the status information is as much as a few hundred bytes in size per credential across a population of hundreds of millions of holders.
The rest of this document proposes a highly compressible, bitstring-based status list mechanism with strong privacy-preserving characteristics, that is compatible with the architecture of the Web, is highly space-efficient, and lends itself well to content distribution networks. As an example of using this specification to achieve a number of beneficial privacy and performance goals, it is possible to create a status list that can be constructed for 100,000 verifiable credentials that is roughly 12,500 bytes in size in the worst case. In a case where a few hundred credentials have been revoked, the size of the list is less than a few hundred bytes while providing privacy in a herd of 100,000 individuals.
This section is non-normative.
This section outlines the core concept utilized by the status list mechanism described in this document. At the most basic level, status information for all verifiable credentials issued by an issuer are expressed as simple binary values. The issuer keeps a bitstring list of all verifiable credentials it has issued. Each verifiable credential is associated with a position in the list. If the binary value of the position in the list is 1 (one), the verifiable credential is revoked, if it is 0 (zero) it is not revoked.
One of the benefits of using a bitstring is that it is a highly compressible data format since, in the average case, large numbers of credentials will remain unrevoked. This will ensure long sections of bits that are the same value and thus highly compressible using run-length compression techniques such as GZIP [RFC1952]. The default bitstring size is 16KB (131,072 entries), and when only a handful of verifiable credentials are revoked, the compressed bitstring size is reduced down to a few hundred bytes.
Another benefit of using a bitstring is that it enables large numbers of verifiable credential statuses to be placed in the same list. This specification utilizes a minimum bitstring length of 131,072 (16KB). This population size ensures an adequate amount of herd privacy in the average case. If better herd privacy is required, the bitstring can be made to be larger.
This section is non-normative.
The following terms are used to describe concepts in this specification.
- claim
- An assertion made about a subject.
- credential
- A set of one or more claims made by an issuer. The claims in a credential can be about different subjects.
- data minimization
- The act of limiting the amount of shared data strictly to the minimum necessary to successfully accomplish a task or goal.
- decentralized identifier
-
A portable URL-based identifier, also known as a DID,
associated with an entity. These identifiers are most often used in a
verifiable credential and are associated with subjects such that a
verifiable credential itself can be easily ported from one
repository to another without the need to reissue the credential.
An example of a DID is
did:example:123456abcdef
. - entity
- A thing with distinct and independent existence, such as a person, organization, or device that performs one or more roles in the ecosystem.
- holder
- A role an entity might perform by possessing one or more verifiable credentials and generating presentations from them. A holder is usually, but not always, a subject of the verifiable credentials they are holding. Holders store their credentials in credential repositories.
- identity provider
- An identity provider, sometimes abbreviated as IdP, is a system for creating, maintaining, and managing identity information for holders, while providing authentication services to relying party applications within a federation or distributed network. In this case the holder is always the subject. Even if the verifiable credentials are bearer credentials, it is assumed the verifiable credentials remain with the subject, and if they are not, they were stolen by an attacker. This specification does not use this term unless comparing or mapping the concepts in this document to other specifications. This specification decouples the identity provider concept into two distinct concepts: the issuer and the holder.
- issuer
- A role an entity can perform by asserting claims about one or more subjects, creating a verifiable credential from these claims, and transmitting the verifiable credential to a holder.
- presentation
- Data derived from one or more verifiable credentials, issued by one or more issuers, that is shared with a specific verifier.
- repository
- A program, such as a storage vault or personal verifiable credential wallet, that stores and protects access to holders' verifiable credentials.
- subject
- A thing about which claims are made.
- verifiable credential
- A verifiable credential is a tamper-evident credential that has authorship that can be cryptographically verified. Verifiable credentials can be used to build verifiable presentations, which can also be cryptographically verified.
- verifiable data registry
- A role a system might perform by mediating the creation and verification of identifiers, keys, and other relevant data, such as verifiable credential schemas, revocation registries, issuer public keys, and so on, which might be required to use verifiable credentials. Some configurations might require correlatable identifiers for subjects. Some registries, such as ones for UUIDs and public keys, might just act as namespaces for identifiers.
- verifiable presentation
- A verifiable presentation is a tamper-evident presentation encoded in such a way that authorship of the data can be trusted after a process of cryptographic verification. Certain types of verifiable presentations might contain data that is synthesized from, but do not contain, the original verifiable credentials (for example, zero-knowledge proofs).
- verification
- The evaluation of whether a verifiable credential or verifiable presentation is an authentic and timely statement of the issuer or presenter, respectively. This includes checking that: the credential (or presentation) conforms to the specification; the proof method is satisfied; and, if present, the status check succeeds. Verification of a credential does not imply evaluation of the truth of claims encoded in the credential..
- verifier
- A role an entity performs by receiving one or more verifiable credentials, optionally inside a verifiable presentation for processing. Other specifications might refer to this concept as a relying party.
As well as sections marked as non-normative, all authoring guidelines, diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.
The key words MAY, MUST, MUST NOT, and SHOULD in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
The following sections outlines the data model for this document.
When an issuer desires to enable status information for a
verifiable credential, they MAY add a credentialStatus
property that uses the data model described in this specification.
Property | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
id |
The constraints on the id property are listed in the
Verifiable Credentials Data Model specification [VC-DATA-MODEL]. The
value is expected to be a URL that identifies the status information associated
with the verifiable credential. It MUST NOT be the URL for the
status list.
|
||||||
type |
The type property MUST be StatusList2021Entry .
|
||||||
statusPurpose |
The purpose of the status entry MUST be a string. While the value of the
string is arbitrary, the following values MUST be used for their intended
purpose:
|
||||||
statusListIndex |
The statusListIndex property MUST be an arbitrary size integer
greater than or equal to 0, expressed as a string. The value identifies the bit
position of the status of the verifiable credential.
|
||||||
statusListCredential |
The statusListCredential property MUST be a URL to a
verifiable credential. When the URL is dereferenced, the resulting
verifiable credential MUST have type property that
includes the StatusList2021Credential value.
|
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1", "https://w3id.org/vc/status-list/2021/v1" ], "id": "https://example.com/credentials/23894672394", "type": ["VerifiableCredential"], "issuer": "did:example:12345", "issued": "2021-04-05T14:27:42Z", "credentialStatus": { "id": "https://example.com/credentials/status/3#94567" "type": "StatusList2021Entry", "statusPurpose": "revocation", "statusListIndex": "94567", "statusListCredential": "https://example.com/credentials/status/3" }, "credentialSubject": { "id": "did:example:6789", "type": "Person" }, "proof": { ... } }
When a status list is published, the result is a verifiable credential that encapsulates the status list. The following section describes the format of the verifiable credential that encapsulates the status list:
Property | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
id |
The verifiable credential that contains the status list MAY
express an id property that matches the value specified in
statusListCredential for the corresponding
StatusList2021Entry (see 2.1 StatusList2021Entry).
|
||||||
type |
The verifiable credential that contains the status list MUST
express a type property that includes the
StatusList2021Credential value.
|
||||||
validFrom | The earliest point in time at which the status list is valid. This property is defined in the Verifiable Credentials Data Model specification in Section 4.6: Validity Period. | ||||||
validUntil |
The latest point in time at which the status list is valid. This property is
defined in the Verifiable Credentials Data Model specification in
Section 4.6: Validity Period. Implementations that consume the status list
SHOULD cache the status list verifiable credential until this
time. Implementations that publish the status list are expected to align
any protocol-specific caching information, such as the HTTP Cache-Control
header, with the value in this field.
|
||||||
credentialSubject.type |
The type of the credential subject, which is the
status list, MUST be StatusList2021 .
|
||||||
credentialSubject.statusPurpose |
The purpose of the status entry MUST be a string. While the value of the
string is arbitrary, the following values MUST be used for their intended
purpose:
|
||||||
credentialSubject.encodedList |
The encodedList property of the credential subject MUST be
the GZIP-compressed [RFC1952], base-64 encoded [RFC4648] bitstring values
for the associated range of verifiable credential status values. The
uncompressed bitstring MUST be at least 16KB in size. The bitstring MUST be
encoded such that the first index, with a value of zero
(0 ), is located at the left-most bit in the bitstring and the
last index, with a value of one less than the length of the bitstring
(bitstring_length - 1 ), is located at the right-most bit in the
bitstring. Further information on bitstring encoding can be found in Section
5.1 Bitstring Encoding.
|
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1", "https://w3id.org/vc/status-list/2021/v1" ], "id": "https://example.com/credentials/status/3", "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "StatusList2021Credential"], "issuer": "did:example:12345", "issued": "2021-04-05T14:27:40Z", "credentialSubject": { "id": "https://example.com/status/3#list", "type": "StatusList2021", "statusPurpose": "revocation", "encodedList": "H4sIAAAAAAAAA-3BMQEAAADCoPVPbQwfoAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAIC3AYbSVKsAQAAA" }, "proof": { ... } }
The following section outlines the algorithms that are used to generate and validate status lists as described by this document.
The following process, or one generating the exact output, MUST be followed when producing a StatusList2021Credential:
- Let issued credentials be a list of all issued verifiable credentials.
-
Let RLC be an unsigned
StatusList2021Credential
without the
encodedList
property set. - Generate a compressed bitstring by passing issued credentials to the Bitstring Generation Algorithm.
-
Set the
encodedList
to compressed bitstring. - Generate a proof for the RLC and publish it to the endpoint listed in the verifiable credential.
The following process, or one generating the exact output, MUST be followed when validating a verifiable credential that is contained in a StatusList2021Credential:
-
Let credentialToValidate be a verifiable credentials
containing a
credentialStatus
entry that is a StatusList2021Entry. -
Let status purpose be the value of
statusPurpose
in thecredentialStatus
entry in the credentialToValidate. - Verify all proofs associated with the credentialToValidate. If a proof fails, return a validation error.
-
Verify that the status purpose matches the
statusPurpose
value in the statusListCredential. -
Let compressed bitstring be the value of the
encodedList
property of the StatusList2021Credential. -
Let credentialIndex be the value of the
statusListIndex
property of the StatusList2021Entry. - Generate a revocation bitstring by passing compressed bitstring to the Bitstring Expansion Algorithm.
- Let status be the value of the bit at position credentialIndex in the revocation bitstring.
-
Return
true
if status is 1,false
otherwise.
The following process, or one generating the exact output, MUST be followed when generating a status list bitstring. The algorithm takes a issuedCredentials list as input and returns a compressed bitstring as output.
- Let bitstring be a list of bits with a minimum size of 16KB, where each bit is initialized to 0 (zero).
-
For each bit in bitstring, if there is a
corresponding
statusListIndex
value in a revoked credential in issuedCredentials, set the bit to 1 (one), otherwise set the bit to 0 (zero). - Generate a compressed bitstring by using the GZIP compression algorithm [RFC1952] on the bitstring and then base64-encoding [RFC4648] the result.
- Return the compressed bitstring.
The following process, or one generating the exact output, MUST be followed when expanding a compressed status list bitstring. The algorithm takes a compressed bitstring as input and returns a uncompressed bitstring as output.
This section is non-normative.
This section details the general privacy considerations and specific privacy implications of deploying this specification into production environments.
This section is non-normative.
This document specifies a minimum revocation bitstring length of 131,072, or 16KB uncompressed. This is enough to give holders an adequate amount of herd privacy if the number of verifiable credentials issued is large enough. However, if the number of issued verifiable credentials is a small population, the ability to correlate an individual increases because the number of allocated slots in the bitstring is small. Correlating this information with, for example, where the geographic request came from can also help to correlate individuals that have received a credential from the same geographic region.
This section is non-normative.
It is possible for verifiers to increase the privacy of the holder whose verifiable credential is being checked by caching status lists that have been fetched from remote servers. By caching the content locally, less correlatable information can be inferred from verifier-based access patterns on the status list.
This section is non-normative.
The use of content distribution networks by issuers can increase the privacy of holders by reducing or eliminating requests for the status lists from the issuer. Often, a request for a revocation list will be served by an edge device and thus be faster and reduce the load on the server as well as cloaking verifiers and holders from issuers.
This section is non-normative.
In general, the herd privacy protections offered by this specification can be circumvented by malicious issuers and verifiers. Its privacy benefits can only be realized when issuers and verifiers intend to avoid tracking or sharing the presentation of particular credentials.
A malicious issuer might intentionally attack herd privacy by creating a unique status list per credential issued in order to establish a 1-1 mapping to track when a verifier processes a specific credential. Similarly, they could establish another a 1-1 mapping by using a different cryptographic key for every credential issued that is tracked in a status list.
A malicious verifier might intentionally attack herd privacy by sharing information from presented credentials with a malicious issuer.
What prevents the issuer from hosting several status list bitstrings (one for each credential) and embedding a statusListIndex
value that represents one of those bitstrings at issuance time? This loophole would allow a 1:1 mapping between credential and status list, eliminating the herd privacy guarantees that are integral to this spec.
This section is non-normative.
There are a number of security considerations that implementers should be aware of when processing data described by this specification. Ignoring or not understanding the implications of this section can result in security vulnerabilities.
While this section attempts to highlight a broad set of security considerations, it is not a complete list. Implementers are urged to seek the advice of security and cryptography professionals when implementing mission critical systems using the technology outlined in this specification.
This section is non-normative.
It is critical that implementers pay particular attention to the way that they encode and decode bitstrings. Failure to do so can result in checking the wrong bitstring index for a given credential, leading to a misinterpretation of its present state (e.g., mistaking a revoked status for an unrevoked status). As stated in Section 2.2 StatusList2021Credential, bitstrings are encoded such that the first (zeroth) index refers to the left-most bit of the bitstring array. The diagram below demonstrates the proper layout for an uncompressed bitstring.
For example, if a bitstring is 131,072 bits in size (16KB), the first index will be 0, and the last index will be 131,071.
This section is non-normative.
There are a number of accessibility considerations implementers should be aware of when processing data described in this specification. As with any web standards or protocols implementation, ignoring accessibility issues makes this information unusable to a large subset of the population. It is important to follow accessibility guidelines and standards, such as [WCAG21], to ensure all people, regardless of ability, can make use of this data. This is especially important when establishing systems utilizing cryptography, which have historically created problems for assistive technologies.
This section details the general accessibility considerations to take into account when utilizing this data model.
Write accessibility considerations.
This section is non-normative.
There are a number of internationalization considerations implementers should be aware of when publishing data described in this specification. As with any web standards or protocols implementation, ignoring internationalization makes it difficult for data to be produced and consumed across a disparate set of languages and societies, which would limit the applicability of the specification and significantly diminish its value as a standard.
This section outlines general internationalization considerations to take into account when utilizing this data model.
Write i18n considerations.
- [RFC1952]
- GZIP file format specification version 4.3. P. Deutsch. IETF. May 1996. Informational. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1952
- [RFC2119]
- Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. S. Bradner. IETF. March 1997. Best Current Practice. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119
- [RFC4648]
- The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings. S. Josefsson. IETF. October 2006. Proposed Standard. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648
- [RFC8174]
- Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words. B. Leiba. IETF. May 2017. Best Current Practice. URL: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174
- [VC-DATA-MODEL]
- Verifiable Credentials Data Model v1.1. Manu Sporny; Grant Noble; Dave Longley; Daniel Burnett; Brent Zundel; Kyle Den Hartog. W3C. 3 March 2022. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/
- [URL]
- URL Standard. Anne van Kesteren. WHATWG. Living Standard. URL: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/
- [WCAG21]
- Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1. Andrew Kirkpatrick; Joshue O'Connor; Alastair Campbell; Michael Cooper. W3C. 5 June 2018. W3C Recommendation. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21/
Referenced in:
Referenced in:
Referenced in:
Referenced in:
- § 1. Introduction (2) (3)
- § 1.1 Conceptual Framework (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
- § 1.2 Terminology (2) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
- § 2.1 StatusList2021Entry (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
- § 2.2 StatusList2021Credential (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
- § 3.1 Generate Algorithm (2)
- § 3.2 Validate Algorithm (2)
- § 4.2 Verifier Caching
Referenced in: