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Metrics SIG
Mission
Computer security incident response and incident management has moved towards more mature phases of development. Although there are still new teams forming, many existing teams are focusing on increasing their responsiveness and improving effectiveness.
Like other communities (such as business, finance and government) that look for quantitative and qualitative methods for benchmarking operations and measuring success, there is an emerging need for similar mechanisms in the incident management community.
The scope of this Metrics SIG will be to bring together interested members of the FIRST community to discuss and identify approaches for internally evaluating CSIRT and incident management practices within an organization. The Metrics SIG will work to bring ongoing efforts in developing CSIRT evaluation mechanisms along with defining and measuring CSIRT effectiveness to the attention of the FIRST community, and enabling those that are undertaking the development efforts to receive input from the FIRST community of experts. This will include identifying ongoing efforts and hosting conversations between the developing organization and FIRST Metrics SIG, and coordinating feedback to the developers from the FIRST community. These engagements will include scheduled events and exchanges, or informal email exchanges. There are areas that are beyond the scope of the SIG, namely:
- The Metrics SIG is not an accrediting or certifying body
- The Metrics SIG will not evaluate other CSIRTs
One ultimate goal of this work is to identify, or where feasible develop, products that any organization with a CSIRT or incident management capability can use to evaluate and assess their capability. This can include not only benchmarking instruments but also sets of criteria for benchmarking particular CSIRT or incident management functions, services, impact or competencies. Statistical methods for analyzing the metrics and identifying trends whether within an organization or across a subset of the community will also be investigated. This may also include exploring the area of taxonomies and ontologies as a way of defining services and measures in a consistent manner across the CSIRT community. Finally methods for training and educating CSIRT members and stakeholders in how to apply or implement such measures will also be within the purview of the Metrics SIG.
Chairs
- Logan Wilkins, Cisco Systems
- Robin Ruefle, CERT/CC
- Initiatives
- Special Interest Groups (SIGs)
- SIGs Framework
- Academic Security SIG
- AI Security SIG
- Automation SIG
- Cybersecurity Communications SIG
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS-SIG)
- CSIRT Framework Development SIG
- Cyber Insurance SIG
- Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG
- Curriculum
- Introduction
- Introduction to CTI as a General topic
- Methods and Methodology
- Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR)
- Source Evaluation and Information Reliability
- Machine and Human Analysis Techniques (and Intelligence Cycle)
- Threat Modelling
- Training
- Standards
- Glossary
- Communicating Uncertainties in CTI Reporting
- Webinars and Online Training
- Building a CTI program and team
- Curriculum
- Detection Engineering & Threat Hunting SIG
- Digital Safety SIG
- DNS Abuse SIG
- Stakeholder Advice
- Detection
- Cache Poisoning
- Creation of Malicious Subdomains Under Dynamic DNS Providers
- DGA Domains
- DNS As a Vector for DoS
- DNS Beacons - C2 Communication
- DNS Rebinding
- DNS Server Compromise
- DNS Tunneling
- DoS Against the DNS
- Domain Name Compromise
- Dynamic DNS (as obfuscation technique)
- Fast Flux (as obfuscation technique)
- Infiltration and exfiltration via the DNS
- Lame Delegations
- Local Resolver Hijacking
- Malicious registration of (effective) second level domains
- On-path DNS Attack
- Stub Resolver Hijacking
- Detection
- Code of Conduct & Other Policies
- Examples of DNS Abuse
- Stakeholder Advice
- Ethics SIG
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)
- FIRST Multi-Stakeholder Ransomware SIG
- Human Factors in Security SIG
- Industrial Control Systems SIG (ICS-SIG)
- Information Exchange Policy SIG (IEP-SIG)
- Information Sharing SIG
- Law Enforcement SIG
- Malware Analysis SIG
- Metrics SIG
- NETSEC SIG
- Public Policy SIG
- PSIRT SIG
- Red Team SIG
- Security Lounge SIG
- Security Operations Center SIG
- Threat Intel Coalition SIG
- Traffic Light Protocol (TLP-SIG)
- Transportation and Mobility SIG
- Vulnerability Coordination
- Vulnerability Reporting and Data eXchange SIG (VRDX-SIG)
- Women of FIRST
- CCB Initiatives
- FIRST CORE
- Internet Governance
- IR Database
- Fellowship Program
- Mentorship Program
- IR Hall of Fame
- Victim Notification
- Volunteers at FIRST
- Previous Activities
- Special Interest Groups (SIGs)
Expected/Targeted members
- FIRST members who are seeking approaches for benchmarking and/or improving their CSIRT processes and metrics to provide effective incident management quantification.
- FIRST members who are interested and willing to help refine, align, and test metrics, as well as to suggest additional improvements for standardizing CSIRT practices within the community.
- Any CSIRT seeking to improve its incident management capabilities.
- Other external parties who might provide subject matter expertise in the area of metrics and standards or those who are interesting in building metrics tools and evaluation mechanisms.
- Other SIGs as appropriate.
Downloads
- Security Incident Timing Metrics - v1.0
SITM Version 1.0 Release (PDF)