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Remove paths from CSP? from Mike West on 2014-02-12 (public-webappsec@w3.org from February 2014)
Remove paths from CSP?
- From: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 09:28:10 +0100
- To: "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Cc: Odin Hørthe Omdal <odinho@opera.com>, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>, Dan Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>, Brad Hill <bhill@paypal-inc.com>, Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@google.com>, Garrett Robinson <grobinson@mozilla.com>
- Message-ID: <CAKXHy=fOWvN0RpvZfBcFVXt+kvex3wOx6iXfA5PdmD7S5Z6pLA@mail.gmail.com>
CSP 1.1 allows authors to add path information to source expressions. It's implemented in both Firefox and Chrome. Generally, it seems like a reasonable thing to want to limit script to 'mycdn.com/js', as it limits exposure. I argued for this feature back in 2012, and implemented it in Chrome. I think I was wrong to do so. Exposing path information makes it fairly easy to leak data cross-origin. I noted this in May last year[1], but [2] and [3] shows that it's far more practical than I thought at the time. Are paths valuable enough to live with this leakage vector? I don't think they are. I'd suggest dropping paths from 1.1 now, before LC, and removing them from both Chrome and Firefox's implementation. We might be able to keep paths for some directives ('form-action' for instance, which might mitigate some of the concerns in Michal's Postcards), but I'm not sure that complexity is worthwhile. CCing some folks from previous discussions. WDYT? [1]: https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2013May/0022.html [2]: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=313737 [3]: https://homakov.blogspot.de/2014/01/using-content-security-policy-for-evil.html -- Mike West <mkwst@google.com> Google+: https://mkw.st/+, Twitter: @mikewest, Cell: +49 162 10 255 91 Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891 Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg Geschäftsführer: Graham Law, Christine Elizabeth Flores (Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.)
Received on Wednesday, 12 February 2014 08:29:02 UTC