Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

Introduction

When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, there was much optimism, about future "openness" in Ethiopian politics. Indeed, Michael Woldemariam claimed that Ethiopia had a "chance not only to reinvent itself but also to bring a wave of reform and perhaps even democratization to the wider region."¹ Upon entering office, Abiy introduced several new reforms, such as the legalization of previously outlawed dissident groups, the promises of open and competitive multiparty elections, and the normalization of relations with neighboring Eritrea.

However, despite the optimism about the country's future in 2018, the changes adopted by Abiy's regime have also unleashed ethnic and political tensions as a wave of violence engulfed the country. Some, such as scholar Simon Marks, argue that the "unbanning of Ethiopian opposition and rebel groups has stoked political fragmentation and long-suppressed rivalries among ethnic communities, leading regional groups to intensify calls for greater independence."² Indeed, reforms may have unleashed the underlying centrifugal pressures in the country that could lead to dissolution. As many point out, this dynamic is reminiscent of the unraveling of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.³

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing Abiy is the armed defiance of central government rule by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF, which had been formerly the governing core of the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), had refused to participate in Abiy's restructuring of the EPRDF into a new unitary party (the Prosperity Party) in 2019. In the new configuration, the EPRDF would be transformed from a confederation of allied parties into a unitary organization with regional branches. The TPLF leadership, under Debretsion Gebremichael, accused Abiy of trying to undo ethnic federalism, a bedrock principle of the regime since 1994. Tensions grew further between the Tigrayan government and Abiy, particularly over the latter's decision to postpone the Fall 2020 general election due to the COVID-19 pandemic.⁴ The TPLF then declared the Abiy government illegitimate and held regional elections in September 2020 with federal authorities, in turn, declaring [End Page 12] the regional election illegal. The confrontation became violent on November 4, 2020, when the TPLF militia attacked the Northern Command Headquarters of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). The war escalated and federal forces and their Eritrean allies captured the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle on November 28, and Prime Minister Abiy declared the operation completed.⁵

However, the TPLF, launched a counteroffensive in 2021, retook Mekelle, and drove federal forces out of Tigray and allied with another ethnic armed group, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), which had splintered from the Oromo Liberation Front when the latter had entered a ceasefire with the Ethiopian government in 2018.⁶ The federal government declared a unilateral humanitarian ceasefire in February 2022. Fighting resumed in August 2022 and continued until November 2022, when a ceasefire brokered by the African Union (AU) took effect. However, since November, there has been little progress toward a comprehensive settlement that would include revising the status of the regions relative to the central government.

In this essay, I argue that the current conflict in Ethiopia describe above is the result of adopting an ethnic federal system in the 1990s, the effects of which threaten to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa region.

Background

Ethiopia's population is extremely diverse, with more than eighty different ethnic groups within the country. However, the four largest groups—the Oromo, Amhara, Somali, and Tigray—make up the bulk of the population. The largest group, the Oromo, comprise approximately 34.49 percent of the population; the Amhara, 26.89 percent; the Somali and the Tigray comprise about six percent of the population, respectively.⁷ Historically, the Amhara have been the politically and economically dominant group in the country, although, after 1991, the Tigray (who, like the Amhara, speak a Semitic language, although from the impoverished northern region) became the politically dominant group after the victory of the Tigray People's Liberation Front over the Marxist-Leninist Derg government. The Oromo (who speak a Cushitic language that is very different from the Semitic Amharic, Somali, and Tigragna languages) have historically been the subordinate group in Ethiopian economics and politics. The Somali have also been less politically relevant, although there has been longstanding conflict in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, with a simmering Somali insurgency in that region since the 1970s.⁸

It is important to recognize that ethnic politics has long been at the heart of Ethiopian political development. Indeed, Ethiopia's modern history has long been characterized by the "ethnic chauvinism" of the dominant Amhara ethnic group.⁹ During both the imperial period (1855-1974) and under the rule of the Marxist-Leninist Derg regime (1974-1991), ethnicity in Ethiopia was politicized. In the former, the regime sought to repress ethnically based sentiments and impose a sense of belonging and allegiance to the multiethnic nation.¹⁰ This ideology was attractive to many Amhara, who embraced the idea that Amhara's cultural identity would remain at the core of this ideology. The imperial system was overthrown in 1974 and replaced by a new Marxist-Leninist regime that sought to make ethnic identities irrelevant via "scientific socialism."¹¹ However, this approach also proved ineffective, and ethnic conflicts eventually led to the demise of the Derg regime in 1991.

The Tigryan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), led by a group of Tigrayan intellectuals, including founder Meles Zenawi, who had been fighting for independence since 1975, played a major role in overthrowing the Derg regime. Starting in the 1980s, the TPLF allied themselves with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, which also sought the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia. In 1989, the TPLF formed a coalition organization with other groups opposed to the Derg rule, EPRDF. At this point, the TPLF controlled most of the important political and military posts in the EPRDF. [End Page 13]

The Effects of Ethnic Federalism on the Ethnification of Ethiopian Politics

In 1991, following the collapse of Derg rule, Ethiopia established a federal system creating largely ethnic-based territorial units. The development of ethnic-based federalism was consistent with the traditional program of the TPLF, which favored the self-determination of ethnic groups during the war against the Derg. Its leaders claimed that only through ethnic and regional autonomy would it be possible to maintain the unity of Ethiopia.¹²

The process of federalization lasted four years and concluded with the adoption of a new constitution in 1995.¹³ The traditional Ethiopian provinces were recombined into nine ethnic-based regional states and two federally administered city-states. The regional states that formed the federation in 1991 were: (1) Tigray; (2) Afar; (3) Amhara; (4) Oromiya; (5) Somali; (6) Benishangul-Gumuz; (7) Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (a merger of five regions); (8) Gambella; and (9) Harari. Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa were made federal cities with special status. Although the constitution vests all powers not attributed to the federal government to the regional governments, under the one-party rule of the EPRDF, the regional states were subordinate to the central one.¹⁴

Several scholars have suggested that ethnic federalism is a key factor in explaining the current "unraveling" of the country.¹⁵ Many have pointed out that previous experiments with ethnic federalism have resulted in national dissolution, sometimes with violent consequences.¹⁶ Critics of ethnic federalism point to the breakup of the Yugoslav and Soviet federations as examples of such centrifugal processes.¹⁷

For Phillip Roeder, the "imprudence" of ethno-federal arrangements is beyond dispute.¹⁸ He argues that ethno-federalism is flawed because it leads to the development of ethnic rather than national identities and thus "increases the likelihood of escalation of conflict into acute nation-state crises."¹⁹ As Jon Abbink noted a decade ago, "ethnic federalism as an institutional set-up privileges ethnicity as one marker of identity over many others (economic, citizenship, occupation, religion, class, or gender) and, in a sense, freezes this one marker of identity, or rather encourages people to identify in ethnic terms."²⁰ For Abbink and others, this ethnification of identity is also accompanied by increased authoritarianism, which fosters ethnic tensions.

There are two reasons why ethnic federalism would lead to the ethnification of identity. The first is that ethno-federal arrangements (even in authoritarian regimes) provide incentives for political entrepreneurs to mobilize ethnic identity.²¹ For instance, in the case of the Soviet Union, Roeder argues that organizing regional governments on ethnic lines and indigenizing party cadres was a kind of "affirmative action," which

Permitted these cadres to build more secure political bases within their ethnic communities, for these policies created a loyal clientele. The creation of this clientele was also fostered by post-Stalinist decentralization. As many administrative tasks were transferred from all-union to union-republic or republican ministries, and as the cadres' discretion in personnel matters was expanded, the cadres' control of patronage opportunities was enlarged.²²

Thus, the institutional framework of ethnic federalism promoted a greater sense of ethnic identity than a national all-Soviet identity, which contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A second reason is that ethno-federalism promotes the socialization of a population with the transmission of values of ethnic particularism among individuals across generations. The educational system is particularly important in creating the conditions of ethnic intolerance.²³ For instance, Mohammed Girma argues that the Ethiopian educational system, as it was established after 1994, was designed to reorient students to their "respective ethnic pasts."²⁴

Thus, ethnic federalism helps create the conditions for ethnic conflict at both the level of the political elite and the level of individual citizens. At the elite level, the debate between ethnic and national identity politics has dominated the political discourse in Ethiopia since [End Page 14] Abiy's ascendance in 2018. In part, to counter the ethnification of politics, Abiy argued in 2019 for the adoption of state ideology based on "Ethiopianess" or Ethiopiawinet, which is at the core of his Medemer (Synergy) political philosophy.²⁵ This approach refers to the cultivation of a sense of transcendent Ethiopian identity that subsumes ethnic identities.

However, for many other ethnic groups such as the Oromo and Tigrayans, Ethiopiwinet is equivalent to the Amhara political dominance of the state and the subjugation of other groups.²⁶ Indeed, Abiy's embrace of "Ethiopianess" has put him at odds with the historical emphasis of the EPRDF regime on ethnic federalism and ethnic group rights.²⁷

There appears to be little support for Ethiopiawinet among the regional political elites. In reaction to Abiy's efforts, some Oromo leaders have called for greater devolution and the deepening of ethnic federalism.²⁸ Others have been more direct in their resistance. In July 2018, the TPLF chairman and then-Tigray regional state president, Debretsion Gebremichael, argued at a rally that Tigrayan secession was a possibility in the future if the current trends continued.²⁹ In other regions, too, ethnic nationalism increased prior to the outbreak of the war at the end of 2020, at least among the political elites.³⁰

At the individual level, there is growing evidence that ethnic identities have become more salient over time. Using data from the recent release of the eighth wave of Afrobarometer data on Ethiopia in March 2021 (which involved data collection from 2018-20),³¹ I have found that individuals who had been politically socialized before 1994 (i.e., fifteen years or older) were about thirty-four percent less likely to identify with their ethnic groups than their national identity, even when controlling for other important variables affecting the choice between ethnic and national identity. This finding supports

the argument that ethnic federalism leads to the greater ethnification of identities among younger cohorts. Although this does not mean that ethnic federalism necessarily led to the current conflict, it does support the argument made by many critics of ethno-federalism that this system is associated with the greater ethnification of identity, a precursor to interethnic conflict.

However, ethno-federalism was not the only culprit for tensions as there also existed general differences between the major ethnic groups in terms of ethnification of identity. Oromos were 3.5 times more likely to prefer their ethnic identity over a national identity when compared to other groups, and Tigrayans were almost seven times more likely than members of other groups to prefer an ethnic identity over an Ethiopian one in the period prior to the outbreak of hostilities at the end of 2020.³² On the other hand, Amhara respondents were less likely to identify with their ethnic identity and preferred their Ethiopian identity more so than other groups. The Amhara appears to be the one group that retains some support for Ethiopianess, whereas other groups expressed greater ethnonational identity prior to the outbreak of the war.³³ However, as Shiferaw and Ishiyama point out, there is also a growing sense of an Amhara political identity, particularly among younger males, largely in reaction to the increasing political demands and demonization of the Amhara by other groups.³⁴

Differences in ethnic identities also translate into different preferences for the organization of the state.³⁵ When asked what type of federal arrangement they would support (a federal system based on ethnicity or a non-ethnic regionally based federalism), Oromo and Tigrayans strongly supported ethnic federalism, and Amhara generally supported regional federalism.³⁶ This is a rather troubling finding, given that there appears to be little agreement [End Page 15] among the major ethnic groups on the political system's form. These differing preferences make the current conflict, which is really based on a dispute over the extent to which the central state controls the ethnic regions, very difficult, if not unresolvable. Given these differences, the conflict will likely grow more intense in the wake of the current civil war in Ethiopia.

Whither Ethiopia?

Although there is ample reason for pessimism regarding Ethiopia's future in the wake of the latest ethnic conflict, this does not mean that the Soviet analogy is inevitable for the country. Future developments in two key areas will be critical in affecting whether the dissolution process is repeated in Ethiopia.

First, a key factor, that led to the demise of the Soviet Union was the fragmentation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the emergence of a regionally based political rival who challenged Gorbachev and the center's right to rule the largest ethnic republic in the federation—Russia.³⁷ Since 2019 in Ethiopia, the EPRDF has been replaced with the "Prosperity Party," and ethnically-based regional organizations have been reduced from technically equal partners in a party "federation" to regional branches of a unitary party. However, the TPLF has refused to join the Prosperity Party and is unlikely to do so after the war concludes.

In addition, there has been growing opposition to Abiy emanating from within the political leadership of the most populous region in the country, Oromiya. Former defense minister Lemma Megersa, who has long been seen as Abiy's mentor, has openly criticized Abiy's "synergy" policies and the plans to reduce the autonomy of the constituent parties of the EPRDF.³⁸ As a result, Lemma was expelled from the Prosperity Party and subsequently placed under house arrest after the start of the war in December 2020.³⁹ However, as Meseret notes, Lemma remains "one of the most formidable voices in Oromiya" and could represent a Yeltsin-like figure to challenge Abiy.⁴⁰ Despite opposition, Abiy's crackdown on potential dissident threats like Oromo nationalist Jawar Mohammed, has, for the moment, contained the emergence of additional fissures within the Prosperity Party. As a result, at least for now, the governing party remains unified behind Abiy.

A second critical factor is the influence of Ethiopia's superpower benefactors, the United States and China. Ethiopia has been a key strategic partner of the United States in the "War on Terror," and the country is seen as critical for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa region.⁴¹ Meanwhile, China, Ethiopia's most prominent financial backer in recent years, has invested significant funds. Beijing will likely be very concerned with protecting those investments and promoting stability in the country. Thus, there will be considerable international pressure to keep the current conflict from escalating to an existential threat to the unity of Ethiopia.⁴²

In sum, although ethnic federalism created the conditions for the emergence of extreme ethnic politics in Ethiopia, and the reforms introduced by Abiy Ahmed in 2018 may have unleashed these forces, whether Ethiopia follows the path of dissolution will depend on the future unity of the Prosperity Party as well as continued support for the Abiy government from its external powers. A settlement that accommodates competing ethnopolitical demands while maintaining the country's unity will thus remain a significant challenge.

For the country to stay together, the "reform" effort must continue in the direction of democracy, at least in the short run. If a settlement is possible, it will likely be a de-facto confederal arrangement where the Tigray region becomes autonomous (perhaps similar to the situation with the Kurds in Iraq). For the rest of the country, restoring a dominant one-party state will be important to stave off further disintegration, albeit with some liberal reforms and rule by law (much like in China). Despite these tentative reforms, it is clear that, for now, full democracy in Ethiopia is likely not in the cards. [End Page 16]