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Cuba/España: El dilema autonomista, 1878-1898

Marta Bizcarrondo and Antonio Elorza. Cuba/España: El dilema autonomista, 1878–1898. Madrid: Editorial Colibrí, 2001. 452 pp.

With the exception of the subject of the Cuban Revolution, no other topic has received better scholarly attention and popular reception than the relationship between Spain and Cuba, before and after independence. Considered an intimate family affair, much deeper in emotions than the relationship with the United States, the link between Spain and Cuba still leaves many stones unturned.

Part of the excellent series published by Colibrí, this is an impeccable volume jointly authored by Marta Bizcarrondo, a history professor at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, and Antonio Elorza, professor of political science at the Universidad Complutense, who, along with Elena Hernández Sandoica, recently produced a milestone work, La Guerra de Cuba (1895–1898) (Madrid: Alianza, 1998). This new work masterfully traces the evolution and death of the experiment of the Partido Autonomista Liberal and peripheral interests that attempted to maintain the linkage with Spain and develop a home rule in which native personalities governed and managed local institutions, subject to many limitations.

The book is aptly titled "the dilemma," because it describes the anguishing choice between the apparently unstoppable road to independence and the [End Page 222] maintenance of strict colonial ties with Spain. From a Cuban point of view, the historical relationship between the two nations is mostly treated in heroic terms that stress the long struggle toward independence. From a Spanish angle, the impact of el desastre has dominated traditional and recent scholarship, exemplified by the selective, impressive production of books issued during the centennial commemoration of the defeat of 1898.

What is unusual about this book is that it deals with a special dimension of a unique desastre. Ironically, it was not a Spanish failure, but a genuine, native Cuban loss. It has been buried and disdained by both scholarly and ideological extremists. The war of 1898 (Spaniards and Cubans alike refuse to call it the "Spanish-American" War) was not only lost by Spain's colonial authorities, backed by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo's suicidal policy of "hasta el último hombre y la última peseta," it was also resoundingly lost by the Cuban autonomistas.

Spanish conservatives and patriotic commentators have considered the autonomista experiment as the beginning of the loss of Cuba. This responds to an overall perception of Spain as a centralized state, of which Cuba was an intrinsic part since the loss of the continental colonies in the Americas. In essence, "autonomy" has been a bad policy, whether applied to Catalonia, the Basque Country, or Cuba. In Cuba, it was one more example of a "tarde y mal" decolonization process that has been the mark of Spanish colonial administration for centuries.

For Cuban nationalists, autonomistas were basically españolistas, who lost the struggle to keep Cuba under the Spanish yoke. From a U.S. perception, there was not much difference between the thesis espoused by the autonomous experiment and the rule of the Captain General. After independence, the economic and social interests once defended by autonomistas were subsumed under the overall context of the conservative movements. Thus, the bad press they received during the Republic era gained new strength (or silence) with the Revolution.

Part of the explanation for the historical disdain for autonomismo expressed from different quarters is the fact that autonomistas tried to combine several irreconcilable forces. On the one hand, they pretended to solidly maintain the link with Spain. On the other, their economic and social origins and interests dictated that they seek a link with the United States. At the same time, they adamantly expressed their will to maintain a personalidad cubana. This strategy was too ambitious and collapsed in 1898. The book convincingly manages to portray and to explain the simultaneous struggle of convincing Madrid of the goodness of the project while neutralizing the effects of the desertions toward the growing ranks of independentismo. [End Page 223]

Joaquín Roy
University of Miami

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