HTTP/2 200 date: Tue, 07 Oct 2025 18:00:24 GMT content-type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 content-encoding: gzip content-security-policy: default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' data: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ https://www.ietf.org/ https://ietf.org/ https://analytics.ietf.org https://static.ietf.org; frame-ancestors 'self' ietf.org *.ietf.org meetecho.com *.meetecho.com cross-origin-opener-policy: unsafe-none etag: W/"7fd64fbd4a7ef78800c932119e615a99" referrer-policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin strict-transport-security: max-age=3600; includeSubDomains vary: Cookie, Accept-Encoding x-content-type-options: nosniff x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN cf-cache-status: MISS expires: Tue, 07 Oct 2025 22:00:24 GMT cache-control: public, max-age=14400 set-cookie: __cf_bm=19qmx7BJ7Tsd12gBtejvu8OMdALO52mUrg8ZVCqHqSE-1759860024-1.0.1.1-wbK6jFTqCS3vXrfL_DODLXnyfQR0oFXRdz3DIvuFsaOx_lGKWmXOYFJvZPPvu7kyRjVPI1oOp3cqBDVLDnk4Lfy.m83cIsXtQn683xcmnhs; path=/; expires=Tue, 07-Oct-25 18:30:24 GMT; domain=.ietf.org; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=None server: cloudflare cf-ray: 98af4c3e08ef165e-BLR alt-svc: h3=":443"; ma=86400 @misc{rfc8391, series = {Request for Comments}, number = 8391, howpublished = {RFC 8391}, publisher = {RFC Editor}, doi = {10.17487/RFC8391}, url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8391}, author = {Andreas Huelsing and Denis Butin and Stefan-Lukas Gazdag and Joost Rijneveld and Aziz Mohaisen}, title = {{XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme}}, pagetotal = 74, year = 2018, month = may, abstract = {This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a hash-based digital signature system that is based on existing descriptions in scientific literature. This note specifies Winternitz One-Time Signature Plus (WOTS+), a one-time signature scheme; XMSS, a single-tree scheme; and XMSS\textasciicircum{}MT, a multi-tree variant of XMSS. Both XMSS and XMSS\textasciicircum{}MT use WOTS+ as a main building block. XMSS provides cryptographic digital signatures without relying on the conjectured hardness of mathematical problems. Instead, it is proven that it only relies on the properties of cryptographic hash functions. XMSS provides strong security guarantees and is even secure when the collision resistance of the underlying hash function is broken. It is suitable for compact implementations, is relatively simple to implement, and naturally resists side-channel attacks. Unlike most other signature systems, hash-based signatures can so far withstand known attacks using quantum computers.}, }