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CWE Glossary Definition
CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
Weakness ID: 312Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.View customized information:For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.×
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Description
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere. 
Common Consequences
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
Impact Details Read Application Data
Scope: Confidentiality An attacker with access to the system could read sensitive information stored in cleartext (i.e., unencrypted). Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.
Potential MitigationsPhase(s) Mitigation Implementation; System Configuration; Operation
Implementation; System Configuration; Operation
In some systems/environments such as cloud, the use of "double encryption" (at both the software and hardware layer) might be required, and the developer might be solely responsible for both layers, instead of shared responsibility with the administrator of the broader system/environment.
Relationships
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name ChildOf 
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data ChildOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
922 Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information ParentOf 
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
313 Cleartext Storage in a File or on Disk ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
314 Cleartext Storage in the Registry ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
315 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in a Cookie ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
316 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Memory ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
317 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in GUI ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
318 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Executable ParentOf
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
526 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in an Environment Variable
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf 
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
199 Information Management Errors
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
Nature Type ID Name ChildOf
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
1013 Encrypt Data
Modes
Of IntroductionThe different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
Phase Note Architecture and Design OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Applicable PlatformsThis listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Languages Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Technologies Class: Cloud Computing (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: ICS/OT (Undetermined Prevalence)
Class: Mobile (Undetermined Prevalence)
Demonstrative ExamplesExample 1
The following code excerpt stores a plaintext user account ID in a browser cookie.
(bad code)Example Language: Javaresponse.addCookie( new Cookie("userAccountID", acctID);Because the account ID is in plaintext, the user's account information is exposed if their computer is compromised by an attacker.
Example 2
This code writes a user's login information to a cookie so the user does not have to login again later.
(bad code)Example Language: PHPfunction persistLogin($username, $password){$data = array("username" => $username, "password"=> $password);}
setcookie ("userdata", $data);The code stores the user's username and password in plaintext in a cookie on the user's machine. This exposes the user's login information if their computer is compromised by an attacker. Even if the user's machine is not compromised, this weakness combined with cross-site scripting (CWE-79) could allow an attacker to remotely copy the cookie.
Also note this example code also exhibits Plaintext Storage in a Cookie (CWE-315).
Example 3
The following code attempts to establish a connection, read in a password, then store it to a buffer.
(bad code)Example Language: Cserver.sin_family = AF_INET; hp = gethostbyname(argv[1]);
if (hp==NULL) error("Unknown host");
memcpy( (char *)&server.sin_addr,(char *)hp->h_addr,hp->h_length);
if (argc < 3) port = 80;
else port = (unsigned short)atoi(argv[3]);
server.sin_port = htons(port);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&server, sizeof server) < 0) error("Connecting");
...
while ((n=read(sock,buffer,BUFSIZE-1))!=-1) {
write(dfd,password_buffer,n);
...
While successful, the program does not encrypt the data before writing it to a buffer, possibly exposing it to unauthorized actors.
Example 4
The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext.
This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair.
(bad code)Example Language: Java
# Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file
...
webapp.ldap.username=secretUsername
webapp.ldap.password=secretPassword
...The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext.
(bad code)Example Language: ASP.NET...
<connectionStrings><add name="ud_DEV" connectionString="connectDB=uDB; uid=db2admin; pwd=password; dbalias=uDB;" providerName="System.Data.Odbc" /></connectionStrings>
...Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information.
Example 5
In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.
At least one OT product stored a password in plaintext.
Example 6
In 2021, a web site operated by PeopleGIS stored data of US municipalities in Amazon Web Service (AWS) Simple Storage Service (S3) buckets.
(bad code)Example Language: OtherA security researcher found 86 S3 buckets that could be accessed without authentication (CWE-306) and stored data unencrypted (CWE-312). These buckets exposed over 1000 GB of data and 1.6 million files including physical addresses, phone numbers, tax documents, pictures of driver's license IDs, etc. [REF-1296] [REF-1295]While it was not publicly disclosed how the data was protected after discovery, multiple options could have been considered.
(good code)Example Language: OtherThe sensitive information could have been protected by ensuring that the buckets did not have public read access, e.g., by enabling the s3-account-level-public-access-blocks-periodic rule to Block Public Access. In addition, the data could have been encrypted at rest using the appropriate S3 settings, e.g., by enabling server-side encryption using the s3-bucket-server-side-encryption-enabled setting. Other settings are available to further prevent bucket data from being leaked. [REF-1297]
Example 7
Consider the following PowerShell command examples for encryption scopes of Azure storage objects. In the first example, an encryption scope is set for the storage account.
(bad code)Example Language: ShellNew-AzStorageEncryptionScope -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -AccountName "MyStorageAccount" -EncryptionScopeName testscope -StorageEncryptionThe result (edited and formatted for readability) might be:
(bad code)Example Language: OtherResourceGroupName: MyResourceGroup, StorageAccountName: MyStorageAccountName State Source RequireInfrastructureEncryption testscope Enabled Microsoft.Storage However, the empty string under RequireInfrastructureEncryption indicates this service was not enabled at the time of creation, because the -RequireInfrastructureEncryption argument was not specified in the command.
Including the -RequireInfrastructureEncryption argument addresses the issue:
(good code)Example Language: ShellNew-AzStorageEncryptionScope -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -AccountName "MyStorageAccount" -EncryptionScopeName testscope -StorageEncryption -RequireInfrastructureEncryptionThis produces the report:
(result)Example Language: OtherResourceGroupName: MyResourceGroup, StorageAccountName: MyStorageAccountName State Source RequireInfrastructureEncryption testscope Enabled Microsoft.Keyvault True In a scenario where both software and hardware layer encryption is required ("double encryption"), Azure's infrastructure encryption setting can be enabled via the CLI or Portal. An important note is that infrastructure hardware encryption cannot be enabled or disabled after a blob is created. Furthermore, the default value for infrastructure encryption is disabled in blob creations.
Selected Observed
ExamplesNote: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
Reference Description Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses a driver that relies on a password stored in plaintext.password and username stored in cleartext in a cookiepassword stored in cleartext in a file with insecure permissionschat program disables SSL in some circumstances even when the user says to use SSL.Chain: product uses an incorrect public exponent when generating an RSA key, which effectively disables the encryptionstorage of unencrypted passwords in a databasestorage of unencrypted passwords in a databaseproduct stores a password in cleartext in memorystorage of a secret key in cleartext in a temporary fileSCADA product uses HTTP Basic Authentication, which is not encryptedlogin credentials stored unencrypted in a registry keyPlaintext credentials in world-readable file.Password in cleartext in config file.Password in cleartext in config file.Decrypted copy of a message written to disk given a combination of options and when user replies to an encrypted message.Plaintext storage of private key and passphrase in log file when user imports the key.Admin password in plaintext in a cookie.Default configuration has cleartext usernames/passwords in cookie.Usernames/passwords in cleartext in cookies.Authentication information stored in cleartext in a cookie. Detection
MethodsMethod Details Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)Effectiveness: High
Memberships
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.816 OWASP Top Ten 2010 Category A7 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage MemberOf 
View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries).884 CWE Cross-section MemberOf Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.934 OWASP Top Ten 2013 Category A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure MemberOf Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.963 SFP Secondary Cluster: Exposed Data MemberOf Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1029 OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure MemberOf Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1348 OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A04:2021 - Insecure Design MemberOf Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1366 ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols MemberOf Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1368 ICS Dependencies (& Architecture): External Digital Systems MemberOf Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1402 Comprehensive Categorization: Encryption
Vulnerability Mapping NotesUsage ALLOWED (this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)Reason Acceptable-Use Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities. Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction. NotesTerminology
Different people use "cleartext" and "plaintext" to mean the same thing: the lack of encryption. However, within cryptography, these have more precise meanings. Plaintext is the information just before it is fed into a cryptographic algorithm, including already-encrypted text. Cleartext is any information that is unencrypted, although it might be in an encoded form that is not easily human-readable (such as base64 encoding).Other
When organizations adopt cloud services, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet. Taxonomy
MappingsMapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name PLOVER Plaintext Storage of Sensitive Information Software Fault Patterns SFP23 Exposed Data ISA/IEC 62443 Part 4-2 Req CR 4.1 a) ISA/IEC 62443 Part 3-3 Req SR 4.1
Related Attack PatternsCAPEC-ID Attack Pattern Name CAPEC-37 Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data References[REF-7] Michael Howard and David LeBlanc. "Writing Secure Code". Chapter 9, "Protecting Secret Data" Page 299. 2nd Edition. Microsoft Press. 2002-12-04.
<https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223>.[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 2, "Common Vulnerabilities of Encryption", Page 43. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006. [REF-172] Chris Wysopal. "Mobile App Top 10 List". 2010-12-13.
<https://www.veracode.com/blog/2010/12/mobile-app-top-10-list>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)[REF-1283] Forescout Vedere Labs. "OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management". 2022-06-20.
<https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/>.[REF-1295] WizCase. "Over 80 US Municipalities' Sensitive Information, Including Resident's Personal Data, Left Vulnerable in Massive Data Breach". 2021-07-20.
<https://www.wizcase.com/blog/us-municipality-breach-report/>.[REF-1296] Jonathan Greig. "1,000 GB of local government data exposed by Massachusetts software company". 2021-07-22.
<https://www.zdnet.com/article/1000-gb-of-local-government-data-exposed-by-massachusetts-software-company/>.[REF-1297] Amazon. "AWS Foundational Security Best Practices controls". 2022.
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/securityhub-controls-reference.html>. (URL validated: 2023-04-07)[REF-1299] Microsoft. "Azure encryption overview". 2022-08-18.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/encryption-overview>. (URL validated: 2022-10-11)[REF-1301] Google Cloud. "Default encryption at rest". 2022-10-11.
<https://cloud.google.com/docs/security/encryption/default-encryption>. (URL validated: 2022-10-11)[REF-1307] Center for Internet Security. "CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark version 1.5.0". Section 3.2. 2022-08-16.
<https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/azure>. (URL validated: 2023-01-19)[REF-1310] Microsoft. "Enable infrastructure encryption for double encryption of data". 2022-07-14.
<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/infrastructure-encryption-enable>. (URL validated: 2023-01-24) Content
History SubmissionsSubmission Date Submitter Organization 2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)PLOVER ContributionsContribution Date Contributor Organization 2023-04-25 "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443. 
ModificationsModification Date Modifier Organization 2025-04-03
(CWE 4.17, 2025-04-03)CWE Content Team MITRE updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations 2024-02-29
(CWE 4.14, 2024-02-29)CWE Content Team MITRE updated Taxonomy_Mappings 2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships 2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings 2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, References, Relationships 2022-10-13 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References 2021-10-28 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Relationships 2021-03-15 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Demonstrative_Examples 2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships 2019-06-20 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Relationships, Type 2018-03-27 CWE Content Team MITRE updated References, Relationships, Type 2018-01-23 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Abstraction, Relationships 2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships 2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Related_Attack_Patterns 2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings 2013-07-17 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Description, Relationships, Terminology_Notes 2013-02-21 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Applicable_Platforms, References 2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships 2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Common_Consequences 2010-06-21 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Relationships 2010-02-16 CWE Content Team MITRE updated References 2009-01-12 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Description, Name 2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings 2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital updated Time_of_Introduction Previous Entry NamesChange Date Previous Entry Name 2009-01-12 Plaintext Storage of Sensitive Information More information is available — Please edit the custom filter or select a different filter.Page Last Updated: September 09, 2025
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