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CWE Glossary Definition
CWE-141: Improper Neutralization of Parameter/Argument Delimiters
Weakness ID: 141Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities
Abstraction: Variant Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.View customized information:For users who are interested in more notional aspects of a weakness. Example: educators, technical writers, and project/program managers. For users who are concerned with the practical application and details about the nature of a weakness and how to prevent it from happening. Example: tool developers, security researchers, pen-testers, incident response analysts. For users who are mapping an issue to CWE/CAPEC IDs, i.e., finding the most appropriate CWE for a specific issue (e.g., a CVE record). Example: tool developers, security researchers. For users who wish to see all available information for the CWE/CAPEC entry. For users who want to customize what details are displayed.×
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Description
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could be interpreted as parameter or argument delimiters when they are sent to a downstream component.
Extended Description
As data is parsed, an injected/absent/malformed delimiter may cause the process to take unexpected actions.
Common Consequences
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
Impact Details Unexpected State
Scope: Integrity
Potential MitigationsPhase(s) Mitigation Developers should anticipate that parameter/argument delimiters will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Implementation
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Relationships
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
Nature Type ID Name ChildOf 
Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
140 Improper Neutralization of Delimiters
Modes
Of IntroductionThe different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
Phase Note Implementation
Applicable PlatformsThis listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
Languages Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence)
Selected Observed
ExamplesNote: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
Reference Description Attacker inserts field separator into input to specify admin privileges. Memberships
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
Nature Type ID Name MemberOf 
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.990 SFP Secondary Cluster: Tainted Input to Command MemberOf Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.1407 Comprehensive Categorization: Improper Neutralization
Vulnerability Mapping NotesUsage ALLOWED (this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities)Reason Acceptable-Use Rationale
This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities. Comments
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction. Taxonomy
MappingsMapped Taxonomy Name Node ID Fit Mapped Node Name PLOVER Parameter Delimiter Software Fault Patterns SFP24 Tainted input to command References[REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 8, "Embedded Delimiters", Page 408. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006. [REF-62] Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 10, "IFS", Page 604. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006. Content
History SubmissionsSubmission Date Submitter Organization 2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19)PLOVER 
ModificationsModification Date Modifier Organization 2023-06-29 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Mapping_Notes 2023-04-27 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Relationships 2023-01-31 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Description, Potential_Mitigations 2020-06-25 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Potential_Mitigations 2020-02-24 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships 2017-11-08 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Applicable_Platforms 2017-05-03 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Potential_Mitigations 2014-07-30 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings 2012-10-30 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Potential_Mitigations 2012-05-11 CWE Content Team MITRE updated References, Relationships 2011-06-27 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Common_Consequences 2011-06-01 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Common_Consequences 2011-03-29 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Potential_Mitigations 2010-04-05 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Description, Name 2009-07-27 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Potential_Mitigations 2008-09-08 CWE Content Team MITRE updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings 2008-07-01 Eric Dalci Cigital updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction Previous Entry NamesChange Date Previous Entry Name 2008-04-11 Parameter Delimiter 2010-04-05 Failure to Sanitize Parameter/Argument Delimiters More information is available — Please edit the custom filter or select a different filter.Page Last Updated: September 09, 2025
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